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One of the responsibilities of the US Navy is to support and enable amphibious landings 
for the US Marine Corps.  Prior to an amphibious landing, the path to the beach must be 
determined free of danger to the landing force.  Often in areas of conflict, the path to the beach 
will be mined to prevent unobstructed access by an opposing force.  If it is determined that sea 
mines may be in the Area of Operations (AO), mine countermeasure (MCM) operations are 
needed before the landing can take place.  Current Marine Corps doctrine requires minefield 
clearance to occur within a 48 to 72 hour period in order to prepare the landing zones for an 
Amphibious Task Force (ATF).  The US Navy‟s current MCM capability does not satisfy the 
Marine Corps amphibious doctrinal requirement.  The MCM Detect-to-Engage (DTE) sequence 
consisting of search, detection, classification, identification and neutralization functions for 
current systems can take up to several weeks to complete.  In order to ensure the safe approach 
and return of an ATF, there is a need to reduce the Detect-to-Engage mine clearance sequence in 
the 10-40ft depth range, while minimizing operational risk of mine clearance personnel to 
counter minefields.   
In this capstone report, a thorough exploration of the problem space is conducted, 
including an MCM threat analysis, current and future MCM capabilities, and stakeholder 
research and interaction.  Through research into current and future threat capabilities, it is 
realized that sea mines are becoming more challenging to search, detect, classify, identify, and 
neutralize.  Enemy tactics of mine employment and technology increase the complexity of the 
problem; with targets now being made of sonar absorbing material, or developed to encourage 
vegetation growth in order to impede visual detection.   
Investigation into current and future MCM systems capabilities indicate that systems 
must be able to conduct Port Defense, Sea Lane Protection and clearance in a non-permissive 
environment, to support MCM operations.  This wide range of tasking requires a system to be 
flexible, expeditious, and accurate in locating, classifying, and identifying a target.  Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) or Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are identified as 
current and future system solutions that provide an advantage to detect, classify, and identify the 
threat with powerful sensor suites in comparison to diver and Marine Mammal Systems (MMS).  
UUV systems have the ability to launch and perform MCM operations more covertly than diver 
and MMS systems, but require more time for data analysis, and their size requires launch from 
surface craft or helicopter platforms.  Although UUV technology is showing promise to solve the 
challenges for MCM operations, the impact this complex technology brings to the MCM 
community and the Navy needs to be evaluated on a continuing basis.    
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Current MCM-1 ships are being phased out and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) platforms 
are being built as replacements to support MCM missions.  However, MCM will not be the sole 
mission of LCS platforms, as the LCS class is being developed to support multiple mission 
criteria in order to meet the future needs of Navy.  This drives concerns for future MCM Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) and mission tasking due not only to the requirement to reduce the 
MCM footprint, but also to reduce manpower requirements.   
In order to address the capability gaps discovered, a set of solution neutral requirements 
were developed as part of the analysis of current capabilities and stakeholder needs.  System 
functions were then developed based on the requirements that were generated to further define 
the system.  Once the solution neutral system was defined, it was necessary to set system 
boundaries in order to scope the project‟s effort towards a manageable solution with respect to 
time and resource availability.  The system boundary was reduced to search, detect, classify, 
identify, engage and communications functions related to the MCM system, system operators, 
and host platform.  The full engage function was later determined to be too complex for our 
scope of research, and it is recommended to be covered by another research cohort.   
Investigation of potential solutions to fit the requirements lead to the elimination of 
airborne and surface based systems as they would not be able to covertly conduct operations.  
Based on research and MCM roadmap doctrine, current capability gaps were mapped to potential 
solutions for removing the man and mammal from the mine field, reducing post mission analysis, 
and establishment of real-time communications.  Three alternative architectures were developed 
to support reduction of the DTE sequence and to address the overarching capability gaps.  Within 
each architecture solution, system components were mapped to identified functions and 
requirements to ensure that the MCM system needs were met.  Each of the architectures was 
developed with a specific concept of operations that fully detailed the real-time communication 
network and system employment solution.  
Each of the three architecture solutions were compared using modeling and simulation 
software tools that represented each system in two separate minefield design reference missions.  
Performance of each alternative was analyzed and compared based on identified measures of 
effectiveness.   
 
The total cost of ownership for each of the architectures was developed using current 
baseline system costing information and government costing sites.  All three architectures were 
then evaluated in an analysis of alternatives that combined an evaluation of the cost estimates 
with previous system performance results to determine a system solution recommendation.   
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The problems and capability gaps defined in MCM operations are complex with many 
challenges that exist today and in the future.  As manning requirements are being reduced across 
the Navy, the need for future systems to remove human dependency will be increasing.  The final 
results of our analysis shows that a fully autonomous system can reduce human burden for target 
processing and remove both man and mammal from the minefield.  In order to support the 
employment of autonomous systems, it is necessary that real-time communication networks are 
established not only to support autonomous operations but also to reduce or eliminate post 
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One of the responsibilities of the US Navy is to support and enable amphibious landings 
for the US Marine Corps.  Prior to an amphibious landing, the path to the beach must be 
determined free of danger to the landing force.  Often in areas of conflict, the path to the beach 
will be mined to prevent unobstructed access by an opposing force.  If sea mines are determined 
to be in the path of the landing force, mine countermeasure (MCM) operations are needed before 
the landing can take place.  
Historically, the US Navy‟s mine countermeasures have been represented by a triad of 
systems consisting of dedicated surface platforms (e.g., Mine Countermeasures MCM-1 class 
ships), aviation platforms (e.g., MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter), and subsurface detachments 
with Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) divers and Marine Mammals Systems (MMS) that 
conduct mine hunting and mine sweeping missions (PEO LMW, 2009).  Current mine 
countermeasure ability to support amphibious landings is sufficient for deep water, however, a 
gap lies in clearing the VSW zone, where in contested water, all three elements of the traditional 
triad are challenged (NWP 3-15, 1996).   
The VSW zone, defined as depths between 10 to 40 feet of water, exhibits unique 
environmental characteristics to Underwater Mine Countermeasures (UMCM) that are not as 
easily overcome as in other operational depth areas.  Underwater visibility is very limited; murky 
sea floors contribute to turbid underwater environments with low light conditions at depth, 
making it difficult for divers to operate, even during daylight.  These environmental aspects are 
compounded by the confined nature of the VSW zone; consisting of inlets, berthing areas, dock 
and bridge pillars, and confined channels that only increase the DTE timeline by significantly 
limiting mobility (NWP 3-15, 1996).  Performing mine countermeasure activities in contested 
VSW zones to support pre-assault, advance force exploration, and reconnaissance amphibious 
landing missions, with brisk engagement requirements, presents restrictions in rapidly detecting 
and clearing mines without being detected by adversaries prior to amphibious force engagement.  
Mine detection in contested waters close to shore allows for easy detection of traditional surface 
(Surface Mine Counter Measures; SMCM) and aerial (Airborne Mine Counter Measures; 
AMCM) platforms by unfriendly radars and simple visual scans. 
While much of the United States‟ mine countermeasure missions are performed utilizing 
aerial and surface platforms, alternative methods are being utilized to address the 10-40 foot 
region requirements.  Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) with specialized sensors, 
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navigation, communications, propulsion, and power subsystems are being tested and fielded to 
conduct localization searches aimed at reducing the tactical timeline for search operations (PEO 
LMW, 2009).  Employment of UUVs is an attempt to limit or completely avoid exposure of 
divers to explosive hazards, and other hazards of the operational environment during the 
precursory step of detecting, localizing, and gaining access to threat objects.  
Man-portable class UUV systems have been employed by the Navy for the past several 
years (PEO LMW, 2009).  While small UUV systems are a relatively new concept for the Navy, 
they have been received with much enthusiasm as an initial step in getting the man out of the 
minefield.  Strides have been made in the development of these new concepts, but a great deal of 
work is still needed to fulfill the full set of requirements from the Fleet (PEO LMW, 2009). 
Although the man-portable UUVs in service today address many of the basic UMCM 
capability needs, they are not a panacea for addressing the full range of tasks in the diverse 
underwater environment.  UMCM systems degrade in performance capability in more complex 
seabed environments where burial, high clutter and irregular bottom types are at play (NWP 3-
15, 1996).  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Current naval mine search, detection, classification, and neutralization systems can take 
up to several weeks to complete mine clearance operations.  This current capability is not 
consistent with the Marine Corps amphibious doctrinal requirement of several days.  In order to 
ensure the safe approach and return of an Amphibious Landing Force, there is a need to reduce 
the DTE mine clearance sequence in the 10-40ft (VSW zone) depth range while minimizing 
operational risk of mine clearance personnel to counter minefields. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This Capstone Project is interested in researching and providing alternative and 
employable system solutions to reduce the DTE mine clearance sequence in the VSW zone 
through investigating the answers to the following research questions: 
1. Is it possible to completely remove the man/mammal from the minefield during UMCM 
operations?  
2. Is it possible to have a system or system of systems that can detect and clear a minefield 
path for amphibious landings within the required CONOPS time specifications?  
3. Will the MCM solutions present today or planned in the near future be able to handle 
current and future threats? 
4. What is the greatest obstacle in reducing the DTE sequence timing?  
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5. What alternatives exist to overcome obstacles to reducing the DTE sequence timing? 
6. For an implemented solution, what are the risks and benefits? 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
In the execution of this Capstone Research Project, assumptions were made to allow for 
detailed analysis of specific areas of the problem space taking into account the allotted project 
time and the individual knowledge, skills, and capabilities of team members.  Throughout the 
project, the following high level assumptions were made: 
 Current enemy tactics are still consistent with previous engagements from past battles or 
encounters. 
 Emerging mine technology is consistent with US or allied capabilities. 
 The VSW region will be typically a 500 yard by 500 yard region of the boat lane. 
 The enemy threat who has planted mines for an anti-landing defense will actively survey 
the mined area from a distance and will engage the MCM force upon detection with 
direct and indirect fire. 
 The design reference mission (DRM) will have both visual and electronic oversight to 
detect any MCM or opposing force movement. 
 System concept design solutions will only be developed for manpower and equipment 
within the project defined system boundary. 
 
In addition to the high level assumptions, more detailed assumptions were implemented 
in the individual analyses in this report and are detailed further in the specific report sections.  
Additionally, for the threat and current capabilities analyses, the data comparing the systems use 
estimated values from unclassified information and are in most cases approximations. 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Figure 1 presents the tailored Systems Engineering Process used through this Capstone 
Project.  The major phases of the Systems Engineering Process consisted of the Problem 
Exploration Phase, the System Definition Phase, and the Modeling of Alternative Architecture 
Phase.  Guided by the defined System Engineering Process, the capstone team members were 
able to successfully define and scope the Capstone Problem, conduct research into the problem 
area, develop functional requirements, and assess the implementation qualities of architectural 
solutions.  The following sections describe the individual parts of the Systems Engineering 




Figure 1. Capstone Project System Engineering Process 
The tailored System Engineering Process developed by the Advanced MCM System cohort team was used as 
guidance for executing the Capstone Project. 
1. Problem Statement/Customer Need 
The Systems Engineering Process started with the definition of a known capability gap 
related to one team member‟s command.  Once the capability gap was agreed to, the problem 
statement was scoped to a level of work deemed to be achievable in the given project timeframe.  
2. Problem Exploration Phase 
With the problem statement scoped, the problem exploration phase was entered.  This 
phase consisted of conducting research to further define the problem space.  The Problem 
Exploration Phase consisted of three activities:  stakeholder analysis, threat analysis, and current 
capabilities analysis.  A comparison of the three activities resulted in identifying capability gaps 
related to the defined problem space and was used as the entrance criteria for starting the system 
definition phase.  
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a. Stakeholder Analysis 
The stakeholder analysis began with the problem statement being leveraged to define a 
list of stakeholders and a summary relationship between MCM and amphibious landings.  
Research was then conducted using MCM documentation and doctrine to generate questions for 
stakeholders to gain more insight into the problem space.  Identified stakeholders were 
interviewed and asked to identify their interests, potential loss in the defined problem, or any 
significant requirements related to the problem statement.  This resulted in a list of stakeholders‟ 
needs that was fed into both the current capabilities analysis and the threat analysis for 
consideration.  The outputs of both the threat and capabilities analyses were fed back into the 
stakeholder analysis identifying new stakeholders and additional questions to pose to 
stakeholders.  The stakeholder analysis facilitated interaction between stakeholders in soliciting 
input guidance toward developing solution architectures. 
b. Current Capabilities Analysis 
The current capabilities analysis consisted of a thorough study of all existing technologies 
and systems currently fielded for MCM in the VSW zone.  The analysis looked at US Navy 
systems that were deployed or planned to be deployed in the near future, and included applicable 
allied MCM capabilities.  Through research of current doctrine, approved development 
programs, and stakeholder interviews, the current capability analysis identified how existing and 
planned platforms fulfill stakeholder needs.  However, the current capability analysis also 
identified capability gaps that cannot be met with existing or planned platforms using current 
policy, procedures, and tactics.  The findings of the current capabilities analysis fed back into the 
stakeholder analysis for further interaction with stakeholders in investigating gaps and 
current/future systems. 
c. Threat Analysis 
The threat analysis identified current mine technologies employed by opposing forces.  
Specific characteristics of each threat were detailed along with the methods and tactics used in 
deploying each mine type in the VSW zone.  The threat analysis defined the mines that were of 
greatest concern in the VSW zone because of their payload size and of their detection rate 
utilizing current MCM assets.  The threat analysis fed into the stakeholder analysis in order to 
confirm the findings with stakeholder representatives. 
3. System Definition Phase 
The System Definition Phase began with inputting the outputs from the Problem 
Exploration Phase, namely the stakeholder, capabilities, and threat analyses.  The System 
Definition Phase consisted of a requirements analysis, functional analysis, and system metrics 
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development.  The outputs of the system definition phase: requirements, functions, and metrics 
served as inputs to the Modeling of Alternative Architectures Phase. 
a. Requirements Analysis 
The requirements analysis utilized the results of the stakeholder, capabilities, and threat 
analyses to evaluate mission and operational environments.  From the construction of a 
theoretical operational environment, a list of stakeholder needs and constraints were developed 
pertaining to the problem space.  Details of capability gaps and stakeholder inputs were used to 
develop system requirements necessary to accomplish the MCM mission given the constraints.  
Information from the functional analysis process and the metrics refinement fed back into the 
requirements analysis for mitigation when requirements were discovered to be inconsistent or 
missing at these later stages. 
b. Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis further developed system operation details, functions, and 
tasking.  Decomposition of requirements from the requirements analysis identified lower-level 
functions and resulted in the refined functional description of the system.  The functional 
analysis resulted in a functional architecture developed in Vitech Corporation‟s CORE software.  
After the functional architecture was in CORE, requirements were mapped to functions to ensure 
traceability from top level to lower level functions and requirements.  The mapping of functions 
to requirements in CORE resulted in adding more details to requirements and functions where 
needed, and served as the input into the system metrics definition. 
c. System Metrics 
The System Metrics development took previous work to develop top level system 
metrics.  Once system metrics were developed, they were compared to the requirements to 
ensure applicability and traceability.  The development of system metrics resulted in the 
conclusion of the System Definition Phase, with the requirements, functions, and metrics being 
fed into the Modeling of Alternative Architectures Phase to further develop the system 
architecture and compare possible solution types. 
4. Modeling of Alternative Architectures Phase 
The Modeling of Alternative Architectures Phase began with the outputs from the System 
Definition Phase.  Our team used Vitech Corporation‟s CORE software, Microsoft‟s Excel 
software and Imagine That‟s ExtendSIM modeling software to determine which alternative 
architecture performed the best.  The analysis conducted during this phase occurred through an 
iterative process between the three phases that resulted in a solution definition and 
recommendation.  The output of this phase was a combination of the Development of Alternative 
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Architectures, Modeling and Simulation, and System Refinement steps in the form of an 
Analysis of Alternatives with Life Cycle Cost Estimation (LCCE). 
a. Development of Alternative Architectures 
This step took the outputs from the System Definition Phase to develop a list of 
Alternative Architectures.  The top level problem statement of DTE reduction was mapped to 
capability gaps and analyzed for solutions to reduce or close the gaps.  Capability gap solutions 
were translated to component solutions and recommendations for three Alternative 
Architectures.  These Alternative Architectures were then used as input to the Modeling of 
Alternative Architectures Phase.  As the Modeling of Alternative Architectures Phase developed 
feedback to the System Definition Phase, the lists of Alternative Architectures were modified. 
b. Modeling and Simulation 
Modeling and Simulation was used as a verification and validation tool of the system 
architecture and requirements of the system solution.  Models were created for each of the 
system architectures and compared with system metrics to determine if the system is viable, and 
how well the technical performance of the proposed system compares to the other systems that 
were developed in the Analysis of Alternatives.  The output of Modeling and Simulation was 
used as the input to the System Refinement stage to provide technical performance information 
used to eliminate or promote specific design approaches. 
c. System Refinement 
System refinement was performed to review system solution details to select and validate 
the best solution.  Both simulation and life-cycle cost results were used in determining the final 
recommendations for the next generation MCM system. 
d. Analysis of Alternative Architectures with LCCE 
The Analysis of Alternative Architectures was conducted based on inputs from the 
System Definition phase.  The System solutions were compared based on the alternative 
architectures for technical and cost parameters.  Performance metrics from Metrics Refinement 
represented criteria for comparing system solutions.  The output of this step was a cost benefit 
analysis and an analysis of alternative architectures.  The results of the Modeling and Simulation 












































II. PROBLEM EXPLORATION 
A. THREAT ANALYSIS 
Mines in the VSW zone are of major concern to the US and its allies.  This threat analysis 
was limited to those mines expected to be found in the VSW range with the ability to hinder the 
advancement of US troops during an amphibious landing on foreign soil. 
 
Naval mines are inexpensive to produce and can be deployed rather quickly.  With this in 
mind, they are seen as an easy way of denying free access to the coastline by an amphibious 
force (PEO LMW, 2009; NWP 3-15, 1996).  Mines can be used effectively to limit the points of 
entry for an assault force, as a force multiplier by limiting the enemy‟s ability to maneuver, or to 
allow friendly forces time to maneuver.  A minefield can have both offensive and defensive 
objectives.  Offensive minefields are placed to slow the advancement or prevent movement of 
the enemy.  This could include placing mines in the port or sea lanes of an enemy.  Defensive 
minefields are intended to protect coastline from assault (JP 3-15, 2011). 
 
A major advantage of using mines is the psychological affect that they have on the 
opposition (PEO LMW, 2009; NWP 3-15, 1996).  As witnessed in Desert Storm, a minefield 
may contain dummy or faulty mines and still prevent access since the potential loss of personnel 
and equipment is too great to risk entering the minefield (Final Report to Congress: Conduct of 
the Persian Gulf War, 1992).  From this it can be concluded, that even if the mine is inoperable it 
still serves a purpose.   
 
The main types of mines that may be found in the VSW zone, the methods for triggering 
them, and the methods used for deploying a minefield are described in this threats analysis 
section.  The technology being incorporated into current and future mines has been examined.  
Finally, the most likely aggressors and their current mine warfare capabilities have been detailed. 
1. Mines Analyzed 
Due to variation in mine size and functionality, an overall “blanket” approach to 
identifying, classifying, and mapping each mine within a similar zone of interest is not practical.  
The following types of mines are likely to be encountered in the VSW range during an 
amphibious landing in a foreign country: moored, bottom, and drifting (Carson-Jelley, 2011).  In 
order to distinguish among the variety of mines, a number of factors were considered when it 
came to identifying mines of concern.  Chief among them was locality.  The primary focus is the 
10-40ft depth range and, therefore, the use of some mine-types is impractical.  Typically, factors 
such as obsolescence and redundancy were also taken into account; however, it is important to 
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remember that the primary goal of a mine is to slow or stop the advancement of the opposition.  
As long as it is believed that the mine poses a threat, obsolete or otherwise, it is serving its 
purpose as a deterrent. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the various types of mines and the positions that they may take in an 
ocean minefield (note that Figure 2 is not to scale).  The VSW section depicts three different 
mines: drifting (floating), bottom, and moored.   
 
 
Figure 2. Mines Used by Depth Range 
Depiction of mine type allocation related to ocean depth zones.  This project is concerned with the VSW zone 
containing threats of bottom, moored, and floating/drifting mines (Carson-Jelley, 2011). 
a. Bottom Mines 
Bottom mines are powerful, non-buoyant mines that are planted on the sea bottom and 
held in position by their weight.  Additionally, they can be referred to as “buried mines,” in 
which case they are embedded in the sea floor, or “proud mines,” when they remain uncovered.  
Figure 3 shows a Manta mine which, over time, has been partially buried by wave action.  Since 
the mine case is non-buoyant, there is a larger capacity for explosives, making the damage radius 
much larger than that of the moored mine.  If the mine is intended for a surface ship, it is best 
that it be positioned no deeper than 200ft below the water‟s surface.  At the 10-40ft depth, 
bottom mines are within their effective range and could be triggered by both magnetic and 




Figure 3. Bottom Mine 
Image of a bottom Manta type mine, which has been partially buried by the ocean bottom due to wave action over 
time.  Bottom mines contain a larger capacity for explosives since they are non-buoyant and their whole casing can 
be filled with explosives instead of air to permit buoyancy (Sei Spa, 2011). 
 
One variation on the bottom mine is the propelled bottom mine.  This variation is 
equipped with a propulsion system that is intended to position the mine at a specified location.  
This can be useful when laying mines, since a ship can fire the bottom mine and its propulsion 
system would then guide it to its final plant position before arming itself (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
Bottom mines are the most difficult to detect.  The latest counter-countermeasure 
technologies employ features such as various mine shapes to encourage burial or deflect sonar 
signals to reduce the effectiveness of search equipment.  In some cases, bottom mines are 
constructed with fiberglass and special sound-absorbing materials which further reduce the 
signal returned by sonar.  Any clutter existing on the ocean floor (i.e., natural formations, 
discarded items, etc.) increases environmental complexity and makes it more difficult to detect a 
bottom mine.  This is compounded by the fact that some mines are manufactured to have the 
appearance of a discarded object, in hopes of reducing its detection (Rabiroff, 2011).  Due to 
their large damage radius and the difficulty in detecting them, bottom mines are considered the 
greatest threat in the VSW zone.  Because of this, bottom mines are the most commonly 
produced and utilized mine for non-NATO countries, specifically China and Iran (NWP 3-15, 
1996). 
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b. Moored Mines 
Moored mines have a positively buoyant casing which is moored to an anchor on the sea 
bed via a chain or cable as seen in Figure 4.  This allows them to float at a predefined depth 
which is dependent upon the length of the cable, the weight of the cable, and the case‟s crush 
depth.  Since the mine casing is designed to be buoyant, there is less space to house the 
explosives.  Because of this, moored mines are less powerful and have a smaller radius of 
damage than that of a bottom mine.  A major benefit, however, is that they utilize a host of 
triggering methods including proximity, acoustic, magnetic, optical shadowing, and pressure 
sensors.  Over time, it is possible that a moored mine may separate from its anchor and float to 
the surface; these are known as floaters.  In some cases, the mine is fitted with a self-destruct 
mechanism that will flood the casing with water in the event that the mine is separated from its 
mooring.  Provided that this does not occur, a moored mine can have a lifespan exceeding 10 
years (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
Moored mines can also be tethered together to create what are called “daisy-chained” 
mines.  These consist of two moored mines that are tied together about 60 feet apart and float a 
few meters below the surface.  When the target hits the cable, the warheads are drawn down 
either side of the ship's hull, exploding on contact (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
Moored mines are vulnerable to a catenary sweep, wherein one or two ships drag a wire, 
or net catenary, to scoop up mines.  The mine, vulnerable to being mechanically severed from its 
mooring cable, would then initiate its self-destruct sequence whereby the mine is flooded.  Then, 
depending upon the type of fuse utilized, the mine can be detected and detonated via acoustic 




Figure 4. Moored Mine 
 
MCM EOD Divers neutralizing moored mine.  Moored mines have a positively buoyant casing which is moored to 
an anchor on the sea bed via a chain or cable as seen in the figure.  Since the mine casing is designed to be buoyant, 
there is less space to house the explosives making moored mines less powerful than non-buoyant mines (Sea Mines: 
An Explosive Problem, 2009). 
c. Drifting Mines 
Drifting mines consist of a buoyant case allowing them to float at or below the water‟s 
surface without anything to fix them in one position.  As a result, they are free to drift with the 
current and shifting tides as shown in Figure 5.  Some drifting mines can be modified by fixing 
them with a weight or impeller that will keep them near the sea bottom; these are known as 
“creeping mines” due to the fact that they drift along the ocean floor.  The Piao-3, utilized by 
China, is one such mine.  This mine uses impellers which allow the mines to hover at a constant 





Figure 5. Drifting Mine 
Drifting mines consist of a buoyant case allowing them to float at or below the water‟s surface without anything to 
fix them in one position.  As a result, they are free to drift with the current and shifting tides (German Mine). 
One advantage of drifting mines is that they can be set to hover around a specific depth, 
which is a great benefit when mines are distributed in waters that are too deep for moored or 
bottom mines.  Additionally, it is difficult for the opposition to map the minefield since the 
mine‟s position is not static.  Drifting mines are less likely to remain in a specified area for an 
extended period of time.  Drifting mines are also easily deployed, unlike moored and bottom 
mines, making them an extremely valuable asset for countering an amphibious assault (Korean 
People's Army Navy, 2011).  Furthermore, drifting mines are typically more simplistic, utilizing 
older technology than bottom and moored mines, making them less expensive.  
 
The disadvantage of drifting mines is that their position is ever-changing and they 
endanger friendly ships as well as enemy ships (NWP 3-15, 1996).  According to The Hague 
VIII Convention of 1907, automatic contact mines that are not under the control of the person 
who laid them must become inactive within 1 hour (Laws of War: Laying of Automatic 
Submarine Contact Mines, 1907).  Because of this, drifting mines are usually fitted with a self-
destruct mechanism that will sink them after a given period of time, neutralizing any threat they 
may cause.  Regardless, the use of drifting mines is not within the rules of engagement, and they 
are considered illegal warfare due to the danger they pose to commercial and civilian surface 
ships (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
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2. Primary Mine of Concern 
From the analysis performed on the three main types of mines it can be determined that 
the bottom mine is the greatest threat to an amphibious assault in the VSW range.  The primary 
reasons being the bottom mine‟s larger capacity for explosives and its ability to be hidden in 
ground clutter.  With only the VSW range in mind, any craft will be in the damage radius of any 
mine placed in this region.  However, the moored and drifting mines have a smaller explosive 
payload capability, comparatively speaking, and the damage caused by these mines is not as 
great when detonated at an equal distance.  When mine hunting and sweeping techniques are 
considered, moored mines are easier to detect, or mechanically sweep.  Discussions with 
stakeholders indicate that drifting mines can be difficult to detect, are easily deployed, and their 
movements make them difficult to track.  However, due to the possibility of moving out of the 
VSW range or deactivating after a set period of time, this analysis does not consider them to be a 
threat greater than bottom mines.   
 
Table 1 is a summary of the general characteristics of the three types of mines considered 
in this analysis.  This summary was developed from information gathered from many sources 
(Erickson, Goldstein, & Murray, 2009; NWP 3-15, 1996; Mason, 2009; Molina, Sánchez, & 





















Table 1. Mine Characteristics 
Summary of the general characteristics of the three types of mines present in the VSW depth zone: bottom, moored, 
and drifting mines.  The table was compiled from information gathered from many sources (Erickson, Goldstein, & 
Murray, 2009; NWP 3-15, 1996; Mason, 2009; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007; Sei Spa, 2011; Rios, 2005). 
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3. Triggering Mechanisms 
According to Mine Warfare (NWP 3-15, 1996), the various types of triggering 
mechanisms can be grouped into three categories:  “contact actuation,” “influence actuation,” 
and “command and control actuation.”  The mines described thus far are equipped with one or 
more of these types of triggering mechanisms in order to resist minesweeping tactics (NWP 3-
15, 1996).  Each mine contains a firing mechanism which triggers the actuation once it receives 
an electrical signal from its detector.  Once the firing mechanism receives the signal, it is 
analyzed to determine if it came from a valid source, such as an enemy ship.  The firing 
mechanism will initiate detonation of the mine if the signal source is deemed valid and within 
range. 
a. Contact Actuation 
The contact trigger is one of the oldest and easiest to use.  In order to detonate the mine, 
the watercraft must make physical contact with the mine.  Current mine warfare tactics describe 
many different types of switches that can be used.  What is common to all the switches is that 
once the watercraft makes contact with the mine an electrical connection is made and causes 
detonation (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
During Desert Storm, the Iraqis made significant use of moored mines using a contact 
actuation method.  Some examples of these are the Soviet M-08, and the Iraqi-produced LUGM-
145 (Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992). 
 
Since this analysis is limited to the 10-40ft depth range, the types of mines most likely to 
have this type of triggering method are either moored mines or drifting mines.  Although bottom 
mines can also have this type of triggering method, this analysis assumes that watercraft 
transiting the 10-40ft depth range would not commonly contact the sea floor making this 
triggering method ineffective for bottom mines. 
b. Influence Actuation 
The influence actuation trigger type does not require physical contact between the ship 
and the mine.  As a ship or other craft moves through the water, there are a multitude of signals 
that can be detected.  This makes it possible to have the mine further away from the target ship 
and still trigger a detonation.  The influence triggers can be grouped into four different sub types.  
According to Mine Warfare (NWP 3-15, 1996), these can be listed as “acoustic influence,” 
“electromagnetic influence,” “pressure influence,” and “seismic influence.” 
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Acoustic   
Acoustic influence triggers consist of hydrophones that are sensitive to the noises created 
by ships as they move through the water (NWP 3-15, 1996)(Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  
These noises generally are that of hull noises caused by the ship moving through the water, 
machinery noises caused by engines and other systems, and noise caused by a ship‟s propeller.  
 
The acoustic influence trigger is susceptible to mine sweeping using equipment that 
simulates the noises caused by ships.  This equipment is pulled through the water emitting noise 
similar to that of a large ship, thus causing the mine to detonate a safe distance away from the 
MCM personnel (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
Information gathered about the MINEA family of mines indicated that some mines have 
the capability to detect sonar signals and receive coded acoustic signals used to activate and 
deactivate the mine (Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  The purpose of sending coded signals 
is to allow the mine to be deactivated for ships which would be “friendly” to the mine, and 
reactivating once it had passed.  This also allowed the minefields to be deactivated at the end of 
hostilities (Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  Advanced versions of these types of mines 
dampen their influence and characteristics to remain undetected when being swept by MCM.  
Electromagnetic 
Multiple sources indicated that apart from the acoustic trigger the next most common was 
the “magnetic influence” trigger.  This type of triggering mechanism detects changes in the 
magnetic fields around the mine.  When a ship with a steel hull moves though the earth‟s 
magnetic field, a slight distortion occurs in the surrounding area.  Although slight, this distortion 
is significant enough to trigger a mine (NWP 3-15, 1996; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007). 
 
A similar technology, electrical potential influence, detects the electric currents caused by 
dissimilar metals immersed in sea water.  Since the hull of a ship and the propeller are made of 
different types of metal, an electrical current is created when the ship moves through sea water 
(NWP 3-15, 1996; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007). 
 
The magnetic influence trigger is susceptible to mine sweeping using equipment that 
simulates the magnetic distortion created by a ship.  This equipment is pulled through the water 
creating a magnetic field that is similar to that of a larger craft causing the mine to detonate a 
safe distance away from the mine counter measure personnel (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
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A few examples of mines using electromagnetic influence technology are the MINEA 
family of mines, the MANTA mine, and the Chinese EM-53 (Erickson, Goldstein, & Murray, 
2009; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007; Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
War, 1992). 
Pressure  
Pressure actuation consists of sensors that can detect the pressure waves caused by a ship 
moving through the water.  These sensors are sensitive and can be triggered by wave action if 
used alone (NWP 3-15, 1996; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  However, a pressure 
triggering method is typically not used as the sole triggering method.   
 
When used in combination with other sensors such as acoustic and magnetic, pressure 
detection can be used to counteract mine sweeping activities.  It has been stated that this 
combination of sensors can make it “virtually impossible to sweep a mine” (Erickson, Goldstein, 
& Murray, 2009).  This is because there is currently no equipment capable of simulating the 
pressure waves necessary without moving a vessel through the area (NWP 3-15, 1996).  When 
these sensors are used in combination, sweeping would require simulating the noise, magnetic 
and pressure signatures at the same time in order to trigger the mine. 
 
Some examples of mines using pressure sensors are the MINEA family of mines, and the 
Chinese C-6 (Erickson, Goldstein, & Murray, 2009; Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007). 
Seismic.  
Seismic influence triggering consists of accelerometers in the mine detecting movement 
in the mine case, or the sea floor where the mine is laid.  As sound waves interact with the sea 
floor and the mine casing, vibrations occur which can be detected by the accelerometers.  Since 
the vibrations are caused by sound waves, seismic triggering is similar to acoustic triggering 
(Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007; NWP 3-15, 1996).  It can be assumed this method of 
triggering would be susceptible to the same mine sweeping techniques used for acoustic 
triggering. 
 
Two examples of mines using seismic influence triggers are the bottom mine version of 
the MINEA family of mines, and the MANTA mine (Erickson, Goldstein, & Murray, 2009; 
Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  It can also be assumed that drifting mines could not be 
effectively triggered using this method.  Since the seismic vibrations are being transmitted 
through the sea floor, the triggering sensor package would need to be in contact with the sea 
floor.  
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c. Command and Control Actuation 
The “Command and Control” method of triggering uses a command sent to the mine 
from a control station causing detonation.  This method is mostly used for port and harbor 
defense since it allows the mines to be detonated only when an observer selects the target (NWP 
3-15, 1996).  This type of trigger cannot be effectively swept since an external signal must be 
sent to the mine before detonation. 
 
The MANTA-103 has an option of having a remote control cable in order to receive 
signals (Sei Spa, 2011).  It would also be possible to use acoustic links similar to the one used in 
the MINEA family of mines (Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007). 
4. Mine Deployment 
Mines can be delivered to their final plant position via aircraft, submarine, or surface 
vessel.  Each method has its situational advantages and disadvantages.  When speed is critical or 
the area to be mined is not freely available to the minelayer, using aircraft is best.  If stealth is 
required, then submarines are much more suited for the task.  In the case of a large number of 
mines needing to be placed, or the availability of other delivery craft is limited, various surface 
vessels may be used.  It is important to be aware of the deployment methods and the reasons for 
their use.  By knowing the method of deployment it becomes easier to determine which mines 
pose a risk in a given area. 
a. Aircraft Delivery 
Aircraft are the preferred method of delivery when placing offensive naval mines.  They 
can access areas to which submarines and surface ships cannot, including existing minefields and 
shallow waters.  Dropping mines is similar to dropping bombs, and typically the same aircraft 
that are used to carry bombs are used to carry and deploy mines of the same weight class.  A 
drawback to this is that unless a cargo-carrying aircraft is used, the weapon loads are small in 
comparison to the large weapon loads that submarines and surface ships have when laying 
mines.  The mines which are deployed by this method are specially designed for air-delivery so 
they do not crush or damage upon contact with the water.  One major advantage is when notified 
of a mine laying mission, aircraft have fast response times.  However, a major disadvantage of 
aircraft delivery is it is much less accurate when compared to other methods (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
b. Submarine Delivery 
Submarine-delivered mines are the preferred method of delivery in covert offensive 
operations.  They are effective at penetrating areas with high surveillance of surface and aerial 
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crafts.  The mines whichs are deployed by this method are specially configured to be launched 
from torpedo tubes or mine belts of the submarine.  Such mines include the propelled bottom 
mine which, once fired, will guide itself to its specified plant position (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
This method can be disadvantageous due to its long response time and limited availability 
of submarines.  When a submarine is called for a mine laying mission, it must first return to port 
where the torpedoes are unloaded and the mines are loaded.  Furthermore, there is a limitation 
capacity of mines that can be carried at once (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
c. Surface Vessel Delivery 
Surface-delivery of mines is the preferred method for defensive minefields only.  It is 
advantageous due to its large load capacity and the accuracy with which the mines are placed.  
During mining operations, the ship is vulnerable to attacks by the enemy and, therefore, it 
requires that the surrounding area be under friendly control.  When a surface ship is called for a 
mine-laying mission, the ship must first travel to a location where the mines can be loaded before 
it can travel to the location of the minefield (NWP 3-15, 1996). 
 
Given the focus of the 10-40ft depth range, surface-delivery is the most common method 
of deployment.  Mines possessed by enemy countries are manufactured to be easily laid from a 
variety of watercraft, including rubber dinghies, tugboats, barges, and dedicated mine laying 
craft (Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992; NWP 3-15, 1996).  If a 
surface craft has a large load capacity, it would be reasonable to deploy lines of mines.  
However, if a craft has a small load capacity, then the pattern of the minefield is more random. 
5. Platforms at Risk 
The assets that are at risk include US Navy and Marine amphibious assault vehicles 
(AAV) which operate in the 10-40 ft littoral zone.  Large US Navy and Marine platforms are not 
considered for this range because the draft of these platforms typically exceeds 40 feet.  
Examples of the high risk assets include, but are not limited to:  LCS class ships, the Landing 
Craft Air cushion, the future Ship to Shore Connector, the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV-
7A1), and possibly the future Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV).  In this region, all mines 






6. Countries of Concern 
In order to fully understand the mine threat, it is important to understand the capabilities 
the enemy possesses.  As of 2001, over 50 countries utilize mines in the littoral region to aid in 
the prevention of amphibious invasion and about 77% of the ship casualties between 1950 and 
2001 were caused by mines (Cornish, 2003).  Figure 6 shows the US ships that were damaged, 
the countries responsible for the damage, and the weapons used.  Due to their current tensions 
with the United States, the following three countries are the prime focus:  China, Iran, and North 
Korea.    
 
 
Figure 6. US Ship Casualties by Weapon (1950-2001) 
As of 2001, over 50 countries utilize mines in the littoral region to aid in the prevention of amphibious invasion and 
about 77% of the ship casualties between 1950 and 2001 were caused by mines (Cornish, 2003).  This chart depicts 
which US ships were damaged by what mines with the country responsible for the associated damage. 
a. China 
China‟s lethal arsenal consists of a wide variety of naval mines.  Their inventory is one of 
the largest in the world and is estimated to contain between 50,000 to 100,000 individual 
weapons.  It is important to understand that mine stocks can be hidden very easily and so it is 
difficult to pinpoint the exact quantity.  China‟s inventory contains 30 varieties of contact, 
acoustic, magnetic, water pressure and mixed reaction aquatic mines, rising moored mines, 
remote control mines, and mobile mines; all ranging from the less advanced technologies of the 
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early twentieth century to the more sophisticated bottom and propelled mines of today (Erickson, 
Murray, & Goldstein, 2007). 
b. Iran 
Proceeded by the United States, Russia, and China, Iran is thought to have the fourth 
largest inventory of naval mines in the world, with an estimated 5,000 mines in its possession.  
The EM11 bottom mine, the EM31 moored mine, and the EM52 propelled rising mine make up 
nearly 1,000 of these mines (5th Fleet Focus: Iranian Underwater Warfare Capabilities, 2007).  
The EM52 is thought to be the most dangerous in their inventory since it is rocket-propelled and 
does not allow time for a ship to deploy countermeasures (Erickson, Goldstein, & Murray, 2009).  
Iran purchased 3 Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 2000 and in the process took possession 
of 1800 mines.  While it is unlikely that the Kilo-submarines are in good condition, they are still 
capable of deploying approximately 36 mines per sortie.  If paired with a merchant ship supplied 
with mines, they could perform 2-3 mine laying sorties per week.  Factor in Iran‟s capability to 
produce non-magnetic, drifting, and remote-controlled mines and they stand to gain considerable 
clout in naval warfare (5th Fleet Focus: Iranian Underwater Warfare Capabilities, 2007). 
c. North Korea 
About 60% of North Korea‟s naval force is arranged along the shore line.  This includes 
approximately 430 combat vessels (i.e. patrol boats, missile boats, and torpedo boats), 35 
submarines, and over 330 support vessels (i.e. landing ships, fire support vessels).  The majority 
of the submarines are Romeo-class, and although some researchers consider them outmoded and 
slow, they are still very capable of deploying mines (Howard, 1999).  Furthermore, North 
Korea‟s mine inventory consists largely of older technology mines.  Despite this, they possess 
the historical experience of their effectiveness and the confidence to use them.  Once the 
defensive minefields have been set, they are monitored by radar and observations teams 
positioned on the coast.  Should the enemy be detected, North Korea will respond with support 
from artillery and missile batteries.  This constant surveillance makes close approach and MCM 
operations very dangerous (Korean People's Army Navy, 2011). 
7. Lessons from History 
To date, Iraq has been the location of the last two US engagements in which mine 
hunting was critical for an amphibious force.  The first engagement was the Persian Gulf War in 
1991 and the second was Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  The Persian Gulf War was considered a mine 
warfare failure to the US, but served as a learning experience that resulted in the mine warfare 
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success of Iraqi Freedom.  By looking at the differences between the two engagements some 
insight can be gained.  
a. Persian Gulf War (1991) 
Out of the reported 1167 mines deployed in the waters around Iraq and Kuwait during the 
Persian Gulf War, many were Iraqi-built equivalents to Russian-made contact mines from a 
WWI design.  Additionally, their arsenal contained more modern mines, including acoustic and 
magnetic influence mines purchased from Russia and Italy.  During the lead up to the Persian 
Gulf War, US forces did not take any action to prevent the use of mines for fear it would provoke 
the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Unfortunately, this allowed the Iraqi Navy to use rotary-winged aircraft, 
modified tug boats, and barges to deploy mines in the areas surrounding Kuwait and Iraq (Final 
Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992). 
 
The Iraqi Navy deployed the aquatic mines in haste, causing them to improperly plan and 
execute the mine laying activities.  As a result, up to 95% of the acoustic mines were later 
determined to be inoperative, and 13% of the moored mines broke free.  Despite this, the US 
received damage to 2 warships and cancelled an amphibious assault on Ash Shuaybah in 
Northern Kuwait.  To further impede the effectiveness of the US MCM forces, the minefields 
were deployed in areas within reach of shore-based missile and artillery batteries and created 
opportunities for small boat attacks (Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 
1992). 
b. Iraqi Freedom (2003) 
During Iraqi Freedom, the US and coalition forces expected the Iraqi Navy to once again 
mine the areas around Iraq.  Consequently, MCM activities began early with air superiority 
activities used to prevent the enemy from deploying mines via aircraft.  This limited Iraq to using 
small rubber boats, modified tugs, and barges.  To further reduce their effectiveness, SEAL 
teams were sent to engage those forces, and those mine-laying assets were captured.  These 
preventative measures were successful in reducing the amount of naval mines Iraqi forces 
deployed and therefore reduced the amount of United States mine counter-measure assets 
required in many areas.  However, this does not show that the ability to detect and clear mines 
improved, and indicates that prevention allowed this conflict to be considered a mine warfare 
success (PEO LMW, 2009). 
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8. Future Mine Capabilities (5-10 years) 
Lethality and stealth are ever-evolving aspects of combat technology.  As such, combat 
mines are always changing with respect to both offensive and defensive capabilities.  When there 
is an improvement in the ability to detect mines it forces an improvement in the technology used 
to avoid detection.  One technology that will be used in the future is Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles.  These unmanned vehicles are ideal for mine placement without the need to put 
personnel in harm‟s way (Mason, 2009). 
 
Wireless communication is currently being incorporated into newer mines giving these 
mines more C2 functionality.  The wireless link coupled with direction finding sensors allows for 
the networking of mines and remote C2 to obtain and relay location, speed, and bearing 
information of targets.  Once this information is determined, a mine can be remotely detonated at 
the best moment to achieve maximum damage.  This detonation could be limited to one mine, or 
cover a group of mines, depending on the target and desired effect.  In addition, this technology 
allows for the possibility of Identifying Friend or Foe (Mason, 2009).  By using acoustic links, 
mines like the SAES‟ MINEA family of mines can be deactivated when “friendly” ships pass 
through the minefield and then restored to an active state once the ships have cleared (Molina, 
Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007). 
 
Computing technology is also becoming more prevalent in the construction of mines.  As 
microprocessors become less expensive, this allows more intelligence to be built into the mines 
and networks of mines.  Given that mines can be equipped with various sensors, it is possible for 
the detection of minesweeping efforts to be circumvented by detecting multiple trigger types.  
For example, if a mine detects the magnetic or acoustic signature of a large ship without 
detecting the pressure signature, the mine would assume this is a mine sweep and stay dormant.  
As mines are equipped with more processing power, they can potentially gain the ability to 
detect more specific targets.  This may allow smaller craft to pass by in order to damage larger 
ones, or they may allow multiple craft to pass by before detonation.   
 
Another technology that is being implemented pertains to the physical shape and 
materials used in the construction of mines.  In order to disguise the mine from detection by 
sonar, mines are being created in irregular shapes.  These shapes could simulate plant life or 
other objects that would normally be found on the ocean floor, including junk that could have 
been dumped into the sea (Mason, 2009; Rabiroff, 2011).  The use of non-magnetic materials is 
being incorporated in order to reduce the chance of detection by magnetic resonance mine 
hunting.  The use of echo eliminating, or “anechoic, “materials are also being explored in order 
to dampen the reflection of sound which would indicate the presence of a mine (Mason, 2009; 
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Molina, Sánchez, & Rodrigo, 2007).  New technologies are being used to actively or passively 
bury mines.  Some case shapes encourage the natural flow of sand and water to bury the mines, 
and some of the aircraft-deployed mines are created to enter the water in such a way that they 
will automatically bury themselves.  It can also be possible to have a torpedo-deployed mine 
incorporate similar technology to use its propulsion to bury the mine (Mason, 2009). 
9. Threat Analysis Conclusion 
Sea mines are becoming more challenging to identify, classify, localize, and detect in the 
VSW zone.  Further work is needed for future systems to maintain the ability to counter and 
respond to emerging threats to continuously allow the US Navy to perform amphibious 
operations in the VSW zone without high risk of damage from sea mines.  
B. CURRENT CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
An assessment of current US MCM and future US and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) systems utilizing current Marine Corps amphibious doctrine, approved 
development programs descriptions, stakeholder feedback, symposium presentations, and 
publicly available unclassified information comprised the current capability analysis.  The 
assessment analyzed whether current and future systems are sufficiently capable to detect, 
localize, identify, classify, and neutralize threats expected in the VSW zone to fulfill stakeholder 
needs in a standalone or system-of-system configuration.  Appendix A presents a description of 
the current and future systems researched that contributed to the findings of the analysis.  
1. Current Capability Gaps 
MCM systems are moving towards remotely operated sensors and systems as opposed to 
divers and mammals in mine clearing operations.  However, there are still several challenges that 
must be met, and capability gaps that exist.  The result of the capability analysis identified 
capability gaps that cannot be met with existing or planned platforms, and systems need to be 










Table 2 identifies the capabilities and limitations of current MCM systems in the 
minefield derived from the research of current systems contained in Appendix A. 
Table 2. Capabilities of Current MCM Systems in the VSW Minefield 
There is currently a variety of MCM systems that are in use by the US and NATO.  This table presents a high level 
view of the advantages and disadvantages of the diver, MMS, UUV/AUV, and Surface/Aviation based systems in 
the VSW Minefield. 
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Table 3 provides a snapshot of what current MCM systems are used against each type of 
mine threat.  As indicated by the table, EOD or diver systems are currently the best method for 
covering the breadth of mine threats as part of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units 
(EODMUs).  EODMU ONE is currently the only Naval command possessing a VSW MCM 
capability.  At present, EODMU ONE utilizes a combination of Marine Mammal Systems 
(MMS), the MK 18 Mod 1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and specialized divers for 
conducting VSW MCM. 
The unmanned systems like the ASQ-14A and SQQ-32 provide mine countermeasures 
capability short of engagement for most of the mine threats in the VSW zone.  The MK104/105 
and SLQ-37 unmanned systems have the best threat coverage, but only provide area engagement 
capability.  It is apparent from Table 3 that a future MCM system is needed to provide the 
necessary coverage across the threat set. 
Table 3. Current MCM System Capabilities 
The current MCM systems in use today provide a range of capabilities across the different mine types. For the top 
portion of the table, an „X‟ denotes a system‟s capability in the corresponding row. For the bottom portion of the 
table, an „X‟ denotes the mine types each system is effective against.  As shown, only an EOD diver system can 





























































RECON X X X      
SENSE X X X      
POINT ENGAGE X   X     
AREA ENGAGE     X X X X 
         
FLOATING X    X   X 
NEAR SURFACE X    X X X X 
MOORED X X X X  X X  
CLOSE TETHERED X X X X  X X  
C-C TETHERED X X X X  X X  
BOTTOM X X X X  X X  
BURIED X     X X  





Table 4 displays MCM systems that are currently under development such as the JABS, 
OASIS, and AMNS and systems currently being fielded like the MK104/105, SLQ-37, and 
MNS.  As seen in Table 4, the developing systems will provide increased capability for 
engagement of bottom mines, but not for buried mines, the focus of this capstone project.  Still 
the EOD solution is the best thus far for capability across the threat set. 
 
Table 4. Future MCM System Capabilities 
The future and developmental MCM systems shown in this figure take the man out of the minefield. For the top 
portion of the table, an „X‟ denotes a system‟s capability in the corresponding row. For the bottom portion of the 
table, an „X‟ denotes the mine types each system is effective against. As seen, these newer systems lack the all-in-
one capability for the detect-to-engage sequence.  This forces the use of multiple systems to carry out a clearance 




















































































































RECON X X X X X X X X  X        
SENSE X X  X X X X X  X        
POINT ENGAGE X          X X      
AREA ENGAGE             X X X X X 
                  
FLOATING X     X        X   X 
NEAR SURFACE X X X   X  X  X  X X X X X X 
MOORED X X X  X  X X  X X X X X X X X 
CLOSE 
TETHERED 
X X X  X  X X  X X X X  X X  
C-C TETHERED X X X  X  X X  X X X X  X X  
BOTTOM X X X  X  X X  X X X X  X X  
BURIED X   X     X    X  X X  
ANTI-INVASION    X     X         
 
Due to the complexity of the VSW environment, creating a system that meets all the 
requirements and challenges is difficult.  Based on the project problem statement, this analysis 
has identified five capability areas that should be considered in current and future system 
developments. 
a. System Ease of Deployment 
The first important aspect to note of current and future MCM systems is that they require 
helicopter deployment, helicopter tow cable, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) ship with crane 
 30 
deployment, or an LCS tow cable.  Although the ability to deploy a system by helicopter or ship 
is not by itself an exclusive limiting factor, a system that could be transported and deployed 
using a variety of platforms would allow for better use of Navy/DOD resources, resulting in time 
and cost savings. 
b. Mine Hunting Process 
Currently, there is not a single system or process that fulfills the need for detection, 
localization, identification, classification, and neutralization without the use of divers or 
mammals in the minefield.  A multi-functional system or integration of multiple systems could 
be deployed to perform the mine hunting process.  The result of a multi-functional system that 
performs all the functions in the detect-to-engage sequence could result in a reduced logistical 
footprint.  The need for redundant functions, such as the re-acquisition of the mine by a second 
neutralization platform, could be eliminated if such a system existed.  
c. Types of Mines 
Reviewing Table 3 and Table 4 it is clear that there is not a singular system that can cover 
the gamut of mines that could potentially be encountered in the VSW zone and not be limited to 
a specific mine threat.  If possible, Future MCM systems should be designed to complete the 
mine hunting process for all types of mines in the VSW zone.  This system concept would 
include mine threats from buried and bottom mines, tethered type mines, surface mines, and 
floating mines. 
d. Oceanic Limitations 
The VSW region is a complex region where the surface and bottom Ekman boundary 
layers merge, stratification can be transient, buoyancy fluxes are significant, and fluid motions 
can be dominated by various waves, tides, or low frequency currents (National Academy Press, 
2000).  The Ekman boundary is the layer in a fluid where there is a force balance between 
pressure gradient force, rotational force and turbulent drag.  This boundary region has several 
natural and man-made factors that can degrade the ability of MCM sensors to acquire, sense, and 
discriminate mines from natural phenomenon.  Increased image aberrations and degraded image 
resolution impact object detection and identification constraining how fast and reliable a search 
can be conducted. 
The influence of meteorological variability on near-shore mine warfare can be either 
direct or secondary.  Direct influences are primarily related to the effects of atmospheric 
conditions on MCM sensor capabilities.  An example of such is cloud cover creating confusing 
shadows for optical sensing, or clouds and rain that degrade both optical and acoustic-sensing 
performance. 
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Secondary influences are mostly related to atmospheric conditions that drive fluid motion 
affecting mine burial conditions and the performance of mine countermeasures.  Local winds 
often influence the burial of the mine and the turbidity of the environment, complicating diving 
operations.  On a large scale, winds can dramatically change local optical and acoustic properties 
of a water column due to circulation caused by the influence of local coastal topography.  The 
local atmospheric conditions can also cause muddy outflows of water from nearby rivers and 
estuaries into the VSW region.   
Spatial and temporal variations in water depth and seafloor profile can influence the 
location and height of breaking waves, the position and strength of surface currents, and the 
propagation of the tide into the VSW region (National Academy Press, 2000).  The measurement 
of water depth in the VSW region changes rapidly due to a wide spectrum of objects on the 
ocean floor.  The fluid dynamics and the sea floor makeup in this region can quickly cover or 
uncovered bottom mines due to the shifting of the sea floor.   
Tidal currents have a direct influence on mine warfare operations in the VSW and surf 
zone region.  Tidal currents can cause a dip that keeps moored mines below the surface, and can 
increase the scour of bottom mines (National Academy Press, 2000).  These tidal currents in the 
VSW region often exceed 1 knot and thus can affect diver and marine mammal operations.  
Currents in the VSW and surf zones are also more directly influenced by wind, wave-driving 
forces, and buoyancy fluxes due to runoff or river outflow.  Tidal models in the VSW and surf 
zone that predict currents are inaccurate due to nonlinearities, bottom friction, and boundary 
effects, such as reflection and local forcing (storm surge) (National Academy Press, 2000).  
There is very little support in modeling to help predict these effects on MCM systems. 
e. Technologic Limitations 
Current MCM systems are not able to expeditiously and accurately complete the mine 
hunting process.  Mine detection system development is making vast leaps towards faster area 
clearance through improvements in the areas of lasers, optics, sonar, and acoustic technologies, 
which have made it possible for humans to review sensor data to effectively identify and classify 
target threats.  The possible integration of these technologies, along with updated software 
capabilities would allow for improved automated processing and target identification and 
classification. 
The effects of optical properties are very important and hard to predict in the VSW 
region.  The variance in optical properties affects the visibility for divers, Light Detection and 
Ranging Systems (LIDAR) and other MCM systems depending on optical sensors (National 
Academy Press, 2000).  The euphotic zone which is defined as the area between the sea surface 
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and the depth where light diminishes to 1 % of its surface value (Chamberlin, 2011).  The depth 
of the euphotic zone depends largely on the concentration of organic and inorganic materials 
dissolved or suspended in the water column.  These suspended materials can create thin layers 
with radically different optical properties that can degrade or obscure the abilities of divers and 
other MCM sensors to detect the bottom and mine like objects. 
Another problem for MCM systems in the VSW region is with acoustic sensors.  Sonar 
systems on MCM vehicles are expected to operate in shallow, very shallow, and deep water 
zones which require them to perform through the entire water column, including near surface, 
seafloor, and sub-seafloor.  This means they are not optimally designed for one specific area but 
must be sufficiently broad to operate over the entire region.  This could add to the difficulty in 
operating in the VSW region, since the VSW area is characterized by the presence of 
reverberative backgrounds, low signal-to-noise environments, and high cluttered acoustic 
backgrounds.  The VSW region has a naturally situated condition in which sound velocity 
profiles are often incorrectly characterized because they are continuously changing.  This sets up 
situations for autonomous platforms to incorrectly interpret mines and mine-like objects, or 
incorrectly identify their locations (National Academy Press, 2000).  Therefore, identification 
and classification are difficult by themselves for an MCM system, with the neutralization process 
adding another layer of difficulty in completing the mission. 
 
Finally, it should be expected that in the VSW areas that are compatible with marine 
amphibious landings, there will be a certain amount of man-made metal object clutter.  This 
metal clutter can be the result of dumping, ship wrecks, fishing losses, and material washed out 
into the area due to storms.  These objects can also produce false positives for MCM operations. 
2. Current MCM Manned System Scenario 
To aid in requirements development and to identify modeling parameters an MCM 
mission scenario was developed.  The mission scenario was created based on clearing a VSW 
region with the current human system.  The overall purpose of this scenario was to provide a 
means of determining additional information on current MCM systems deficiencies.  This 
information was then used to help shape the requirements and modeling parameters of the new 





a. Vignette Facts and Assumptions 
The following facts and assumptions are used in this vignette: 
1. A typical boat lane or Q-lane required for an Amphibious Operation is 2000 to 2700 
yards by 500 yards (MCWP3-13, 2011).  A boat lane is the area in which Marine 
Amphibious forces travel from amphibious ships to the landing beach via Amphibious 
Assault Vehicles, Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), and Landing Craft Mechanized 
and Utility (LCM/LCU) boats. 
2. A typical Amphibious Operation will consist of 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) 
with approximately 29,000 Marines and Sailors (Trickey, February 2010).  For planning 
purposes the amphibious force typically needs 12 Boat Lanes to be cleared (Moon, 2011).  
3. The VSW region will be typically a 500 yard by 500 yard region of the boat lane. 
4. The typical MCM diver can swim at a speed of 1 knot.  This equates to 500 yards in 15 
minutes (Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011). 
5. A dive team consists of 2 people (Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon 
Systems, 2011).  Within the mission, several dive teams will be assigned to complete the 
tasking.  The number of dive teams required to conduct the mission will depend on the 
size of the operational area.  Dive supervisors will take into account the limitations of the 
divers and their equipment during the planning phase. 
a. Assumption: Dive teams are not affected by tidal or natural currents. 
b. Assumption: Dive teams are not affected by optical properties of the water. 
6. Diving equipment weight and MCM equipment for one person is approximately 226 lbs 
(Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011). 
7. A two person team can roughly scan 23 yards in a sweep (Marine Corps System 
Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011). 
8. The sweep priority for the amphibious force is to detect, mark, and avoid (Clements, 
2011).  
a. Assumption: It will take a dive team 5 min to identify and mark a mine while 
conducting a search. 
b. Assumption: The MCM dive team, consisting of two dive teams, is covertly 








Figure 7 displays a typical clearance swim pattern conducted by MCM divers; MCM 
divers clear (identify, inspect and mark) the area in a similar pattern by swimming back and forth 
parallel to the shore.  It is estimated that it will take 21 passes to clear the VSW region as 
described by vignette facts and assumptions.   
 
Figure 7. Beach Landing Site VSW Clearance 
Typical clearance swim pattern used by a diver system.  The typical coverage area will typically be 500 yards x 500 
yards in the VSW area (Google Maps, 2011). 
 
For this scenario it is assumed that the mine density is 5 mines per 500 square yards.  
Based on the assumptions it would take one dive team 5 hours and 30 minutes to swim the 
pattern as shown in Figure 7.  However, this is assuming that the dive team can continuously 
swim at 1 knot, which is unrealistic.  To compensate, a fatigue factor of 3% was added to time 
calculations after the divers had swam 5 laps.  Adding the estimated time it takes to identify, 
inspect, and mark a suspected mine along with fatigue, the estimated time to clear the area is 6 
hours and 51 minutes.  Due to limits of available air in oxygen tanks, it is essentially impossible 
for one team to sweep this area in that time.  Therefore, it is assumed that the minimum number 
of teams needed to clear this VSW region is two teams.  Assuming that each team covers half of 
the area to be cleared, it will take approximately 3 hours 40 minutes to clear the region. 
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Based on this analysis, it will take a minimum of 5 diver teams to clear the VSW region 
for one boat lane.  Extrapolating this information, the estimated personnel required to clear 12 
boat lanes is 60.  Since each person carries 213 pounds of equipment, the amphibious forces 
must have the room to carry 10,244 pounds of dive MCM equipment to support the teams. 
b. Diver-based MCM System Limitations and Takeaways 
1. To identify and mark mine-like objects the VSW region in approximately 4 hours 
requires 60 people.  If mines need to be classified and neutralized, additional planning 
must be performed to allow crews to identify the mine-like objects.  This will require 
additional time.  
2. Current MCM platforms do not have the space to support current MCM operations.  
To meet the above time requirement, 60 divers are required.  This value does not 
include the personnel needed to support the divers.  The current LCS ships only 
provide berthing for 35 additional personnel.  Therefore, 2 LCS ships will be required 
to complete the mission.  This analysis also does not include the personnel required to 
clear the rest of the boat lanes.  If the same personnel were used to clear the total 
lanes, it will require additional time to transport, collect data, and rest the crew. 
3. The LCS ships must have the necessary storage capacity to store the equipment.   
4. The dive team requires additional planning time that must be accounted for to allow 
the crew to operate when the environment is affected by tidal currents and natural 
obstructions.  
5. The dive team must operate during times of limited visibility to enable them to 
remain undetected.  The back-of-the-envelope (BOE) analysis took this factor under 
consideration for the analysis and determined that portions of the clearance operation 
will need to be performed during times of light.  This will make the team vulnerable 
to the enemy and very difficult for the team to remain covert.   
6. The dive team requires a transportation boat to enter the operation area and remain 
close to the field to support divers.  This creates an extreme limitation providing 
support from the host platform to the diver transportation boat during clearance if the 
host platform intends to remain over the horizon (OTH).  
3. Current Capability Analysis Conclusion 
It was determined through analysis and research in this MCM capabilities analysis report 
that the current and future MCM systems are unable to adequately meet the 72 hours of clearance 
time for amphibious VSW operation.  A redesigned system architecture and reassessment of its 
concept of employment is recommended along with an evaluation of the development of future 
systems to ensure they meet amphibious operational timeline requirements.  Current and future 
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MCM systems are transitioning to remotely operated sensors with intentions to remove divers 
from amphibious mine field operations as much as possible, but there are still several common 
challenges that need to be addressed with remotely operated sensor systems before they can be 
meet MCM operational requirements.   
 
In general, limitations of the new MCM systems, particularity with UUV/AUVs, are that 
they require more time for data analysis, with limited covert operation especially with devices 
towed from above the water.  Due to the size of UUV/AUVs, they require large platforms such 
as an LCS or helicopter to launch them in desired mission operations.  Oceanic factors causing 
issues with sensor information in the VSW zone create another hurdle to overcome in conducting 
MCM operations in this region. 
C. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In developing an understanding of current MCM threats and capabilities, it became 
necessary to look further into the implementation of MCM using historical examples to guide the 
development of an architectural solution and operational concept. 
1. Background 
US forces have been developing MCM capabilities since World War I, where the US 
Navy assisted the United Kingdom with clearing the North Sea Mine Barrage (Gilbert, 2001).  In 
1988, MCM concepts were launched to counter mines deployed in the Persian Gulf by Iran.  The 
mining situation in the Persian Gulf was dubbed the “Tanker Wars” because both Iraq and Iran 
focused their mines to attack shipping platforms in this area.  The threat of mined harbors and 
sea lanes were used with the intent of terrorizing friendly forces into diverting from normal 
operations.  The goals of these actions were to draw other countries into a war, or to cause Allied 
forces to expend capital in providing defenses for maritime shipping.  Iran covertly attacked 
shipping bound for neutral countries at the time including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates, in the hopes that these attacks would force the Sheikdoms to take sides and thus 
force Iraq into withdrawing from Iranian territory (Andrew, 2007).  While Iraqi forces attacked 
shipping with air assets in a declared war zone, Iran was successful in attacking shipping 
covertly with mines.    
Iran‟s intent in 1988 is slightly different from the defensive objective of an enemy that 
develops a coastal defense against an amphibious assault.  The mining used by the Iranians was 
to covertly harass merchant shipping and disrupt transit through the gulf.  By subtly placing 
mines in an area away from territorial waters and leaving them unattended, the enemy avoids 
culpability by lack of presence when a mine detonates.  Mines used for littoral defense are 
similar to US mining policies since they are used to delay or disrupt amphibious forces with the 
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intent of shifting counter attacking forces to stop the landing.  Against an amphibious force, the 
mines are used to canalize an attacking amphibious force into a kill zone targeted for destruction.  
Therefore, the threat emplaces a coastal defense with an over-watching force that will engage 
and attempt to destroy all MCM operations with direct or indirect fire.  This is uniquely different 
from the Persian Gulf experience in which mines were placed by a country trying to hide its 
identity.    
The takeaway is that the enemy threat will not only be defensive, but also offensive in 
tactics.  For this report, the MCM units cannot assume freedom of movement when sweeping a 
coastal defense that has employed sea mines.  To develop systems to support an amphibious 
operation, it is important to assess and analyze how MCM operations deploy and employ tactics 
to develop support systems to execute an amphibious operation. 
a. MCM Operational Phases 
MCM doctrine states that there are five maritime MCM mission objectives when 
planning operations.  These objectives are Exploratory, Reconnaissance, Breakthrough, Attrition, 
and Clearing (JP 3-15, 2011).  The order of conduct for MCM operation phases are: 
1. Exploratory Phase – In this phase, an advance task force (ATF) conducts quick 
reconnaissance to determine if mines are present in the path of the amphibious force. 
2. Reconnaissance Phase – In this phase, the ATF conducts a more thorough reconnaissance 
to determine:  
a. Gaps in mine fields and any other obstacles present.  The amphibious force 
desires to find a path through the mines before attempting to neutralize mines to 
create a path.  In this phase, the navy planners try to find boat lanes to the shore in 
which the amphibious force can bypass and avoid obstacles.   
b. Mine density along the desired paths to the objective landing point 
c. Type of mines along the paths and their locations 
d. Limits of the width and length of the mine fields and obstacles 
e. Hydrographic reconnaissance in the area of operation, that determines depths, 
beach gradients, and the nature of the bottom and man-made obstacles 
3. Breakthrough – The objective of this phase is directed at rapidly opening channels and 
staging areas for an amphibious operation.  The goal is to reduce the threat to friendly 
shipping vessels passing through a mine threat area in a specified time available for 
MCM. 
4. Attrition – The objective of this phase is to continuously keep the threat of mines to 
shipping traffic as low as possible when vessels must continue to transit the mined waters 
for a comparatively long period of time. 
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5. Clearing – In this phase, the mines are removed from the assigned area, reducing risk to 
specified acceptable level. 
b. Mine Field & Obstacle Detection in Support of Amphibious Operations 
The fundamental phases the MCM systems must perform are the Exploratory, 
Reconnaissance, and Breakthrough phases to support an amphibious mission.  The most critical 
tasks in accomplishing these objectives is identifying where the obstacles and mine fields are.  
However, unlike the mission to conduct MCM operations to protect sea lanes of communication 
or port security; the second most important task is clearing the mine fields.  This concept is 
derived from several sources.  A 1998 Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in 
Littoral Power Projection report stated:  
Rather than pursue an attritionist approach through cumulative destruction, the 
commander must subject the enemy‟s mines and obstacles to rigorous 
surveillance and reconnaissance in order to locate and avoid them altogether or 
maneuver through existing gaps. When avoidance is not an option and adequate 
gaps are not readily identifiable, rapid, in-stride breaching of the enemy‟s mines 
and obstacles will be conducted (Rhodes & Holder, 1998).    
This was again echoed in a 2000 report from the United States Naval Research Advisory 
Committee (NRAC) Panel: 
The MCM mission must provide for mine clearance for checkpoints, straits, and 
the full length of the lines of communication as well as for projection of power 
ashore.  There have been on-going evolutionary changes to doctrine and tactics 
that capitalize on the full potential of our current capabilities.  These changes in 
tactics and doctrine have not solved the mine threat in the CLZ to 40ft water 
depth; however, the emerging tactics do offer an alternative of going around or 
over a mined beach.  The commander must detect, classify and identify the 
construct of the mine threat, assess the viability of gaps, determine the potential 
for in-stride penetration and issue an operations order.  The order might direct 
exploitation of the gaps, direct minefield clearance for surface assault, or order 
vertical envelopment, or any combination of the above, including all of them.  
The requirement to clear the mined area remains.  The order must provide mine 
clearance of an area large enough in capacity to provide for the unloading of the 
huge volumes of materiel and warfighting personnel required to exploit the initial 
attack and conduct subsequent operations ashore… (Naval Research Advisory 
Committee, 2000).   
Lastly, in a 2005 brief to the Mine Warfare Association, Brigadier General Neller stated, 
“Commanders must be able to detect and avoid mines when possible, and breach them when 
necessary” (Neller, 2005). 
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c. Mine Clearance Area   
The most critical objective is finding the gaps during the reconnaissance phase of the 
operation.  However, in order to determine the number of assets needed to conduct a MCM 
reconnaissance; the size of the area and number of routes needing reconnaissance must be 
determined.  
 
Figure 8 comes from Brigadier General Neller‟s presentation to the Mine Warfare 
Association and it depicts the size and the number of routes needing reconnaissance for one 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).  From the figure, a MEB needs two littoral penetration 
sites (LPS) to land its assets ashore.  A LPS is a continuous segment of coastline through which 
landing forces cross by surface or vertical means (STOM, 2011).  It is an area big enough to 
support the landing of one Battalion Combat Team (BCT).  However, to provide flexibility for 
the Marine force to maneuver from over the horizon, a MEB requires at a minimum 4 LPS to be 
reconnoitered.  Each LPS will consist of 8 potential littoral penetration points (LPPs).  LPPs are 
a spot on the shore to fix as objective for the amphibious force to breach or come ashore.  It 
needs only be large enough to support the passage of a single craft, but it may be used by a 
maneuver element or series of maneuver elements passing in column (STOM, 2011).  The BCT 
will actually need only 4 LPPs to be cleared, but once again requires the flexibility in maneuver.  
Therefore the MCM assets must be able to reconnoiter a total of 32 LPPs.  If the amphibious 
operation needs to support 2 MEBs it could be surmised that the MCM operation must 
reconnoiter 64 LPPs and clear 12 to 16 LPPs.    
 
 
Figure 8. Amphibious Landing Site Dimensions 
 
Map depicts the number LPPs and size of area that MCM assets will need to clear (Neller, 2005). 
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To determine the width of the area that needs reconnoitering, it is surmised that each LPP 
is wide enough to support one boat lane.  A typical boat lane as described in MCWP 3-13, is 
between 2000 to 2700 yards long by 500 yards in width (MCWP3-13, 2005).  Therefore if each 
LPP is 500 yards in width and they are separated by 100 yards, a LPS must be at a minimum 
4800 yards in width.  If each LPS is separated by 3 Km as shown in Figure 8, the minimum 
width for MEB landing site is approximately 28 Km.  To support 2 MEBs, the landing site width 
can range from 28 to 56 Km.  This is because the MEB could land side by side or one after 
another.   
 
The length of the area is determined by adding the length of the boat lane with the 
approach lane.  Figure 9 shows the concept for launching Amphibious Assault Vehicles 
including the approach lane, launch area and a boat lane.  The approach lane is the area in which 
a boat approaches an area to launch AAVs.  The approach lane typical length is from 2000 to 
10,000 yards (MCWP3-13, 2005).  Therefore the total length of MCM clearance area is the boat 
lanes plus the approach lane, which is a maximum of 12,700 yards.  The maximum overall area 
the amphibious MCM assets must reconnoiter and clear to support an amphibious landing for 2 
MEBs is approximately 56 Km by 12.7 Km. 
 
Figure 9. Amphibious Operations Area 
 
Figure depicts the concept for launching AAV in support of an Amphibious Operation (MCWP3-13, 2005). 
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2. Current Mine Clearance Operations 
If mine fields cannot be bypassed on certain lanes, breach operations become necessary.  
It is during the breakthrough phase, the third MCM operational phase, in which the ATF will 
perform breaching operations of the mine fields that cannot be bypassed or gone around.  MCM 
doctrine states that there are 4 fundamental steps to breaching a mine obstacle in support of an 
amphibious landing which are: Suppression, Obscuration, Security, and Reduction (Joint Pub 3-
15, 1999).  Alternatively, NATO describes these steps as: Suppression, Obscuration, Isolation, 
and Reduction (NATO, 2010).  For the purpose of this report, the NATO doctrine will apply.  
NATO document ATP-8(B) Volume I describes these steps as the following: 
a. Detection of a Minefield 
The mine field is detected and classified by the ATF during the exploration and 
reconnaissance phase shown in Figure 10.  Boat lanes are determined and mines needing 
neutralization are selected.  
 
Figure 10. Mines are detected and located 















b. Suppression  
“Effective suppression is the mission-critical task during any breaching operation.  
Suppression protects the forces that are conducting operations to reduce the sea mine risk, 
neutralize obstacles or maneuver through these, and fixes the opposing force in his position.  
Suppressive fires include the full range of lethal and non-lethal fires, from naval gun support 
(NGS) and close air support (CAS) to electronic attack (EA)” (NATO, 2010).  Figure 11 
graphically shows a concept for suppressing the threat‟s ability to over-watch the mine field. 
 
 
Figure 11. Suppression of Threat 
 
















c. Obscuration  
 “Obscuration hampers opposing forces‟ observation and target acquisition (TA), and 
conceals friendly activities and movement.  EA prevents the opposing force‟s use of radar and 
radio signals to observe and report the operation” (NATO, 2010).  Figure 12 demonstrates a 




Figure 12. Obscuration 
 



















d. Isolation  
“Isolation of the landing area is required to prevent opposing force interference with (sea) 
mine and obstacle clearance operations, and passage of forces ashore through breached lanes.  
Isolation can be achieved in a manner similar to that described in Suppression and also by 
elements of the landing force that are placed ashore by air-insertion.  These landing force 
elements can neutralize coastal defense installations and seize and deny routes of ingress into the 
landing area, thus preventing the opposing force to counter-attack the landing beaches” (NATO, 
2010).  Figure 13 demonstrates the amphibious force isolating the coastal defense from being 
reinforced and being able to engage the MCM force. 
 
 
Figure 13. Isolation 
 




















e. Reduction  
“Identification and marking of safe lanes for the landing force to conduct surface 
landings takes place by naval forces from the ATF, other assigned forces, and elements from the 
landing force.  The location of lanes depends largely on identified weaknesses in the sea mine 
and obstacle belt.  If the ATF cannot find gaps or weak coverage in the obstacles, they will apply 
concentrated force at a designated point to rupture the defense and create a gap.  Units reducing 
obstacles mark the lane and report the obstacle type, location, and lane locations to higher 
headquarters.  Details of lanes are handed over to follow-on forces that further reduce or clear 
the obstacles, if required” (NATO, 2010).  Figure 14 demonstrates the time when the MCM force 
has successfully reduced the mine obstacle and has created a breach for the amphibious force to 
transit through. 
 
Figure 14. Reduction of Obstacle 
Drawing is to demonstrate a naval force breaching and reducing the mine obstacle to allow the naval force to pass. 
3. Analysis of Capability Gaps 
In order to understand and appreciate the capability gaps for current MCM operations 
supporting an amphibious force, a comparison analysis was conducted evaluating previous 
amphibious landings with current and expected future US Naval assets.  Even though there are 
more recent historical examples of amphibious operations, the WWII invasion of Guadalcanal 
was chosen for comparison to a hypothetical invasion with today‟s and future naval assets for the 
following reasons: 
1. Guadalcanal was the first invasion for the United States during WWII.  This created a 
situation in which the US tested its newer technology and tactics for conducting 
amphibious operations against an enemy with a coastal defense.  The application of new 
technology and tactics is still relevant to amphibious force landings today.   
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2. Two crucial battles had taken place before Guadalcanal, the Battle of Coral Sea and the 
Battle of Midway.  This made the US and Japan on parity for Air and Naval operations.  
The US did not hold air superiority, nor did its naval forces have a superior advantage 
over Japan.  This would be the case today if the US would experience a conflict with 
China or Russia and it needed to perform an amphibious operation. 
The full comparison analysis is contained in Appendix C.  The following capability gaps 
were found through the comparison analysis and current doctrine. 
a. OTH Capability 
The use of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) by a defensive force necessitates sufficient 
standoff distance by the invading force in order to avoid and counter the ASCM threat.  The 
presence of ASCMs drives the requirement for the ATF to operate from OTH.  OTH is a difficult 
term to define as the definition of the appropriate OTH distance from the objective varies.  Joint 
Publication 3-02 Amphibious Operations states that “over-the-horizon amphibious operation is 
an amphibious operation initiated from beyond visual and radar range of the enemy shore” (JP 3-
02, 2009).  This is normally at the horizon which is approximately 22 to 25 miles at sea.  
However, it is suggested that the ATF that contains MCM assets initially operate no closer than 
50 nm from the objective in order to provide a large margin of time to react to launched ASCMs.  
Additionally, other analysts have said that amphibious assaults will be launched from OTH at 25 
to 50 miles at sea (Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 1999).  This further justifies 
that current and future MCM system should have the ability to be deployed and launched from 
distances greater than 50 nm in order to meet the highest requirement.   
b. MMS and need for Unmanned Vehicles 
MCM Operations from distances greater than 50 nm creates other gaps in MCM system 
performance.  It drives the need for unmanned vehicles to replace the divers and MMS to 
perform MCM operations for the amphibious force.  According to stakeholder inquires, the 
MCM operations must be done within a 48 to 72 hour time frame before the arrival of the main 
Task Force (TF).  This drives a requirement for a capability of sustained covert MCM operations 
to be done at distances greater than 50 nm from the C2 ships.  Even though MMS can be inserted 
covertly, the sustaining covert operations at distances greater than 50 nm from C2 ships starts to 
exceed marine mammal limits, and can be considered a deficiency in the capability to perform 
the mission.  
c. Communication Gap with Unmanned Vehicles 
MCM operations from distances greater than 50 nm creates a gap in the ability to 
communicate with remote vehicles.  The MCM system will have a need for a secure, adaptable, 
 47 
and robust communication system.  Taking into consideration that many communication systems 
are line-of-sight (LOS) systems, C2 MCM ships operating at distances 50 nm or more from the 
objective will be unable to communicate with distant remote vehicles.  The MCM C2 ships will 
require another method to communicate with the unmanned vehicles, and possibly use multiple 
communication methods and connections to respond to failures or dropped connections to 
maintain communication when transiting through and about the operation area.  
d. System Manning Gaps 
In addition to the system need for adapting to communication modes, there are other 
circumstances that create the need for a capability to operate autonomously.  Presently, MCM 
personnel are estimated to number 690 personnel from calculations for MCM Sea and Air 
support.  This estimate is based on the fact that it takes 6 officers and 75 enlisted to operate an 
MCM ship.  If 25% of the crew is used to run the ship and the other part is used to run the MCM 
systems; then it requires 60 personnel for the MCM assets.  Task Force 76 (TF 76) is a forward 
deployed Pacific force consisting of Amphibious Squadron 11 and a Mine Countermeasure 
Squadron.  TF 76 is composed of 4 MCM ships, which equates to 450 MCM personnel to 
support a given mission (Task Force 76 Webmaster, 2011). 
The Navy started retiring MCM class ships in 2008, planning to have their mission fully 
taken over by the LCS in 2017 (Munoz, 2011) when all MCM class ships have been 
decommissioned.  The LCS will have only 35 additional berthing accommodations for mission 
kit personnel (O'Rourke, 2011).  If each LCS shown in Table 42 (Appendix C) was dedicated to 
MCM operation, this equates to 140 berthing spaces available.  However, it is not reasonable to 
assume that all four LCS are dedicated to MCM.  It should be assumed that one of the LCS will 
be dedicated to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to protect the landing force.  Therefore, the total 
berthing dedicated to MCM will be about 105.  A future MH-60 AMCM detachment (DET) will 
consist of 23 personnel.  If two AMCM DETs are attached to the LCSs then there will be a 
requirement to provide berthing for 46 personnel.  This leaves room for 59 personnel to support 
the surface MCM operation as compared to the 450 for present day missions.  
 
In a meeting discussing remote piloted aircraft (RPA), the chief scientist for the US Air 
Force, Dr. Mark Maybury, said that the “Number 1 manning problem in the Air Force is 
manning our unmanned platforms” (Maybury, 2011).  Dr. Maybury showed RPAs need just as 
many, and sometimes more personnel to operate than piloted vehicles.  The Air Force and Army 
recognize that the answer to reducing the number of required personnel and the life-cycle cost of 
remote piloted vehicles (RPV) is the creation of autonomously operating unmanned vehicles.  
The Navy is currently creating ships with lower personnel capacity, but that creates gaps in the 
ability to command and control remotely piloted vehicles.  The reduction in future manning 
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requires MCM vehicles to operate with autonomy so that the manning requirement is reduced.  
The MCM vehicle needs not only the capability to operate in a fully autonomous mode, but in a 
semi-autonomous mode to provide mission-dependent options and redundancy of control.  
 
Understanding how to solve current and future manning constraints starts with defining 
current manning expected for MCM systems, especially in the case of the MK 18 Mod 1 UUV 
systems.  This has proven to be difficult to define since on station manning depends on the 
experience and proficiency of the current trained operators and the size of the mission.  At this 
point, assumptions have been determined based from stakeholder information that typically, the 
mission will consist at a minimum of 7 personnel:  two UUV operators that handle system launch 
and recovery and operations, one qualified small boat operator, and two Post Mission Analysis 
(PMA) personnel to review the collected and processed data.  The number of personnel required 
for the mission expands in respect to the size of the mission area increasing.  This would then 
require additional UUVs, UUV operators and PMA personnel, especially if additional vehicles 
are required to be launched with more complex sensors that are expected to produce large 
amount of imagery data to be reviewed.   
e. Unmanned Vehicle with On-Board Processing Gap 
Many present day MCM unmanned vehicles need to be recovered to download 
information so that human post mission analysis (PMA) can be performed on the collected data.  
Stakeholders have indicated that PMA is error-prone, produces false positives, and is a very 
lengthy process.  This alone drives a requirement for the MCM vehicle to have the ability to 
perform its own processing with reliable auto-target recognition (ATR) functions.  However, 
with the requirement for the MCM system to operate further than 50 nm from the C² ships, the 
MCM vehicles will not be able to transition back-and-forth between the C² ships and the AO 
without taking up precious mission time and resources.  This creates another gap in being able to 
perform the MCM mission.  The MCM system must have the capability to perform on-board 
processing and compress the information and conduct data transmit and receive effectively to the 
ATF without delaying mission execution.   
f. Unmanned Vehicle Deployment Gap 
Covert MCM operations from distances greater than 50 nm also creates a need for the 
MCM vehicle to be delivered covertly to the AO.  Presently there are no MCM systems being 
developed that can be delivered via stealth at distances greater than 50 nm.  MCM vehicles 
should be capable of being delivered or deployed from subsurface, air, stealthy surface, or 
ordinance delivered platforms.  Additionally, since the distance between the AO and where the 
C² ships are located are so great, the MCM vehicles need a high degree of endurance to transit 
and operate for long periods of time.  This is outside the ability of most MCM systems today.  
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Future MCM vehicles will need the capability to be covertly and autonomously be refueled or 
recharged to sustain their operation.  They should be able to loiter and conserve energy while not 
performing a mission or waiting to be recovered. 
g. VSW Sensor Gap 
As discussed earlier, the VSW region is difficult to operate in as it suffers from merging 
Ekman boundary layers, transient stratification, buoyancy fluxes caused by changes in salinity of 
the water, and various winds, waves, tides, and currents (National Academy Press, 2000).  This 
drives the need for MCM vehicles that operate in the water with strong propulsion system with 
precise and robust navigation and sensor systems.  Currently there are no water-borne systems 
that can operate effectively in all environmental conditions in this region today.  The ability to 
design systems to perform in the diverse VSW environment still remains a gap in the ability to 
perform MCM for an amphibious force. 
 
The diverse quality of the VSW region makes it impossible to use just one sensor to 
detect, locate, and classify mines.  Waves and winds can change the optical and acoustic 
properties of water columns due to circulation caused by the influence of local coastal 
topography (National Academy Press, 2000).  Local weather can cause conditions that produce 
muddy, outflows of water from nearby rivers and estuaries.  The fluid dynamics can quickly 
cover and uncover mines by shifting the sea floor.  Euphotic zones, caused by organic and 
inorganic materials dissolved or suspended in the water, will degrade optics and lasers.  The 
sound reverberation backgrounds, low signal-to-noise environments and high cluttered acoustic 
backgrounds will degrade acoustic sensors (National Academy Press, 2000).  Lastly the dumping 
of metal clutter, shipwrecks, and fishing losses will produce false positives with magnetic 
detectors.  
 
Most MCM systems are single sensor systems which do not collaborate with other 
systems.  This creates a gap in the ability to perform effective MCM operations in the VSW area 
with unmanned systems.  The MCM system must have the capability to fuse information from 
multiple sensors and process it to detect, locate and classify mines.   
h. Neutralization Gap 
Lastly, there are no unmanned MCM systems that effectively perform neutralization 
(disable a mine) in the VSW area.  There are no systems being developed that can be deployed 
from OTH and can be used to covertly neutralize mines.  This creates another gap in our ability 
to perform amphibious assaults against a hostile force with an anti-landing defense.  There is a 
need to develop a neutralization system that will either neutralize the mine covertly or neutralize 
it on command. 
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D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A stakeholder analysis was conducted to identify stakeholder needs, requirements, 
scenarios, modeling metrics and parameters, and input for system benefits, cost, and trade-off 
analysis.  Questions posed to stakeholders in the analysis were derived from research and 
stakeholder documents pertaining to the problem statement. 
1. Objectives 
The objective of the stakeholder analysis was to identify applicable stakeholders, gather 
background details about MCM, and develop a summary of their needs.  Research was 
conducted utilizing the stakeholders‟ own MCM documentation and public MCM literature to 
find answers and information, and to clarify specific questions relating to the problem at hand.  
The process used for conducting the stakeholder analysis is shown Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. Stakeholder Analysis Process 
Stakeholder Analysis Process used in elicitation of input from stakeholders and translation of input to requirements. 
 
The stakeholder analysis consisted of performing seven different activities:  Identify 
Stakeholders, Group/Categorize Stakeholders, Develop Questions, Gather Stakeholder Answers 
& Views, Develop Weighting Scale, Develop Process to Identify Requirements/Needs, and 
Analyze Inputs.  Further descriptions of these activities are detailed as follows: 
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a) The first activity, Identify Stakeholder, conducted an analysis of resources used to date in 
order to identify stakeholders.  This activity served as an input to conducting basic 
research.  During this activity, contact with stakeholders was initialized by requesting 
them to communicate with our group about MCM.  The output of this activity was a list 
of potential stakeholders. 
b) The second activity, Group/Categorize Stakeholders, grouped and categorized the 
stakeholders into three groups: Primary, Secondary, and External.      
a. Primary Stakeholders consisted of stakeholders who are held responsible for 
success or failure of the system. 
b. Secondary Stakeholders consisted of stakeholders that had a large stake in the 
system and had a high profile but were not directly held responsible for success or 
failure of the system. 
c. External Stakeholders consisted of stakeholders that were affected by the system 
but had very little if any input or involvement in implementing the solution. 
During this activity the stakeholders were evaluated for the relevancy to the project.  If 
the identified stakeholders did not fall into one of these groups they were deleted.  The 
output of this activity was three stakeholder groups. 
c) The third activity, Develop Questions, drafted potential questions to discuss with 
stakeholders based on the capstone project problem statement.  Questions were generated 
from the external activities of the basic research, the threat analysis, and the capabilities 
analysis, coupled with initial feedback from stakeholder interaction.  Questions were 
selected and categorized for individual stakeholders based on the output of activity 2, the 
relevant grouping or categorization of stakeholders.  The output of this activity was a set 
of questions that were e-mailed or personally discussed with stakeholders. 
d) The fourth activity, Gather Stakeholder Answers & Views, gathered and sorted the 
resulting answers and opinions from stakeholders from the third activity, Develop 
Questions.  The stakeholder answers were assessed to determine if a process needed to be 
developed to identify and discriminate between conflicting viewpoints.  The output of the 
Gather Stakeholder Answers & Views activity resulted in a master list of responses from 
the stakeholders. 
e) The fifth activity, Identify Requirements or Needs, developed a process for de-conflicting 
different viewpoints from the stakeholders.  This process was used to filter responses and 
to identify and prioritize requirements and needs.  The Identify Requirements/Needs 
activity took the outputs of activity 2, Group/Categorize Stakeholders, and activity 6, 
Develop Weighting Scale, to develop a process for evaluating answers.  The Identify 
Requirements/Needs activity was triggered by the responses of the answers gathered 
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from the stakeholders (activity 4).  If the answers did not warrant a formal process, this 
activity was skipped.   
f) The sixth activity, Develop Weighting Scale, developed a weighting scale based on the 
category of stakeholders.  The weighted scale allowed the stakeholders that are most 
closely related to the problem to have precedence in the decision-making process.  This 
activity was triggered by the output of activity 5, Identify Requirements/Needs.  If there 
was a need to develop a formal process to evaluate the answers, this activity created 
stakeholder weights.   
g) The last activity, Analyze Inputs, took the stakeholder answers from activity 4, 
Stakeholder Answers & Views, and translated them into requirements, capabilities, and 
scenarios for modeling.  This translation was accomplished by intuitive analysis of the 
answers or via the filter created by activity 5, Identify Requirements/Needs.  The output 
of this activity was fed into the external activities of modeling, requirements 























2. Stakeholder Identification 
 
Table 5 contains the list of stakeholder organizations that were identified in this Capstone 
Project.  Personnel identified in the list are representatives of the stakeholder organization. 
Table 5. Stakeholders List 
Stakeholder organizations identified to have an interest in Next Generation Mine Countermeasures in the VSW zone 





Code Organization Title Person Primary Secondary External 
PMS 403 
Remote Mine hunting Systems  
Program Office Mr. Steven Lose X 
  PMS 408 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) and Counter Radio 
Controlled Improvised 
Explosive Device Electronic 
Warfare (CREW) Program 
Office Mr. Matt Zalesak X     
PMS 420 Littoral Combat Ship (LSC) 
Mission Modules Program 
Office 
Mr. George B 
Saroch X     
PMS 495 Mine Warfare Systems 
Program Office 
Mr. Andrew 
Fuller  X     
PMA-299 H-60 Program Office Mr. Danny Sinisi X     
OPNAV -
N852 
Mine Warfare  Branch 
 LCDR Brian 
Amador X     
NSWC-PCD 
NSWC Panama City Division - 
Mine Warfare Systems Branch 
Mr. Aamir 
Qaiyumi X     
OPNAV-
N88 Director, Air Warfare Division 
 CDR Shelby 




Aviation  Plans and 
Requirements     X 
 
PMS 340 Navy Special Warfare Program 
Office     X 
 
USMC-
CmdEng USMC Combat Engineering Capt Peter Moon 
  
X 
NMAWC Naval Mine and Anti-
Submarine Command 
Mr. Marvin 
Heinze X     
EODMU 1 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal 











EODMU1 ITT Tech Rep  Mr. Bob Stitt X 
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3. Stakeholder Interviews 
Appendix B lists the questions that were developed from stakeholder research and the 
answers that provided input into the threat and capabilities analyses.  Stakeholder questions were 
directed at the relevant stakeholder, as indicated, with the resultant response or non-responses.  
The questions varied in topics from the stakeholders‟ perspective of current system performance 
to asking stakeholders to identify current MCM capability constraints.  When stakeholders were 
asked to address if current systems today are capable of removing the man/MMS from the mine 
field, it was an unanimous agreement that current systems are not providing this capability and 
are still requiring nearby support.   
 
When stakeholders were asked to address current operational constraints imposed in 
current MCM operations and systems, the stakeholders all gave different, but all valid concerns.  
One stakeholder indicated that the diversity of the VSW environment and our ability to develop 
technology to perform in all situations was a constraint for conducting operations.  Another 
stakeholder identified that large current system footprints are a major constraint and are limiting 
MCM deployment capabilities.  An additional constraint came from a stakeholder who voiced 
that current doctrinal restrictions of identification and classification by a human (diver) and 
confirmed to be officially classified and also before neutralization can occur is something that 
potentially inhibiting the advancement of technology solutions.   
 
Not all questions were able to be answered or were answered in general terms in order to 
avoid discussions into classified areas.  Some questions related to platform interoperability with 
the LCS or future MCM platforms were not answered, as well as questions related to current 
amphibious lane clearance marking methods.  Some of the vague answers were related to 
questions about future manning expectations with responses that were very short and limited.  
Stakeholders did indicate what questions they currently did not have answers for varied from 
questions related to future manning concerns and various future operational considerations.  
4. Stakeholder Analysis Summary Findings 
At the conclusion of the stakeholder analysis, the number one insight discovered was the 
apparent disconnect between the MCM community and the Marine/Navy Amphibious 
Operations strategic planning activities.   
 
Additional key points from the stakeholder analysis are: 
 
a) As the MCM-1 decommissioning process is being executed, the replacement surface-
based MCM systems will need to be housed and stored on the new Littoral Combat Ships 
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(LCS) or other amphibious ships.  There seems to be a lack of coordination in defining 
shipboard manning and footprint requirements for the MCM equipment and personnel.    
b) The most effective system for performing MCM in the VSW region is the Marine 
Mammal System (MMS).  However, their footprint is extremely large, consuming the 
majority of amphibious ship well deck.  This is precious space that would normally be 
dedicated to Marine Corps personnel and equipment. 
c) The Marine Corps requires that MCM must provide the capability to clear a minimum of 
12 boat lanes to land 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) of 29,000 Marines and 
Sailors (Trickey, February 2010).  The requirement is for the lanes to be cleared covertly 
within the objective of 72 hours.  There appears to be a lack of planning for the number 
of assets required by the MCM force to facilitate the clearance of those lanes or a 
timeline for conducting clearance operations.  The MCM community does not accurately 
address the amount of time it will take to collect the data, recover the data, and perform 
the clearance supporting an amphibious force. 
d) All Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) require a launch and recovery platform that 
is typically a small craft that remains close to the minefield.  At this point, UUVs support 
removing the diver from conducting clearance operations but it does not support 
stakeholder requirements of removing the man from the minefield. 
e) All the systems being developed presently to replace the MMS require post mission 
analysis (PMA) to be performed.  Man/Mammal replacement systems are increasing the 
DTE timeline because there is not currently an efficient way to gather real-time data from 
the UUV platform.  
f) PMA currently involves humans manually reviewing several hours of sonar data which is 
time consuming and error prone due to human fatigue. 
g) All the systems currently under development are tested and operated with the assumption 
that the environment is permissive.  This is an unrealistic expectation in performing an 
amphibious operation, and it should be assumed that operations will be in non-
permissive, hostile environments.  MCM systems need to be designed to counter anti-
landing defenses.  Anti-landing doctrine focuses on the development of four layered 
barriers and the particular area that the MCM community should be concerned with is the 
engineering barriers.  Doctrine emphasizes that the engineering barrier will be over 
watched by land based artillery, air-defenses systems and crew served weapons (JP 3-02, 
2009).  The enemy threat intends to deny freedom of movement to conduct MCM 
operations.  The MCM scenarios for the development of MCM systems revolve around a 
port defense or clearing a Q-lane.  It should be expected that the enemy who has planted 
mines for an anti-landing defense will have an over watch that will engage the MCM 
force upon detection with direct and indirect fire.   
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h)  Systems being developed do not fully address Over-the-Horizon (OTH) amphibious 
operations.  An assumption made for this analysis is that the MCM community is 
focusing on getting initial concepts and technology to work in the challenging VSW 
environment, rather than focusing on the need for clandestine MCM operations needed to 
support OTH capabilities. 
i) MCM clearance execution is not consistent with training execution.  In training, divers 
and MMS train to complete full DTE operations.  In execution of real world events, the 
mission is often cut short and a full DTE is not always complete.  An assumption made 
for this finding is that due to the timeline restrictions, the execution of neutralization is 
very rarely performed.   
j) In the MCM systems in use today and under development for the future, there is limited 
UUV neutralization capability.  From informal discussions with PMS 408 (EOD), it was 
indicated that only recently, development of a UUV mine neutralization system, the 
EUNS (Expendable UUV Neutralization System), has begun with notional concept 
development.  The lack of neutralization assets creates a situation in which MCM and 
amphibious forces must perform a mark and avoid maneuver.  However, it was not 
indicated from the research about how mines will be marked or their locations 
communicated to a Marine Corps force performing OTH amphibious operations. 
k) In technology demonstrations, there are usually several different UUVs completing 
separate missions.  Each technology team runs portions of the mission profile and limited 
time is focused on running them together as a complete DTE sequence.  MCM has not 
fully analyzed how these assets will be coordinated or controlled as an MCM SoS in 
support of Marine Corps amphibious operations. 
5. Stakeholder Analysis Conclusion 
From the stakeholder feedback received, it was clear that there are no current or emerging 
solutions that can accomplish the full DTE mission.  The lack of response from a number of 
critical stakeholders, limitation on some information due to content classification, and conflicting 
responses as indicated in Appendix B prompted an informal analysis of responses detailed in the 
previous section.  This informal analysis of the information received seems to reveal an 
emerging disconnect between the Mine Countermeasure (MCM) community and the 
Marine/Navy Amphibious Operations planning elements.   
 
This disconnect could be caused by a number of reasons.  One assumption made from 
this analysis is that MCM architecture should be considered a system of system (SoS).  It is 
composed of several systems consisting of ships such as the Littoral Combat System (LCS), 
helicopters such as MH-60S and MH-53E, divers, Marine Mammals Systems (MMS), Light 
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Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems, air and sea acoustic and magnetic systems, recording 
and post mission analysis systems, and delivered and air delivered neutralization systems.  In 
addition to the multiple stakeholders and systems involved in the triad of MCM clearance, MCM 
architecture should be considered from a SoS approach due to the complexity and diversity of 
the VSW environment.  It is recommended as a potential solution to use multiple vehicles that 
individually conduct smaller portions of the DTE sequence.  This approach is also recommended 
that the SoS takes into consideration full collaboration throughout the mission to conduct MCM 
operations in order to ensure that system requirements and functions are met. 
 
On future amphibious ships and LCS platforms, there will be limited transport space and 
available berthing for support personnel.  The systems currently being developed span a number 
of different organizations and contractors that do not seem to know how they are affected by the 
other organizations with similar missions, or what requirements are levied on them from other 
organizations‟ decisions.  These organizations referenced in Appendix B,  
Table 5 are focused on their own development and have not communicated with each 
other sufficiently to meet the needs of the Navy/Marine Corps customer.  A hypothesis is that 
there is a need for a Lead System Architect for the overall MCM SoS.  However, the results of 
this stakeholder analysis did not give enough supporting evidence from critical stakeholders to 
confirm or deny this hypothesis.   
 
Future systems will be able to conduct port defense, sea lane protection and clearance in a 
permissive environment.  However, the systems that are currently fielded or being developed 
have severe limitations in supporting a marine amphibious operation against anti-invasion 
defense.  If these disconnects are not corrected, marine amphibious operations will be severely 
handicapped. 
 
The disconnection seems to be with the MCM community concentrating on developing 
systems that require platforms to have freedom of launch, recovery, and operation without 
considering entry and operation in denied access areas.  The presentations and training of these 
systems appear to assume the MCM unit has freedom of movement and the ability to operate 
from land.  This will not be the case when performing amphibious landings against a threat that 







































III. SYSTEM DEFINITION 
A. IMPORTANT NEXT GENERATION CAPABILITIES 
Based on the analysis of gaps in existing and planned systems against current threats, 
operational considerations, and the results of the stakeholder analysis, the following are the most 
important capabilities that are needed for the Next Generation Mine Countermeasures for the 
VSW Zone in Support of Amphibious Operations:  
1. Covert Activities 
The MCM system needs the capability of performing MCM operations covertly by 
maintaining a minimum visual, radar, magnetic, and acoustic signature to support the 
amphibious advance party activities.  Covert operation will result in relaxing the need to provide 
suppression fire in the obscuration activity of the MCM breakthrough phase.  If MCM can be 
conducted without detection, the opposing force will not react hostilely and expose forces to 
unnecessary risk.  
2. Real-Time Information 
The MCM system needs the capability to provide Marine amphibious forces with real-
time information of mines and mine field locations, cleared and marked boat lanes, location of 
barriers, and outside disturbances and to allow the Amphibious Force to exploit gaps in enemy 
defense or avoid mine obstacles.  This will give the Marine amphibious force the ability to 
employ Ship-To-Objective Movement (STOM) to outflank or envelop an adversary, secure the 
vulnerable flanks of other friendly forces, or to remove landward threats to the maritime domain 
(Marine Corps Development Command, 2011). 
 
The MCM system‟s speed during the conduct of the mission, applies not only to the 
speed at which MCM platforms can cover a threat area, but also to the speed of data exchange, 
processing and fusion of information to give the Marine Amphibious force as significant 
advantage (Bachkosky, et al., 2000). 
3. Rapid Clearance of Mines 
The MCM system needs the ability to rapidly clear multiple boat lanes to allow the 
Marine Corps the ability to exploit flexibility, speed, and maneuver across domains.  
4. Detection of Marked Mines 
The MCM system needs the capability to effectively bottom map, assess the 
environment, detect, identify mines from non-mine bottom objects (NOMOs), classify mine 
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types, and mark and map mine locations with a high degree of certainty in the VSW to the beach 
exit to enable maneuver forces to avoid or bypass mines (Bachkosky, et al., 2000). 
5. Over-the-Horizon Deployment 
The MCM assets must have the capability of being deployed from OTH (50 nautical 
miles or greater).  As discussed earlier, this gives the amphibious force the capability to offset 
the enemy‟s ability to target and react to the amphibious force with coastal defenses.  
6. Autonomous Operations 
The MCM system needs the capability to perform autonomous collaborative operations 
to reduce the manpower footprint to conduct MCM operations. 
 
Autonomous vehicles are needed so that they can operate with future reduced manning 
requirements.  Today‟s iteration of unmanned systems involves a high degree of human 
interaction.  DoD must continue to pursue technologies and policies that introduce a higher 
degree of autonomy in order to reduce the manpower burden and reliance on full-time high-
speed communications links while also reducing decision loop cycle time (Unmanned Systems 
Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 2011). 
 
For unmanned systems to fully realize their potential, they must be able to achieve a 
highly autonomous state of behavior and be able to interact with their surroundings.  This 
advancement will require an ability to understand and adapt to the environment, and the ability to 
collaborate with other autonomous systems, along with the development of new verification and 
validation (V&V) techniques to prove the new technology does what it should. 
 
Efficiencies can be gained by automating the tasking, processing, exploitation, and 
distribution (TPED) of data collected by unmanned systems.  Autonomy can help extend vehicle 
endurance by intelligently responding to the surrounding environmental conditions (e.g., exploit 
and avoid currents) and appropriately managing onboard sensors and processing (e.g., turn off 
sensors when not needed). 
7. Precise Navigation 
The MCM system needs the capability for precise navigation, which allows for a 
common tactical picture and provides for safe navigation, mine avoidance, and reacquisition if 
necessary for neutralization purposes. 
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8. Sufficient Power and Propulsion Capabilities 
The MCM system needs the capability that gives power of sufficient capacity to support 
propulsion and combat systems (sensors, onboard computer, communications, and neutralization 
systems). 
 
The rapid development and deployment of unmanned systems has resulted in a 
corresponding increased demand for more efficient and logistically supportable sources of 
propulsion and power.  In addition to improving system effectiveness, these improvements have 
the potential to significantly reduce life-cycle costs. 
9. Robustness and Durability 
The MCM system needs to be robust and durable in order to perform reliably in a 
hazardous environment.  
10. Reduced Footprint 
The MCM system needs the capability that gives it a vehicle footprint reduced to the 
degree that technology can allow to facilitate handling and flexibility with respect to 
transportation and deployment. 
 
The stakeholder analysis documented that mammal systems can take up to a half of a 
well deck of an amphibious ship.  With the retirement of the MCM ships, and reduced capacity 
in ship types, the physical footprint of MCM equipment must be reduced to allow other mission-
essential equipment to be onboard to protect the amphibious force. 
11. Easy Launch and Recovery 
The MCM system needs the capability of a rapid launch and recovery.  The man-machine 
interface must be designed to allow the MCM ATF to quickly put the MCM system into 
operation in order to reduce the DTE time frame. 
12. Training 
The MCM system must be designed for training capabilities that can be assessed against 
joint training requirements.  Such a strategy will improve basing decisions, training 
standardization, and has the potential to promote common courses resulting in improved training 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
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13. Interoperability 
To achieve the full potential of unmanned systems, the MCM system must be capable of 
operating seamlessly across the domains of air, ground, and maritime and also operate 
seamlessly with manned systems. 
 
Robust implementation of interoperability tenets will contribute to this goal while also 
offering the potential for significant life-cycle cost savings.  System interoperability is critical in 
achieving these objectives and requires the implementation of mandated standards and 
Interoperability Integrated Product Team (I-IPT) profiles.  Properly implemented, 
interoperability can serve as a force multiplier, improve joint war fighting capabilities, decrease 
integration timelines, simplify logistics, and reduce total ownership costs (TOC).  One of the 
most powerful tools in maximizing interoperability and achieving these objectives is the 
adoption of the open systems architecture concept (Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 
FY2011-2036, 2011). 
14. Communications 
Unmanned systems rely on communications for C2 and dissemination of information.  
The MCM system design should be capable of addressing frequency and bandwidth availability, 
link security, link ranges, and network infrastructure to ensure availability for 
operational/mission support of unmanned systems.  The MCM system should be capable of 
transmitting and receiving command and control information underwater. 
 
Planning and budgeting for Unmanned System operations must take into account realistic 
assessments of projected satellite communication bandwidth, and move toward onboard pre-
processing to pass only critical information.  Additional benefits are greatly reducing high 
bandwidth communication needs and decreasing decision cycle time. 
B. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
To assist with the development of system requirements and to compare potential system 
architectures that would improve effectiveness of mine countermeasures in relevant operational 
situations, a DRM was created.  The DRM takes into account current MCM and amphibious 
landing doctrine in developing a realistic situation to test the viability of potential MCM system 
architectures. 
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1. DRM Objectives 
OBJECTIVE 1. The overall objective for this DRM was to develop scenarios to help 
determine the feasibility of an MCM system supporting an amphibious operation within a 
threshold of 72 hours and an objective time of 48 hours after deployment. 
OBJECTIVE 2. Define area coverage rates (ACR) in the VSW area for the following: 
a. Detection of mine field 
b. Location and classification of mines 
c. Mapping of mines/obstacles and gaps 
d. Neutralization of selected mines 
OBJECTIVE 3. Explore communication effectively between MCM system, Assault Force 
(AF), and Amphibious Landing Force (LF) during the mission profile. 
OBJECTIVE 4. Provide insights and suggestions for changes in tactics based on 
information gathered from Objectives 1 through 4. 
2. Concept of Operations 
The MCM system is typically deployed by an AF arriving approximately 72 hours before 
the main body of the LF.  The AF‟s function is to participate in preparing for the main assault by 
conducting such operations as MCM (JP 3-02, 2009).  To support the amphibious operation, 
there are three critical objectives the MCM force must accomplish as part of the concept of 
employment: exploratory, reconnaissance, and breakthrough (JP 3-15, 2011).  Figure 16 shows a 
concept for the activities of the deployment and operation of the MCM system in accordance 
with Marine Corp doctrine.  For this project the system will be bounded to the activities involved 
in the DTE sequence.  
 64 
 
Figure 16. MCM System(s) Concept of Operation Activities 
A concept for the activities of the deployment and operation of the MCM system.  The activities that are bordered in 
red indicate those activities within the bounded system. 
a. Pre Deployment Activity 
During this activity the MCM system is prepared to be put into operation.  The 
following is a list of some of the sub-activities: 
1. The system(s) are unpacked and assembled.  
2. Preventative Maintenance checks are done on systems. 
3. System(s) are fueled or charged. 
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b. Deploy/Initiate Communication System 
During this activity the communication system is either deployed or is initiated and 
established to facilitate communications OTH.  
c. Initiate MCM Control Station 
The MCM system will include a control station that is onboard a host platform.  It will 
facilitate the command and control and collaboration for all the MCM operations and systems.  
The MCM control station will be used to develop the plan for the operation and will be used to 
create the mission parameters for the vehicles. 
d. Initiate Vehicle(s) 
Prior to this activity the vehicles are fueled or charged up.  They are activated and loaded 
with mission parameters.  Their navigation systems are synchronized with the host platform 
navigation systems. 
e. Communication with MCM Control 
During this activity all communication links with MCM control and host command and 
control is established.  All external communication links are checked and monitored.  This 
communication link will either be maintained or re-established as necessary during the entire 
search period.  This communication will enable the controlling platform to control and direct the 
vehicles in the AO. 
f. Launch MCM Host System(s) 
During this activity the MCM system, or the transport platforms that carry the MCM 
system, are launched.  The transport vehicle is delivers the MCM vehicle quickly and covertly to 
the deployment points.  The AF will remain greater than 50 n.m. from the AO during the search 
period.  
g. Transit to Drop Points 
The MCM system will be carried by a transport vehicle to be deployed outside the area of 
operation.  The transport vehicle will communicate with the MCM control station on departure 
and when it deploys MCM vehicles.  The MCM system will be carried by a transport vehicle for 
deployment either 20 miles or 10 miles away from the area of operation depending on the 
mission requirements.  
h. Deploy MCM Vehicle(s) 
During this activity the MCM system is deployed from the transport vehicle.  The 
transport vehicle will communicate with MCM control for status of the deployment.  The 
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transport vehicle may or may not loiter at the deployment point during the period the MCM 
system transits to the area of operation. 
i. Transit to Area of Operation (AO) 
During this activity the MCM system shall transit from the deployment points to the AO.  
Upon successful deployment, the MCM system shall establish communication with MCM 
control and receive course and authorization to proceed. 
j. Communicate between MCM Systems 
Upon launch, the MCM system shall establish communication between any other MCM 
systems in the operation area.  Depending upon the level of autonomy the communications will 
vary.  This could be as simple as identification information or as complex as delivering tasking 
for the individual MCM system. 
k. Conduct Exploratory Search Activities  
Upon arrival at the AO the MCM vehicles will do the following: 
1. Alert MCM control upon arrival 
2. Receive last minute guidance and proceed with mission 
3. Configure search patterns between vehicle(s) 
4. Conduct quick search for the presence of mines 
5. Refuel and recharge if necessary (Note: This refers to in AO refueling as the tasking 
platforms will be at a significant standoff distance.) 
6. Report to MCM control the hydrographic conditions of the water routes 
7. Report to MCM control the presences of mines and obstacle(s) 
Upon completion of this activity, the MCM systems may or may not continue on to the 
next phase.  Depending on the mission profile, they may loiter in the area or conduct refueling 
and recharging activities. 
l. Conduct Reconnaissance Search Activities 
During this activity, the MCM vehicle(s) receives further guidance of potential routes and 
reconfigures their search patterns.  They will perform the following: 
1. Detect, locate, classify and map every mine and obstacle along routes 
2. Determines mine density and gaps along routes 
3. Refuel and recharge 
4. Communicate with between vehicle(s) 
5. Communicate map back to MCM control 
 67 
6. If necessary, communicates raw data back to MCM control for processing 
Upon completion of this activity, the MCM vehicle(s) may or may not continue on to the 
next phase.  They may loiter in the area or conduct refueling and recharging activities. 
m. Conduct Breakthrough Activities 
During this activity the MCM vehicles receive further guidance on routes, littoral 
penetration points and neutralization guidance of selected mines.  The MCM vehicles will 
proceed to do the following: 
1. Reacquire and neutralize suspected mines 
2. Communicate status between vehicles 
3. Communicate map and status back to MCM control 
n. Communicate With MCM Control & LF 
During this activity the MCM vehicles will communicate with the MCM host platform 
control station.  The MCM host platform will then communicate with the LF which will update 
the status of their routes and activate markers for mines. 
3. DRM Setup 
The sea floor is described by both a category and by the clutter density.  This will affect 
how well sensors are able to accurately detect the various objects on or buried in the sea floor. 
Category A: Smooth sand with <10% case burial 
Category B: Moderate sand with <10% case burial, or smooth sand with 20-75% case 
burial, or smooth-moderate mud/sand with 10-20%, or smooth rock with 0% case burial 
Category C: rough sand with <10% case burial, or rough mud/sand with 10-20% case 
burial, or moderate mud with 20-75% case burial, or moderate-rough rock with 0% case 
burial 
Category D: > 75 % mine case burial (Fuller, 2011) 
Clutter Density 1: < 15 NOMBOs per nm
2 
Clutter Density 2: 15 to 40 NOMBOs per nm
2 




The bottom type that was used in the minefield is B-2.  This means that the sea floor is 
not completely smooth sand.  It could be moderately rough sand, or mud.  It can also be used to 
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describe the amount of burial a mine has.  For example if a mine was in smooth sand buried up 
to 20-75%, it would be just as hard to see as the same mine buried less than 10% in moderately 
rough sand.  The clutter density is based on non mine like bottom objects.  This could be rocks, 
or other objects that are not mine like.  These objects can hide a mine or at least slow down the 
search for the mines.  In the minefields there will be between 15 and 40 NOMBOs for every nm
2
. 
a. Mission 1 
An amphibious assault has been planned against an area where “Country Orange” has 
invaded and has built up a defense.  The intent for the mission is to search an area in preparation 
for an amphibious assault which will be taking place in 3 days. 
 
1. Since “Country Orange” is a hypothetical adversary, the data used to establish slope and 
currents is based on Guadalcanal in order to provide a starting point of reasonable values.  
The test area consisted of a grid 500 yards X 500 yards with sea floor depth starting at 10 
ft and increasing at a 1˚ slope.  A current of 2.5 knots was simulated.  In this area of 500 
yards by 500 yards, there were smaller areas where the depth increased or decreased.  
The changes in depth were no more than 5%.  The average bottom composition was 
classified as B-2.  In the test area there were 150 mines total consisting of 105 bottom 
mines with between 10% and 75% burial.  There were also 45 moored mines.  Alongside 
the mines there were 75 random non-mine objects such as man-made debris and 
environmental objects that could be detected as mine-like objects.  The pattern of the 
mines was selected randomly and was used throughout all simulations of this mission to 
provide a common benchmark.  The proposed systems were judged on percentage of 
mines detected and the time the search would take to complete.  Successful completion 
was based on when the systems finished the search pattern and classifying and 
identifying the mine-like objects detected. 
2. After the search is completed, the proposed systems used the neutralization plan that was 
developed to clear a path through the VSW zone. 
3. The search time included any time required to replenish any consumables if required. 
b. Mission 2 
An amphibious assault has been planned against the same area as outlined in Mission 1, 
where “Country Orange” has invaded and has built up a defense.  As with Mission 1, 
Guadalcanal was used as a template to determine reasonable values.  The intent for the mission is 
to clear an area in preparations for an amphibious assault which will be occurring once the path 
is clear.  Preliminary reconnaissance by other systems has indicated the chosen area is the best 
path to bring the assault force to shore.  Although a path had been cleared, the opposition has 
been able to re-deploy mines into the area. 
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1. The test area consisted of a grid 500 yards X 500 yards with sea floor depth starting at 10 
ft and increasing at a 1˚ slope.  A current of 2.5 knots moving across the test area was 
simulated.  In this area there were smaller areas where the depth increased or decreased.  
These changes in depth were no more than 5%.  The average bottom composition was 
classified as B-2.  In the test area there were 50 mines consisting of 40 bottom mines with 
between 10% and 75% burial.  There were also 10 moored mines.  Alongside the mines 
there were 75 random non-mine objects such as man-made debris and environmental 
objects that could be detected as mine-like objects.  The mines were laid in 5 non-parallel 
lines covering the test area.  The same pattern was used throughout all simulations of this 
mission to provide a common benchmark.  The proposed systems were judged on 
percentage of mines detected and the time the search would take to complete.  The 
systems were asked to classify, identify, and neutralize the mines. 
2. The search time included any time required to replenish any consumables if required. 
c. Replenishment 
An amount of time was added if the system was unable to complete the mission without 
replenishment to simulate the act of in-mission range extension.  Replenishment is for any fuel, 
energy source, or other materials that are required to allow the system to continue mine hunting 
and neutralization activities. 
C. REQUIREMENTS 
Following the development of the DRM, requirements were developed to successfully 
perform the outlined missions and bridge the capability gap. 
1. Requirements for the MCM System 
The following are the most important requirements the MCM System should be able to 
perform to in order to meet the capabilities and fill the gaps as identified earlier.  The parenthesis 
following each requirement denote the objective (“O”) value and the threshold (“T”) value tied 
to the requirement.  The following MCM system would include the MCM control stations which 
monitors and controls the MCM operation, the MCM vehicle and the MCM communication 
system. 
1. (REQ 1.0): The MCM system that includes the vehicle and launch platform shall perform 
its MCM missions as clandestine operations.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall have a 95% probability of not being detected with 90% 
confidence level by visual/IR sensors from the shore while performing search, 
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detect, classify, and mark in the VSW area during daylight hours and during times 
of high and low visibility. 
b. The MCM system shall have a 80% (T), 95% (O) probability of not being 
detected by radar with 90% confidence level by shore based radar systems while 
performing search, detect, classify, and mark in the VSW area. 
c. The MCM system magnetic signature shall have a 90% probability of not being 
detected with 90% confidence level while performing search, detect, classify, and 
mark in the VSW area. 
d. The MCM system acoustic signature shall have a 90% probability of not being 
detected with 90% confidence level while performing search, detect, classify, and 
mark in the VSW area. 
The rationale for these requirements came from the 2000 NRAC document entitled 
“Unmanned Vehicles (UV) in Mine Countermeasures” (Naval Research Advisory 
Committee, 2000).  The document cites the need for UV to conduct clandestine MCM 
operations and indicates that in order for the UV to conduct MCM operations, it should 
have the capability of maintaining minimum radar, magnetic, and acoustic signatures 
(Bachkosky, et al., 2000).  This cohort developed probability percentages based on sound 
engineering judgment.  Current systems are concentrating on the ability to detect and 
classify mines and not focusing on performing covert operations.  Therefore baseline 
probability numbers were not available from specifications or reports that this Cohort 
could use to develop these requirements.  We recommend further research to create 
adequate baseline requirements based on specific mission needs.   
2. (REQ 2.0): The MCM system shall have precise navigation which allows for a common 
tactical picture and provides for safe navigation, mine avoidance, and reacquisition if 
necessary for neutralization purposes. 
 
This requirement is further refined by the following vehicle requirements: 
a. The MCM system shall have onboard navigations systems that maintain accuracy 
of navigation to +/- 1 meter over a 48 hour operation period without receiving 
corrections from a ship or boat. 
b. The MCM system shall maintain navigation accuracy of +/- 1 meter over a 48 
hour period of operation in Sea State 4. 
c. The MCM system navigation accuracy shall maintain stable and accurate platform 
navigation accounting for environment (i.e. current, crosswinds, and pressure). 
0.01% of distance (O), 0.1% of distance (T) 
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d. The MCM system shall be to navigate either in autonomous or override for man-
in-the-loop operation.  MOTL/Auto (O), Auto (T) 
e. The MCM system shall create navigation velocity information originating from 
navigational sensors (e.g. dead reckoning, INS, acoustic, Doppler velocity 
sonar/log (DVS/DVL), geophysical, ultra-short baseline/long baseline) 
geophysical, ultra-short baseline/long baseline) for live feedback for guidance.  
0.01% velocity error (O), 0.1% velocity error (T) 
f. The MCM system shall have obstacle avoidance abilities to evade objects in 
environment.  all foreign objects within FOV (O),  foreign objects 1ft
3
 within 
FOV (T)  
g. The MCM system shall collect, store, process, and report navigation data 
information (e.g. bathymetric, position, attitude, heading, and bearing) through 
the network, provide all track info (100%) (O), provide vital track info (95%) (T) 
The rationale for these requirement come from fact the system must be effective to 
locate, mark, and map mines and mine like objects.  To complete the overall system 
requirements the system needs to be able to precisely navigate to the given AO and 
through the given area of interest.  If the system can maintain an accurate location to 
within +/- 1 meter the obstacle or mine has a higher probability of being avoided or re-
acquired for neutralization.   
3. (REQ 3.0): The MCM system shall be capable of operating in autonomous modes.  These 
autonomous modes could be Fully Autonomous, Semi-Autonomous, Tele-operation, and 
Remote Control as defined in the following requirements: 
 
a. The MCM system shall be able to transition to and from AO, establish 
communication with other MCM assets, synchronize with other MCM assets, 
establish search patterns with other MCM assets, initiate search, detect, map, 
locate, identify, and classify UXO and Non-Mine, Mine-like Bottom Object 
(NOMBO) without human intervention.  This mode of operation is called Fully 
Autonomous. 
b. The MCM system shall be capable of performing search patterns and 
neutralization operations with permissions from human-robot interactions (HRI).  
This mode of operation is called Semi-Autonomous. 
c. The MCM system, while operating in degraded mode, shall be capable of 
providing video and sensory feedback to a manual operator and accept waypoint 
guidance from HRI.  This mode of operation is called Tele-operation. 
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d. The MCM system, while operating in a sensor fault mode, shall be capable of 
being continuously controlled via a radio link without providing video or sensory 
feedback to the MCM control ship.  This mode of operation is called Remote 
Control. 
e. The MCM system shall be able to accept tasking from a predetermined MCM 
platform.  
f. The MCM system shall be able to create and transmit tasking to other MCM 
system. 
g. The MCM system shall be able to receive and accept tasking from any other 
MCM system with authority to control. 
h. MCM system shall be able to collaborate with other system without human 
operator interaction to organize, and synchronize search patterns and search 
techniques to detect, identify, and classify mines and non-mines. 
i. The MCM system shall be capable of monitoring, reporting mission progress, 
provide mission level directions, coordinating missions, and tasking one or more 
MCM systems in a supervisor mode. 
j. The MCM system shall adapt to systems failures or operational conditions that 
prevent it from continuing in its optimal mission profile and will react within the 
confines of its capabilities.  This adaptation is called an adaptive mission profile. 
k. The MCM system shall continue to perform the mission in a degraded mode 
unless commanded to do otherwise by the MCM command platform. 
The rationale for this requirement is to remove the man from the mission operating 
environment and to reduce the man-footprint for operating the system. 
4. (REQ 4.0): The MCM system shall have onboard processing capabilities to process 
targets, create reports, and create collaboration schemes for performing MCM operations.  
This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall create target reports that contain, target ID number, target 
location, time target was located, target type, and target fuse information. 
b. The MCM system shall create status reports that indicate the system unique ID 
and if the system is moving, searching, attacking, transiting, refueling, or 
performing a Built in Test (BIT). 
c. The MCM system status report failure indications shall indicate one or more of 
the following: All Subsystems Go, Navigation degraded, Navigation Fail, Sensor 
System Degraded with Sensor System Type Failed, Sensor System Failed, 
Onboard Processor Degraded, Onboard Power System Degraded, Propulsion or 
Steering Degraded, Propulsion or Steering Failed, Recording System Failed, and 
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Communication System Degraded.  Indications will provide the further ability to 
investigate into the underlying problem in order to determine if the mission is still 
supportable given the failure. 
The rationale for this requirement is to specify the types of reports the MCM system 
should receive or send to effectively enable the overall MCM system to perform the 
operation. 
5. (REQ 5.0): The MCM communication system shall enable real time processing of MCM 
assets, mine contacts, support autonomous operations and support amphibious forces with 
situational awareness.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall respond to and receive commands and reports from 
external systems to collaboratively conduct MCM missions. 
b. The MCM Control System shall communicate via net-centric overarching 
strategic and tactical networks.  
c. The MCM communication system shall create and broadcast status reports to 
support MCM and amphibious operations. 
The rationale for this requirement is that a real-time communications system must handle 
mission critical information and perform real-time computations.  The system must 
enable the amphibious force to obtain information concerning the mission, enemy forces, 
neutral or non-combatants, friendly forces, terrain and weather.  The rationale for MCM 
Control System to have net-centric strategic and tactical networks stems from MCT 5.1.1 
to (Provide and Maintain Communications) to all send and receive data that includes 
verbal, electronic and written formats.  Information can include plans, orders, 
intelligence, weather, friendly troop/unit status, and location reports (JP 1, 2-0 Series, 3-
0, 3-56 Series, 6 Series, MCDP 6, MCWP 3-40.2, 3-40.3, NDP 6). 
6. (REQ 6.0): In order for the MCM system to perform MCM missions, the system shall 
demonstrate endurance requirements to perform MCM missions for no less than 72 hours 
without requiring it to be recaptured or deactivated to perform maintenance or 
preventative maintenance.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The sustained area coverage rate for the MCM system shall not be less than 0.083 
n.m.
2
/hr (T) and 0.125 n.m.
2
/hr (O) (assuming an area of 500 yards long by 26 
nautical miles wide). 
b. The MCM system shall be able to sustain 30 knot speed without need for 
refueling in sea state 4 while transitioning from the distant retirement area to AO. 
c. The MCM system shall have an endurance of 48 hours without requiring refueling 
while conducting normal MCM operations.  
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The rationale for this requirement is that the MCM system must be able to cover a large 
area to ensure it is able to map the best approach lane for the amphibious landing.  The 
MCM system must be able to arrive at the area of interest in a timely fashion.  The time 
needed by the MCM system to arrive at a given location is directly related to the overall 
mission time.  For reference, the current endurance requirement for a lightweight vehicle 
is 20 hours.  Paragraph c above defines the total search is between 17.4 and 34.8 miles.  
Therefore, it was deemed reasonable that the vehicle should cover the average distance of 
26 n.m..   
7. (REQ 7.0): The MCM system shall be designed to operate in the air (for navigation 
equipment to be working prior to an aerial drop), surface, and subsurface environment in 
support of worldwide amphibious operations.  It is envisioned that a MCM system can be 
developed that can operate from air, surface or subsurface platform.  Even though the 
system may not be performing MCM functions, it may be required to be powered so that 
it can be programmed with last minute launch instructions or navigation coordinates or be 
required to perform BIT.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall be able to be launched and operate in sea state 3 (T), and 
sea state of 4 (O). 
b. The MCM system shall be capable of operating in water temperatures from 28°F 
(0°C) to 90°F (32°C).   







C) (air temperature; protected from direct sunlight).  Rationale 




F) was recorded in 





F) in Verkhoyansk Russia 7 Feb 1892. (Global Climate Data for 
Developing Military Products, 1987).  Operation of electronic equipment often 
generates additional heat that can further degrade performance in such an area 
without specialized cooling, making such extreme temperature requirements 
necessary for deployment in all types of areas.  
d. The MCM system shall withstand a thermal shock associated with exposure to a 
18°F per minute rate of temperature change, to temperature extremes of -20°F (-
28.9°C) and 109°F (43°C) (air). 
e. The MCM system shall be capable of operating (i.e., transit and maneuver, not 
search-classify-map) at water depths up to (threshold) 300, and (objective) 900 
Feet of Sea Water (FSW).  Rationale for requirement: The MK18 is specified to 
operate at 300 FSW (Fournier, 2011) and the Hydrographic Multibeam 
Replacement Sonar is specified to operate down to 400 meters 1312 ft.  Even 
though it is not envisioned that the system will not search for mines at 900 FSW; 
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it may be required to lie dormant in 900 feet of water.  It is envisioned that a 
system could be covertly seeded in the AI and not be activate for use until needed.  
The system would be required to operate to move after a time of lying dormant.   
f. The MCM system shall be capable of operating (i.e., transit and maneuver, not 
search-classify-map) at the surface of the water. 
g. The MCM system shall be capable of operating in a current less than or equal to 
(threshold) 5 kts, (objective) 10kts flowing in any direction. 
h. The MCM system and all other components intended for in-water operations shall 
be capable of operating in water having a salinity level up to (threshold) 45 parts 
per thousand (ppt). 
i. The MCM system shall be capable of operating within turbidity conditions up to 
and including (threshold) 66 mg/l (~ 8 Nephlometric Turbidity Units (NTU)) of 
suspended particulate matter, as measured by a Formazin calibrated optical 
backscatter meter. 
j. The MCM system shall be capable of being recovered. 
The rationale for this requirement is that the MCM system must be able to operate over 
wide temperature, pressure and other environmental extremes to meet the Navy‟s 
worldwide service.  
8. (REQ 8.0): The MCM System shall be capable of rapid deployment from a minimum of 
50 nautical miles from AO; where deployment is defined as the time needed to transition 
from a storage state on a host platform to actual launch and operation in the water. 
 
9. (REQ 9.0): The MCM system shall be capable of detecting and classifying mines.  This 
requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall be able detect, classify, and map both bottom and moored 
mines in a VSW area in a time frame of less than or not greater than threshold 48 
hours, objective 24 hours. 
b. The MCM System shall trigger an alert for a suspect mine-like object 
c. The MCM systems shall be able to transmit mine location, mine identification 
information, and urgent reports to other MCM systems and MCM control. 
 
10. (REQ 10.0): The MCM system shall be able to execute collaborative search patterns from 
multiple pre-mission loaded search patterns for the AO.  The MCM system shall be able 
to adjust search patterns while underway based on input or tasking from other MCM 
systems and platforms. 
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11. (REQ 11.0): The MCM system shall be capable of neutralizing mines. 
a. Upon receiving a command to neutralize a mine, the MCM system shall reacquire 
the mine within 10 minutes (T), 5 minutes (O) for neutralization. 
b. The MCM system shall be capable of neutralizing the effects of mines in clearing 
(threshold) 8, or (objective) 16 Littoral Penetration Points and boat lanes in the 
VSW area within 48 hours (Neller, 2005).  
The rationale for time requirements is that systems will first perform a reconnaissance 
and map the mines along routes and pass this information back to the MCM control.  A 
mine is considered effectively neutralized if its location is known and it can be avoided.  
If a mine cannot be avoided then other options must be considered to destroy the mine or 
neutralize its ability to detect an intended target or its ability to detonate.  Once the 
control determines what lanes to clear it will issue orders to clear certain mines.  Since 
the vehicle should know where the mines are, it is envisioned that it should not take more 
that 10 minutes to reacquire the mine for neutralization.  The rationale for clearance 
requirement of 48 hours is the following:  The overall mission to clear all the lanes for 
the amphibious force is 72 hours.  However, clearing the VSW area is just a portion of 
the overall area that must be cleared. Therefore assigning 72 hours to clearing a path in 
the VSW area would not account for the time to deploy the vehicles and clear the area 
outside the VSW area.  Therefore, since the VSW area is the hardest area to detect and 
locate mines; 2/3 of the total 72 hour mission time was deemed necessary to clear paths 
in the VSW area.  This calculates out to 48 hours.   
 
12. (REQ 12.0): The MCM system shall incorporate multiple sensor(s) to enable the MCM 
system to detect, identify, locate, and classify observable features of UXO in all regions 
of water to include the VSW region.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system sensors shall be able to create a full 360 degree view of the 
target to enable identification. 
b. The MCM system sensors shall be to detect the presence of explosives through 
the use of chemical sensors. 
c. The MCM system sensors shall incorporate a 3-D level as objective, 2-D as 
threshold sonar system with high resolution. 
d. The MCM system shall demonstrate the ability to place its sensor to observe the 
target from any angle available. 
e. The MCM system shall contain a biomimetic sonar for detection of buried bottom 
mines. 
f. The MCM system vehicle shall incorporate combined acoustic and high 
resolution visual sensor systems to identify UXO in turbid waters. 
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g. The MCM system shall incorporate a magnetic gradiometer that can be extended 
away the MCM vehicle body to mitigate the noise effects of the MCM vehicle 
and to enable the MCM system to detect shallow water bottom buried mines 
(Yaun, Hock, Xiao, Soon, & Teck, 2010; Hagen, 2010). 
h. If GPS is used for navigation of the MCM system during ingress, egress, and/or 
search-classify-map (S-C-M), it shall use military P-code capable receivers. 
2. Other Important Requirements for the MCM System 
The following requirements are important for the MCM system to meet; however, 
these requirements are not as important to meet as the top requirements.  Only partially 
meeting these requirements will still enable a successful system. 
1. (REQ 13.0): The MCM system shall be designed to operate in the electromagnetic (EM) 
Naval Air, Surface, and Subsurface environments per MIL-STD-461 without failure or 
degradation in performance 
The rationale for this requirement is that the MCM system must be able to operate over 
wide environmental extremes to include the electromagnetic environment.  It is important 
the MCM system operate without degradation in the electromagnetic environment.  
However there are tests that the system could fail and still be considered capable to 
perform its mission.   
2. (REQ 14.0): In order for the MCM system to perform MCM missions, the MCM system 
shall be reliable and available.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM system shall have an operational availability of not less than 95% (O), 
85% (T).  This Ao is for the overall system availability including the MCM 
command & control system, MCM vehicles, MCM communication nodes, and 
MCM deploy and recovery system. 
b. The MCM system shall be designed for maintainability with repairable 
subsystems having less than 1 hour mean time to repair (MTTR) on single point 
failures and 3 hours for non-critical failures.  This MTTR is for the overall system 
including the MCM command & control system, MCM vehicles, MCM 
communication nodes, and MCM deploy and recovery system. 
c. The MCM system shall have a mean time between failure (MTBF) of not less 
than 100 hours (T), 300 hours (O) with 95% confidence. 
 
3. (REQ 15.0): The MCM system shall be able to be launched by a subsurface, surface or 
air platform.  This requirement is further refined by: 
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a. The MCM system shall be recovered by a subsurface or surface platform within 
15 minutes of closure with an MCM vehicle and launch platform. 
b. The preparation of the MCM system for launch shall not be greater than 
15minutes. 
c. The actual launch sequence of the MCM system shall not take longer than 10 
minutes after preparation for launch and the launch command is given. 
The rationale for this requirement is that current launch and recovery take up a significant 
portion of the allotted detect-to-engage sequence time (Operators, 2011).  Designing for 
rapid launch and recovery will provide more time to complete the MCM mission in the 
operations area, rather than using this time onboard the command platform.  
4. (REQ 16.0): The MCM system shall minimize the system weight and footprint by 
implementing a modular design.  This requirement is further refined by: 
a. The MCM vehicle/payload weight shall not be more than 753 pounds 
(Honeywell, 1982). 
b. The MCM system shall be capable of receiving in-situ range and operation 
extension upon depleting onboard energy reserves.  
The rationale for this requirement is that storage room on MCM ships is being reduced.  
The physical size of the vehicle should not be larger than MK50 torpedoes to ensure they 
can be deployed from aircraft.  The size of the control stations and storage units need to 
be sized to go on any ship.  The design should be modular to allow ease of upgrading the 
MCM system with future technology and/or to change the configuration of the platform 
based on mission requirements. 
5. (REQ 17.0): The MCM system shall be equipped with an approved Weapons Safety 
Explosive Safety Review Board (WSESRB) fire control solution during operation and 
implement safety interlocks and keep-out zones for servicing to minimize human hazards 
and risks.  
6. (REQ 18.0): The system shall implement modular open systems software architecture for 





D. SYSTEM METRICS 
System metrics provide an avenue to compare alternative system architectures by 
identifying and defining system effectiveness measures that reflect overall stakeholder 
expectations and satisfaction.  Metrics drive the detailed design of the system to meet specific 
metric threshold values as well as allowing verification and validation of the system 
requirements and functions, providing traceability of metrics to stakeholder requirements and 
operational functions.  
1. System Metrics Selection Process 
Since a great deal of the determination of system metrics relied on understanding the 
needs of the system, stakeholder needs were analyzed first.  Some of the stakeholder needs 
include reducing the DTE, addressing OTH operations, and reducing human error due to human 
fatigue.  These, as well as other stakeholder needs, were analyzed to develop a set of metrics that 
would help in the analysis of performance of system design alternatives.  System requirements 
and functions were also analyzed to help determine the metrics.  Table 6 displays the result of 
these three analyses to determine the high level system parameters that would drive the creation 














Table 6. High Level System Parameters that drive System Metrics 
Result of analysis of stakeholder needs, requirements, and functions to determine high level system parameters from 
each category that would drive the creation of overarching system metrics to analyze the performance of the 
developed system at a high level. 
 
 
High Level Stakeholder 
Needs 
High Level Requirements 
High Level System 
Functions 
1. Area that can be covered 
with implemented system 
2. Number of persons in the 
minefield at any given time 
3. Area coverage rate 
4. False detection rate 
5. Implementation of a real-
time data processing 
capability between system 
components 
6. Number of operators 
7. Transit speed 
REQ 1.0: Clandestine Operations 
REQ 2.0: Navigation Precision 
REQ 3.0: Autonomous Operational Modes 
REQ 4.0: Processing Capabilities 
REQ 4.0: MCM Communication 
REQ 6.0: Endurance 
REQ 7.0: Operational Environment 
REQ 8.0: Deployment Distance  
REQ 9.0: Detection and Classification 
REQ 10.0: Collaborative Search Patterns  
REQ 11.0: Mine Neutralization 
REQ 12.0: Multiple Sensors 
REQ 13.0: Electromagnetic Environment 
REQ 14.0: Reliable and Available 
REQ 15.0: Launch Platform 
REQ 16.0: Minimize Weight, Footprint 
REQ 17.0: Weapon Safety 
REQ 18.0: Software Architecture 
 
1. (FD.1) Detect 
2. (FC.2)  Classify 
3. (FI.3) Identify 
4. (FE.4) Engage 
5. (FT.5) Transit 
6. (FCO.6) Communicate 
7. (FS.7) Search 









2. System Metrics Selection 
Table 7 depicts the final MCM system metrics along with units of measure that were 
derived from an analysis of Table 6.  The comparison of stakeholder need, requirements and 
functions showed that all three areas address the concern related to clearing and searching the 
minefield area in an effective amount of time.  This translated to the first identified metric of 
ACR.  
Along with correctly identifying the mines, the comparison analysis also identified the 
need to reduce the amount of mine targets that are missed during search operations.  
Misinterpreting or not properly identifying a mine could cause catastrophic results.  As a result, 
the concern for measuring the percentage of mines a system would miss during a search was 
translated to the Undetected Mines metric. 
Lastly, the reduction in manning, surface presence of support craft and successfully 
conducting all mission phases with a low profile was identified as a common concern.  This was 
the determination for identifying Stealthiness as a comparison metric as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. MCM System Metrics 
The data presented is the culmination of the iterative process of comparing stakeholder needs, current capability 
gaps, threat analysis, functional analysis, and system requirements.  These metrics were used to compare alternative 
system architectures. 
System Measures of Effectiveness Unit of Measure 
AREA COVERAGE RATE Nautical Miles
2
/Hour (nmi²/hr) 
UNDETECTED MINES % of Total Mines Undetected 
STEALTH Probability of Detection by Enemy (%) 
 
3. System Metrics Definitions 
a. Area Coverage Rate 
The area coverage rate is defined as how fast the system can complete the detect-to-
engage sequence in the clearance of an area for safe operations to occur.  The unit of measure for 
this metric is the nautical miles (squared) covered per each search hour.  For the purposes of this 
report, the engagement of the mine can be considered any means that renders the mine 
ineffective against an amphibious landing force.  For example, in some cases this may mean 
marking and mapping the mines, while in other cases the engagement may entail the complete 
destruction of a mine with explosives, chemicals, and Electronic Warfare (EW) technologies. 
b. Undetected Mines 
The undetected mine is a metric chosen to represent targets missed by the system.  
Targets missed by systems cause a significant increased risk to amphibious landing teams, 
increasing the risk of loss of a human life. 
c. Stealth 
Stealth measures the system‟s ability to carry out operations in a covert manner.  The 
system must be designed with mechanisms to isolate and avoid mechanical noises that could 
reveal location to underwater passive sonar arrays or submerged acoustic system like 
submarines.  Stealth capabilities must allow the system to be undetected from autonomous 
acoustic sensor systems used in battlefield awareness and other wide range surveillances such as 
visual and radar scans.  Covert operation will result in relaxing the need to provide suppression 
fire in the obscuration activity of the MCM breakthrough phase.  If MCM can be conducted 
without detection, the opposing force will not react hostilely and expose forces to unnecessary 
risk.  Stealth will be measured as a function of the probability of detection by enemy forces. 
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E. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
1. Functional Decomposition 
In order to accommodate the overall need to reduce the time it takes to clear a minefield 
in support of an amphibious assault, high level functions from current doctrine need to be 
addressed.  These are Detect, Classify, Identify, and Engage.  From the capabilities analysis and 
stakeholder analysis, it was discovered that current systems take a long time to transition from 
the Identify function to the Engage function.  Many times this transition is delayed due to the 
lack of real-time communications or the lack of ability for the system to Classify and Identify the 
mines autonomously.  This in turn requires the system to be recovered and the data to be 
downloaded and analyzed before the Engage function can be performed.  During the Engage 
function the current mission sequence requires the system to re-acquire the contact before it can 
be neutralized causing further delay in completing the DTE sequence.   
 
The goal of the functional analysis was to take capability gaps in conjunction with the 
current doctrine and requirements analysis to develop functions that further develop system 
details and tasking.  Since one of the major capability gaps defined was the lack of real-time 
communications, the Communicate function was created to manage the interfaces with the 
environment external to the system as well as connect the MCM vehicle to the host platform.  
The remaining high level functions derived were mapped to at least one top level requirement 
and describe the tasks to be performed in detecting a mine within the VSW zone.  These 
functions include the Deploy, Recover, Perform Planning, and Receive Maintenance functions.  
Additional task development outside of the VSW zone includes mission planning, the platform 
launch and transit from outside the operational area of interest, and the platform‟s recovery.  
Varying degrees of sub-functions were added to the high level functions to provide needed 
expansion where multiple tasks were involved.  Vitech Corporation‟s CORE software was used 
to model the system‟s solution-neutral architecture by providing a medium to map out the 
functions and sub-functions while enabling the linking of requirements to pertinent functions.  At 
the conclusion of the functional decomposition, all developed requirements were linked to their 
implementation function and a sound solution-neutral architectural model existed in CORE that 






Figure 17 shows the general functional flow of the DTE sequence to complete a mission 
in the VSW zone by a single detection platform.  The following section contains a brief overview 
of the functions created and modeled in CORE.  Linking of the functions‟ inputs, outputs, and 
triggers was performed in CORE and is not listed in subsequent descriptions in order to provide 








Figure 17. Functional Flow Block Diagram of MCM Detect to Engage Sequence 
Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) of functions performed by MCM system during a mission conducted in the VSW zone.  Walking through the FFBD, the 
mission starts with the Perform Planning Function.  Once Perform Planning completes, both the Communicate function and Deploy functions start.  The 
Communicate function performs the communications from the MCM system to external systems and is active throughout the duration of the mission, until the 
MCM system is recovered. After the Deploy function, the first loop, LP1, is entered and the Transit function starts, where the MCM system transits into or out of 
an operational area depending on direction given by the host platform.  With the completion of the transit function, either the Recover function is called to 
recover the MCM system (if the system has transited to a recovery point), or a second loop is entered to search for mines in the operational area (if the MCM 
system has transited into a search area).  Entering the second loop, LP2, begins the Search-Detect-Classify-Identify sequence.  The Search function effectively 
“mows the lawn” in the operational area looking for mine-like objects.  If a mine-like object is detected, the Search function ends and the Detect-Classify-
Identify sequence starts for the mine-like object.  Once the Identify function has completed, a decision is made whether to engage or not engage the detected 
mine.  Once this decision is made, either the Engage function is called, or it is bypassed.  After the Engage function completes or is bypassed, the second loop, 
LP2, restarts at the Search function, searching the operational area again for a new mine-like contact. LP2 is exited if the MCM system reaches the end of the 
operational area, or is directed to stop searching during the Search function. This exit of the second loop is noted on the FFBD as “LE2”, the loop exit.  When 
LP2 ends, the first loop, LP1, is restarted and the transit function is called again to move the MCM system to a new operational area to further prosecute mines or 
to a recovery point to recover the MCM system.  Once the Communicate and Recovery functions have completed, the Receive Maintenance function is 
performed at the end of the mission. 
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a. Perform Planning 
Figure 18 depicts the functional hierarchy of the Perform Planning function.  The 
Perform Planning function describes events where either a tasking authority or the MCM 
platform itself is planning or accepting a search.  Since all system actions depend on a 
predetermined set of parameters, planning the search and the DTE actions need to be handled 
onboard, with some input from outside systems.  The Perform Planning function includes four 
sub-functions: 
 
1. FPP.10.1 Create tasking for MCM assets 
2. FPP.10.2 Accept search plans 
3. FPP.10.3 Accept tasking from MCM assets 
4. FPP.10.4 Create message about contacts (anticipated mine locations in AO) 
 
Figure 18. Perform Planning Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Perform Planning function.  The Perform Planning function describes events where 

















Figure 20 depicts the functional hierarchy of the deploy function.  Since the amphibious 
task force will be stationed at a standoff distance from the operational area, there is a need to 
have flexibility in the deployment of the system.  Depending on the required level of covertness 
for the individual mission, it would be possible that the system would need to be launched by 
either air, surface or sub-surface vehicles.  The top level deploy function describes events at the 
start of the DTE sequence with the platform being deployed into the field.  The deploy function 
includes three sub-functions: 
 
1. FDE.8.1 Deploy from sub-surface craft 
2. FDE.8.2 Deploy from surface craft 
3. FDE.8.3 Deploy from aircraft 
 
Figure 19. Deploy Functional Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Deploy function.  The Deploy function describes events at the start of the DTE 
















Figure 20 depicts the functional hierarchy of the recover function.  Since the amphibious 
task force will be stationed at a standoff distance from the operational area, there is a need to 
recover the system after it has completed its mission.  The top level recover function describes 
events at the end of the DTE sequence with the platform being recovered from the field at a 
recovery point.  An emergency recover function was included as a sub-function to account for 
the recovery of a system with an unrecoverable failure during the mission.  The recover function 
includes two sub-functions: 
 
1. FR.11.1 Recover from surface craft 
2. FR.11.2 Emergency recover  
 
Figure 20. Recover Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Recover function.  The Recover function describes events at the end of the DTE 
sequence with the platform being recovered from the field.  An emergency recover function was included as a sub-















Figure 21 depicts the functional hierarchy of the transit function.  The transit function 
describes events immediately before and after the search function where the MCM platform is 
transiting to and away from the operational area of interest.  Since the amphibious task force will 
be stationed at a standoff distance from the AO, the system will need to travel from the 
deployment location to the AO.  In order to reduce the probability of detection of the system by 
the adversary it will be not be practical to deploy the system in the AO.  This being the case, the 
system will need to be able to travel to the area in a covert method.  The transit function includes 
eight sub-functions: 
  
1. FT.5.1 Determine deployment coordinates 
2. FT.5.2 Determine path to operational area 
3. FT.5.3 Engage navigational sensors 
4. FT.5.4 Engage transiting system 
5. FT.5.5 Transit and monitor for obstacles 
a. FT.5.5.1 Continue transiting clear path 
b. FT.5.5.2 Modify path to avoid obstacle 
6. FT.5.6 Acknowledge entering search areas 
7. FT.5.7 Determine direction and distance to recovery point 
8. FT.5.8 Create message indicating arrival at recovery point 
 
Figure 21. Transit Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Transit function.  The Transit function describes events immediately before and 




Figure 22 depicts the functional hierarchy of the search function.  The top level search 
function describes events when the platform has reached the operational area of interest and 
starts to perform the search functions to detect contacts.  As part of the overall need to find mine-
like objects that would prevent an amphibious assault from being performed, the search function 
provides the ability for the system to detect the mines.  Sub-functions include the initialization 
and deactivation of the search sensors and the modification of the search pattern in response to 
detected contacts and other events in the mission.  The search function includes six sub-
functions: 
 
1. FS.7.1 Enter operational area 
2. FS.7.2 Activate search sensors 
3. FS.7.3 Follow search commands 
a. FS.7.3.1 Follow programmed search pattern 
b. FS.7.3.2 Determine if search pattern should be modified 
c. FS.7.3.3 Change search program 
4. FS.7.4 Record platform location 
5. FS.7.5 Create mission complete message 
6. FS.7.6 Deactivate search sensors 
 
 
Figure 22. Search Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Search function.  The Search function describes events when the platform has 




Figure 23 depicts the functional hierarchy of the detect function.  The high level detect 
function describes the events of receiving contact information from system sensors, recording 
both location and environmental information from the sensors, and creating a message to 
transmit indicating the detection of a contact in the path of the detection platform.  The need for 
this function comes from the overarching problem of locating mine-like objects.  This function 
fulfills many requirements involving first the detection of a contact, and then recording of the 
contact‟s location.  The detect function also fulfills requirements to create a report for mission 
analysis personnel.  If a mine is unable to be detected, the rest of the functions will not be able to 
meet the need of the end user.  The detect function includes four sub-functions: 
 
1. FD.1.1 Receive information from sensors indicating contact in the area 
2. FD.1.2 Record location of contact 
3. FD.1.3 Record environmental information from sensors 
4. FD.1.4 Create message about a detection in the area and its location 
 
Figure 23. Detect Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Detect function.  The Detect function describes the events of receiving contact 
information from system sensors, recording both location and environmental information from the sensors, and 










Figure 24 depicts the functional hierarchy of the classify function.  The high level 
classify function describes events directly after a contact is detected and is determined to be 
either a mine-like or non-mine-like object.  If an object is classified as non-mine-like, then the 
system can ignore and continue with the search.  However, if the contact is determined to be 
mine-like then either the system or the operator must take further steps to determine the level the 
threat it poses.  Any mine-like object will prevent the amphibious assault from occurring unless 
steps are taken to neutralize the object.  The classify function includes three sub-functions: 
 
1. FC.2.1 Process sensor input 
2. FC.2.2 Determine if contact is mine-like or non-mine-like 
3. FC.2.3 Create message about contact classification 
 
Figure 24. Classify Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Classify function.  The Classify function describes events directly after a contact is 















Figure 25 depicts the functional hierarchy of the identify function.  The top level identify 
function describes events triggered by the classify function determining a mine-like contact has 
been found.  The identify function proceeds to further identify a mine-like contact as either 
bottom, moored, or drifting mine.  If the contact is non-mine-like, the system will determine if 
the contact could cause a threat to the detection platform and must be avoided.  This could come 
in the form of a large rock, or other obstacle in the path of the system.  The identify function 
creates a message to be transmitted from the system indicating further information about the 
mine-like contact.  The identify function includes five sub-functions: 
 
1. FI.3.1 Determine if mine-like contact is a bottom mine 
2. FI.3.2 Determine if mine-like contact is moored mine 
3. FI.3.3 Determine if mine-like contact is drifting mine 
4. FI.3.4 Determine if mine-like contact should be avoided 
5. FI.3.5 Create message about mine identification 
 
 
Figure 25. Identify Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Identify function.  The Identify function describes events triggered by the classify 
function determining a mine-like contact has been found.  The Identify function proceeds to further identify a mine-
like contact as either bottom, moored, or drifting mine. 
i. Engage 
The top level engage function describes events triggered by a mine-like contact being 
detected and determines the need to engage.  The engage function processes inputs of 
information on the mine-like contact of interest from previous steps in the DTE sequence.  There 
are several ways to engage a mine.  The one method is to determine the mine‟s exact location, 
mark it and avoid the mine‟s surrounding area when transiting the area.  Another way is to 
neutralize the mine real time as it is found and identified.  However, some situations require that 
 93 
the mine is identified and located during an initial search (reconnaissance mission) with 
neutralization occurring later (re-acquire and neutralize mission).  Locating the mine a second 
time should not take as long since the location is already known.  The neutralization sub-
function, if triggered performs the functions related to neutralizing the mine-like contact.  The 
engage function includes four sub-functions with one sub-function containing three lower-level 
functions: 
 
1. FE.4.1 Create Neutralization Plan 
a. FE.4.1.1 Determine necessity and method for neutralization 
b. FE.4.1.2 Create message requesting approval of neutralization plan 
c. FE.4.1.3 Neutralization plan approved/modified by tasking authority 
2. FE.4.2 Reacquire (Note: Reacquire takes into account if the Engage function is not called 
directly after the Identify function, the mine will need to be relocated to effectively 
neutralize it.) 
3. FE.4.3 Neutralize contact (disable contact) 
4. FE.4.4 Create message about engagement results 
 
Figure 26 depicts the functional hierarchy of the engage function. 
 
Figure 26. Engage Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Engage function.  The Engage function describes events triggered by a mine-like 
contact being detected and determines the need to engage.  The Engage function processes inputs of information on 
the mine-like contact of interest from previous steps in the DTE sequence.  
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j. Communicate 
Figure 27 depicts the functional hierarchy of the communicate function.  The 
communicate function describes the link between all the MCM platforms performing the mission 
and exists throughout the whole mission from start to finish.  Communicate is how the platform 
sends and receives information by any means while deployed.  Since one of the short comings of 
current systems, though becoming more prevalent in emerging systems, is that real-time 
communications are lacking, the communicate function is critical in providing information to 
other MCM systems and to the amphibious task force.  The determine status function relays 
functional status to the tasking authority and provides alerts if the system becomes degraded to a 
point where the mission is impacted.  The communicate function includes four sub-functions: 
 
1. FCO.6.1 Receive communications 
a. FCO.6.1.1 Receive hard connect communications 
b. FCO.6.1.2 Receive wireless communications 
2. FCO.6.2 Transmit communications 
a. FCO.6.2.1 Transmit hard connect communications 
b. FCO.6.2.2 Transmit wireless communications 
3. FCO.6.3 Determine Status (in-mission status) 
a. FCO.6.3.1 Perform BIT (Built-In-Test) 
b. FCO.6.3.2 Create message about operational status, including errors 
c. FCO.6.3.3 Determine time, locations, direction, and speed 
4. FCO.6.4 Store information 
 
Figure 27. Communicate Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Communicate function.  The Communicate function describes all the functions that 
are performed when a message is created in other functions.  The Communicate function is the link between all the 
MCM platforms performing the mission and exists throughout the whole mission from start to finish. 
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k. Receive Maintenance 
Figure 28 depicts the functional hierarchy of the receive maintenance function.  The 
receive maintenance function describes events where the MCM platform is under maintenance to 
support future missions.  The maintenance function will assist the system to meet the operational 
availability and reliability requirements.  The receive maintenance function includes five sub-
functions: 
 
1. FRM.9.1 Perform maintenance diagnostics 
2. FRM.9.2 Receive corrective maintenance 
3. FRM.9.3 Receive preventative maintenance 
4. FRM.9.4 Receive energy replenishment 
5. FRM.9.5 Create message about maintenance status 
 
 
Figure 28. Receive Maintenance Function Hierarchy 
Functional decomposition of the Receive Maintenance function.  The Receive Maintenance function describes 















F. MAPPING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TO SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 
Top level requirements and top level functions were mapped to show traceability and 
develop initial concepts towards system architectural descriptions.  The mapping of requirements 



































































































































REQ 1.0 Clandestine Operations X X X X X X X X  X X 
REQ 2.0 Navigation Precision X X X X   X     
REQ 3.0 Autonomous Operational Modes X X X X X X X  X  X 
REQ 4.0 Processing Capabilities X X X X   X     
REQ 5.0 MCM Communication X X X X X X X X X X X 
REQ 6.0 Endurance     X  X X   X 
REQ 7.0 Operational Environment     X   X   X 
REQ 8.0 Deployment Distance     X       
REQ 9.0 Detection and Classification X X X    X     
REQ 10.0 Collaborative Search Patterns X X X         
REQ 11.0 Mine Neutralization X  X    X     
REQ 12.0 Multiple Sensors X X X X   X     
REQ 13.0 Electromagnetic Environment        X X  X 
REQ 14.0 Reliable and Available         X X  
REQ 15.0: Launch Platform     X   X   X 
REQ 16.0: Minimize Weight, Footprint        X  X X 
REQ 17.0: Weapon Safety    X        
REQ 18.0: Software Architecture X X X   X X   X  
Figure 29. High Level Functions Mapped to High Level Requirements 
Figure depicts High Level Requirements mapped to High Level Functions for the solution MCM system. The 












G. SYSTEM BOUNDARY 
As defined in previous sections of this report, this analysis has identified the complexity 
and diversity of the VSW zone, defined the requirements and functional attributes necessary for 
a system operating in the VSW environment.  Due to the dynamics of the system scope defined 
by this cohort team, a decision was made to reduce the problem scope to a manageable effort that 
would fit within the constraints of our project schedule.  Figure 30 describes the bounded system 
as the shaded area in comparison to the definition of the fully defined system.  The scope of the 
system boundary was chosen to represent the key functions that relate back to the problem 
statement of addressing the reduction of the DTE sequence in support of amphibious landing 
operations.  It is recommended that functions outside the system boundary are explored by other 






Figure 30. System Boundary 
Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) of functions performed by MCM system during a mission conducted in the VSW zone.  Shaded functions indicate the 
system boundary for this report.  Shaded functions were examined in depth and with the remaining functions are recommended for future cohort research teams 
to explore due to the additional complexity and depth of the remaining functions.  Walking through the FFBD, the mission starts with the Perform Planning 
Function.  Once Perform Planning is complete, both the Communicate function and Deploy functions start.  The Communicate function performs the 
communications from the MCM system to external systems and is active throughout the duration of the mission, until the MCM system is recovered.  After the 
Deploy function, the first loop, LP1, is entered and the Transit function starts, where the MCM system transits into or out of an operational area depending on 
direction given by the host platform.  With the completion of the transit function, either the Recover function is called to recover the MCM system (if the system 
has transited to a recovery point), or a second loop is entered to search for mines in the operational area (if the MCM system has transited into a search area).  
Entering the second loop, LP2, begins the Search-Detect-Classify-Identify sequence.  The Search function effectively “mows the lawn” in the operational area 
looking for mine-like objects.  If a mine-like object is detected, the Search function ends and the Detect-Classify-Identify sequence starts for the mine-like object.  
Once the Identify function has completed, a decision is made whether to engage or not engage the detected mine.  Once this decision is made, either the Engage 
function is called, or it is bypassed.  After the Engage function completes or is bypassed, the second loop, LP2, restarts at the Search function, searching the 
operational area again for a new mine-like contact. LP2 is exited if the MCM system reaches the end of the operational area, or is directed to stop searching 
during the Search function. This exit of the second loop is noted on the FFBD as “LE2”, the loop exit.  When LP2 ends, the first loop, LP1, is restarted and the 
transit function is called again to move the MCM system to a new operational area to further prosecute mines or to a recovery point to recover the MCM system.  
Once the Communicate and Recovery functions have completed, the Receive Maintenance function is performed at the end of the mission. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
As previously discussed, the boundary of this research is restricted to the scope and 
function that the MCM system conducts in the operational area during the DTE sequence.  
Further investigation has proven that even with the scope reduced to the functions of the DTE 
sequence, the problem is still very complex and challenging to solve due to the many parameters 
that need to be taken into consideration to develop a solution space.  The decision was made to 
explore the level of autonomy on next generation MCM systems and their effect on meeting the 
capability gap.  Three alternative architectures were developed to further investigate. 
A. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
Our earlier research has shown that the capability gap solutions that had the potential for 
reducing the DTE were identified as removing the man and mammal from the mine field, 
removing or reducing PMA, incorporating sensor fusion and extending system endurance.  Table 
8 displays capability gaps identified as contributors that increase DTE time and developed ideas 
at providing solutions to bridge the gap.  The architecture analysis effort was focused on 
exploring levels of autonomy, investigating the benefits of real-time data analysis, and 





















Table 8. Capability Gaps 
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 The primary architecture analysis focused on exploring different levels of autonomy and 
was based on information provided in the Unmanned System Integrated Roadmap 2011-2036 
and the Naval MCM UUV Roadmap (February 2011) documents that indicate the progression of 
future technology is shifting focus of DTE task reliance from humans to unmanned autonomous 
systems.  
The analysis and development of communication networks was derived by investigating 
the definition of autonomy and the paradigm shift of human control over to decisions being made 
by autonomous unmanned systems.  In order for the humans to transition to the support and 
monitoring role for autonomous systems, it is necessary to have real time data feedback to a C2 
human element in certain architectures.  In addition, one of the biggest obstacles with reducing 
the DTE sequence has been identified by stakeholders and research is the time delay from 
planning the mission to the time it takes to produce final target location and details.   
As discovered through researching capability gaps, system endurance is a limiting factor.  
The UUV system must transit from a drop point to its AO under different environmental factors 
that can affect navigation and energy reserves which hinder the ability of a system to complete 
its mission without the need for refueling or recharging.  It is necessary to manage the system 
power requirements with realistic system power technologies given the previously defined 
DRMs.   
 
Additionally, the communication system must be able to sustain communication links 
between the vehicle(s) and the Host Platform for the entire length of the mission.  It is necessary 
to manage and coordinate the communication needs with sustained operations.   
B. LIST OF ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY 
 
This section gives a high-level overview of three alternative architectures that were 
explored.  Subsequent sections give further detail for each alternative‟s unique concepts and 
configuration. 
1. Alternative Architecture One: Fully/Semi-Autonomous System  
The main components of Alternative Architecture One are:  
a. Fully autonomous Self Propelled Underwater Detection System (SPUDS) vehicle. 
b. Fully autonomous over-the-horizon (OTH) buoy communication network. 
c. Two person team operating the MCM command and the Host Platform MCM C2 
Processing System at the Host Platform. 
The main characteristics of Alternative Architecture One are: 
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a. The vehicle performs navigation functions to include obstacle avoidance without human 
intervention or guidance from the Host Platform. 
b. The vehicle can collaborate between like-vehicles to perform missions without human 
intervention. 
c. The vehicle performs the mission functions of search, detect, classify, and identify. 
d. The communication between the SPUDS vehicle(s) and the Host Platform is conducted 
via a field of communication buoys operating autonomously that convert acoustic 
communications to RF communications.  The buoy field also provides navigation 
reference points to the SPUDS vehicles in the AO. 
e. The MCM Host Platform creates a tactical map of AO based on mine type and mine 
location information received from vehicles. 
f. The Host Platform can control one or multiple SPUDS vehicles without increasing man-
power or processing/communication infrastructure.  
2. Alternative Architecture Two: Tele-Operated System 
The main components of Alternative Architecture Two: 
a. Tele-operated SPUDS vehicle. 
b. Existing Common Tactical Data Link provided by MH-60 and/or Fire-Scout UAV for 
OTH C2 and data-linking real time sensor data.  Data is transmitted via a tethered 
floating surface antenna. 
c. Six person team operating the Host Platform MCM C2 Processing System at the Host 
Platform.   
The main characteristics of Alternative Architecture Two are: 
a. The Host Platform performs navigation functions to include obstacle avoidance by 
steering the vehicle or giving waypoint guidance. 
b. The vehicle cannot collaborate between like-vehicles without human intervention for 
mission accomplishment. 
c. The Host Platform performs the functions of search, detect, classify, and identify through 
processing real time MCM sensor data arriving from SPUDS vehicles via a data link. 
d. The communication between the SPUDS vehicle is conducted via an existing Navy data 
link system provided by an air platform such as a MH-60 helicopter or a Fire-Scout 
UAV.  The data link is accomplished through the use of the floating tethered antenna. 
e. The MCM Host Platform creates a tactical map of AO based on real time mission 
analysis performed on the Host Platform.  This mine type and mine location information 
is derived by a real time analysis of MCM sensor data streaming from the SPUDS 
vehicle. 
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f. The Host Platform can control one or two SPUDS vehicles without increasing man-
power or processing/communication infrastructure.  The factors that are affected by 
increasing the number of vehicles are the data-link bandwidth and Navy assistance 
required to provide real-time processes.  Therefore adding additional SPUDS vehicles 
will require increasing man-power and processing/communication infrastructure. 
3. Alternative Architecture Three: Remote/Tele-operated System  
The main components of Alternative Architecture Three are: 
a. Hybrid Remote-Pilot/Tele-operated SPUDS vehicle that is operated in the AO by a local 
team. 
b. A five person team operating the Host Platform MCM C2 Processing System at the Host 
Platform.   
c. Three person local team to operate the SPUDS vehicle.  This local team is in the AO 
while the MCM Host Platform is operating OTH.  
The main characteristics of Alternative Architecture Three are: 
a. This system requires a local operator team that operates OTH from the MCM Host 
Platform.  The local operation team consists of 3 people operating a SPUDS vehicle from 
a small boat in the AO.  
b. The local operator performs all navigation functions to include obstacle avoidance by 
steering the vehicles or giving waypoint guidance. 
c. The vehicles cannot collaborate between themselves without human guidance for mission 
accomplishment. 
d. The Host Platform performs the functions of search, detect, classify, and identify through 
post-mission analysis (PMA) of raw MCM sensor data retrieved from a recording device 
on the SPUDS vehicle. 
e. The communication between the SPUDS vehicle(s) and the local operator is conducted 
via a new radio data link system that is used to control the vehicle‟s navigation during 
mission execution. 
f. The MCM Host Platform creates a tactical map of the AO based on the PMA.  The mine 
type and mine location information is derived from the PMA. 
g. The Host Platform cannot control SPUDS vehicle.  Increasing the number of SPUDS 
vehicles in the field to perform the mission will increase man-power and 
processing/communication infrastructure requirements.  
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C. BASE MCM ADVANCED SYSTEM 
Three alternatives architectures were developed in an effort to provide acceptable 
solutions to the problem.  Figure 31 shows same base components that the alternative 
architectures share.  These base components are dubbed the “MCM Advanced System.”  The 
MCM Advanced System is composed of three major subsystems which are the UUV System, 
OTH Communication System, and the Host Platform MCM System.  Despite the base system 
remaining the same among the three architectures, the component‟s blocks shaded gray in Figure 






Figure 31. MCM Advanced System Component Diagram 
 
This Diagram depicts the system components of the base MCM Advanced System. Grey shaded components indicate areas that differed in the detailed design of 
the three alternative architectures. 
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1. MCM Advanced System Components 
The following section details the specific components of the MCM Advanced System 
depicted in Figure 31. 
a. UUV System 
The unmanned underwater vehicle system (UUV System) is further detailed by 
navigation, mission processor, communication, propulsion, power, and neutralizer 
subcomponents.    
UUV Navigation System 
The UUV Navigation System is composed of sensor components and computers that 
enable the UUV to track itself in 3-dimensions during a mission.  These components provide 
heading, 3-dimensional velocity, 3-dimensional acceleration, and depth for all alternatives.   
UUV Mission Processor 
The UUV Mission processor includes all sensors, components and computers that enable 
the UUV to process mission critical data and vehicle operation.  This includes sensors that are 
used to search, detect, classify, and identify targets.  All three alternative architectures contain 
the same sensors and components with the exception of optical sensors.  However, the number of 
mission processors and the allocation of functionality for calculating precise coordinates used for 
tracking vehicle position and mine locations are varied between alternatives.  The allocation of 
search, detection, classification, and identification functionality also vary between the mission 
processor and the MCM Host Platform for each alternative. 
UUV Communication System 
The UUV communication system includes the interfaces and components that allow the 
UUV to communicate in order to execute MCM missions.  These components are detailed 
further in the alternative architecture decompositions. 
UUV Propulsion System 
The UUV propulsion system includes the interfaces, components, and computers that 
propel the vehicle through the water.  It includes the motors, transmission, steering linkages, fins, 
and controllers.  In this analysis the propulsion system does not vary between alternate 
architectures.    
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UUV Power System 
The UUV power system includes the interfaces, components, and computers that provide 
power to the UUV system.  The power system includes power monitoring, power regulating, 
power switching, power generation, and power protection systems.  In this analysis the power 
system does not vary between alternate architectures.  It is assumed that the power system 
provides sufficient power to sustain the power draw of the system during mission execution.  The 
power source is a hybrid power source consisting of a lithium ion battery system with a 
secondary fuel cell power system to recharge the battery and provide additional boost power 
when needed.  The addition of a fuel cell gives opportunities to refuel the system while in 
operation and thus sustain or increase its area coverage.    
 
The power consumed by the individual systems was not calculated or estimated in this 
analysis.  It is understood that the power draw of the individual systems can have drastic affects 
on the type of power generation system needed and the definition of the vehicle architectures.  
Further study will be needed in the future to determine the power needs of the next generation 
system.  
Neutralizer 
The UUV Neutralizer system includes the components necessary to render a mine non-
operational.  Neutralization could include destroying a mine, neutralizing a mine‟s ability to 
detect a vehicle, or detonate a mine to make it inoperable.  In this analysis, the focus was 
maintained on evaluating vehicle systems that would fulfill the searching, detection, 
classification, and identification functions of the future system.  With that caveat, the highest 
priority for the Marine Amphibious force is to know where the mines are located so that they can 
be avoided; an effective neutralization method that was used in this analysis.   
 
It is recommended that the neutralization component and function should be allocated to 
another low cost vehicle.  This is because performing neutralization carries the risk that the 
vehicle performing the neutralization can also become disabled or destroyed when executing a 
neutralization tactic.  This is another area that is recommended for a follow-on in depth study. 
b. OTH Communication System 
The OTH Communication system includes all the components necessary to allow over 
the horizon communications between the MCM Host Platform and the MCM vehicle. 
   
Figure 32 shows the expected communication services internal and external to the MCM 
Advanced System.  Although Figure 32 shows the OTH communication system as internal to the 
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advanced system, this service could be provided by a system external to the MCM Advanced 
System.  The three alternative architectures explored the differences between this communication 
service provided by a system developed for the MCM Advanced System, or provided by an 




Figure 32. MCM Advanced System Context and Interfacing Diagram 
 




c. Host Platform MCM System  
The Host Platform MCM System contains the Host Platform Ordinance Distribution 
System (HPODS), the Host Platform Launch & Recovery System, (HPLRS), the Host Platform 
MCM Communication System (HPMCS), the Host Platform MCM C2 & Processing System 
(HPMC2PS), and the Host Platform Fuel/Power Distribution System (HPFPDS) subcomponents.  
Host Platform Ordinance Distribution System 
The HPODS system contains the components that store and distribute ordnance aboard 
the Host Platform.  It is envisioned that the neutralizer on the MCM UUV is considered ordnance 
and will be handled as such.  The system needs to handle and store the neutralizer separately 
from the MCM UUV.  The neutralizer component is not addressed in this analysis as previously 
discussed.  It is recommended that another study be developed to investigate impacts and 
solutions for handling the neutralizer aboard the MCM Host Platform. 
Host Platform Launch & Recovery System 
The HPLRS system contains the components to safely launch and recover the MCM 
UUV.  This component was not addressed in the alternative analysis and it is recommended that 
another study investigate the impact and solutions for launching and recovering the MCM UUV 
aboard the Host Platform.  
Host Platform MCM Communication System 
The HPMCS contains the components that enable the Host Platform to communicate with 
the MCM vehicle via the OTH Communication system.  The communications between the MCM 
UUV and the Host Platform are shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33.  
Host Platform Command and Control Processing System 
The HPMC2PS contains the components that enable the Host Platform to command and 
control MCM vehicles.  It contains the processing for creating tactical overlays of the AO and 
programs the UUV with routes and guidance.  The HPMC2PS pools information from the UUVs 
to determine where gaps in the mine fields exist, and creates routes for the amphibious force to 
navigate to the beach.  The HPMC2PS also makes neutralization plans based on processed 
information. 
Figure 32 displays the MCM Advanced System context diagram and how the HPMC2PS 




Host Platform Fuel/Power Distribution System 
The HPFPDS system contains the components that fuel or store power to the MCM 
system while it is on the Host Platform.  This component is not addressed in the alternative 
architecture analysis and it is recommended that further study be conducted to investigate the 
impact and solutions for handling fuel/power for the system while aboard the MCM Host 
Platform. 
d. Local Operator MCM System 
The local operator MCM system consists of personnel and components necessary to 
operate a remote vehicle and to launch and retrieve an MCM vehicle.  For architectures that 
contain remote controlled MCM vehicles, the local operator team is required to be nearby to 
control the vehicle 
2. Host Platform MCM Communication System Sub-Components 
Figure 33 depicts the detailed base design of the Host Platform MCM Communication 
System component.  This component was further broken down into shared base components 
across alternatives because of the complexity of the component.  Components shaded gray in 
Figure 33 indicate components that were changed across alternatives.  The following section 




Figure 33. Host Platform MCM Communication System Component Diagram 
 
This diagram depicts the sub-components of the Host Platform MCM Communication System component. 
Components shaded gray indicated components that varied across alternative architectures. 
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a. HP MCM Radio 
The radio component of the HPMCS varies between alternatives and is dependent on the 
level of autonomy applied to the architecture.  Depending on the level of autonomy the 
bandwidth of the radio system have been adjusted to accommodate the data needs. 
b. HP MCM Server 
The HP MCM Server stores, retrieves, and transmits data to the HPMC2PS.  Depending 
on the alternative architecture this component may or may not be part of the system. 
c. HP MCM Server Power 
The HP MCM Server Power component delivers filtered and surge protected power to 
the HPMCS.  This component was not addressed in this report and it is recommended that 
another study investigate the impact and solutions for handling the power for the HPMCS.   
d. HP MCM Router/Switch 
This component routes and enables networking of the Host Platform MCM system.  This 
component varies depending alternative. 
e. HP MCM Antenna 
This component enables the HP MCM Radio to transmit and receive information from 
the MCMUUV component.  It is considered a separate component from the HP MCM Radio 
because the component needs to be mounted to the host ship.  Depending on the alternative this 
component may already be part of the Host Platform, or will need to be routed to and mounted in 
an optimal location.  Further study will need to be performed to choose the optimal location for 
an antenna.  Determination of optimal location is outside the scope of this project. 
f. HP MCM Recorder 
The HP MCM Recorder records all mission parameters in order to be retrieved for further 








3. Host Platform C2 Processing System Sub-Components 
Figure 34 depicts the detailed base design of the Host Platform Command and Control 
Processing System component.  This component was further broken down into shared base sub-
components across alternatives because of the complexity of the C2 Processing System.  The 




Figure 34. Host Platform Command & Control Processing System 
 
This diagram depicts the components in the Host Platform MCM Communication System. Components shaded gray 
indicated components that varied across alternative architectures. 
a. HP C2 Computer 
The HP C2 Computer system processes the incoming data from the MCM UUV.  The 
computer system creates the functionality to command and control the MCM vehicles.  It 
coordinates information with the Host Platform command and control center with the number of 
computers varying between the alternatives. 
b. HP C2 Display(s) 
The HP C2 Displays shows MCM vehicle status, maps, tactical symbols, sensor data, and 
user information to the operators.  The number of displays and information varies between 
alternatives. 
c. HP C2 Human Control Interface 
The HP C2 Human Control Interface contains all the components that are used to 
interface the human operator to the MCM system.  It contains items such as control panels, 
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keyboards, mice or trackballs, joysticks and other controls that are used to operate the MCM 
system.  The number and type of interface varies with the different alternatives. 
D. FUNCTIONS MAPPED TO SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Table 9 depicts the allocation of the Search, Detect, Classify, Identify, Engage, and 
Communicate functions to the MCM Advanced System components.  It should be noted that 
Table 9 distinguishes that the allocation is different, depending on the alternative, by designating 
the letter "A" for alternative.  The letter "X" indicates the function is allocated to the component 
regardless of alternative.  The varied components in the mapping correspond to the varied 
components of Figure 31. 
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Table 9. Functions Mapped to System Components 
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FCO.6.2   A A             X X   A 
Determine Status FCO.6.3   X               X X   A 















FRM.9.3       X X X   X X     X   
Receive Energy 
Replenishment 





FRM.9.5   X X             X X   A 
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E. REQUIREMENTS MAPPED TO SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Table 10 depicts a mapping of requirements to MCM system components.  Table 10 
distinguishes that the allocation is different, depending on the alternative, by designating the 
letter "A" for alternative.  The letter "X" indicates the function is allocated to the component 
regardless of alternative.  More details regarding each alternative can be found in Appendix E.    
Table 10. MCM Advanced System Components Mapped to Requirements 
This table lists system requirements allocated to system components. X= Allocated to all Alternatives, 
A=Alternative Specific 



















































































































































































































































REQ 1.0: Clandestine 
Operations 
A  A X X X A A X A 
 
A 
REQ 2.0: Precise 
Navigation 












REQ 4.0: Processing 
Capabilities 




REQ 5.0: MCM 
Communication 








REQ 7.0: Operational 
Environment 
X X X X X X  
     
REQ 8.0: 
Deployment Distance 




REQ 9.0: Detect and 
Classify Mines  A A    A  A A 
 
A 
Note: Requirements REQ10.0 through REQ 18.0 are not included in the analysis because they 
are not differentiators in the discrimination of the alternatives.  
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1. MCM Advanced System Components for Clandestine Operations 
To design the Advance MCM system to meet the clandestine operational requirements, 
the requirements have been allocated to the system components as shown Table 10 for special 
design considerations for the following reasons: 
 
a. If the navigation system components are not precise enough, they will demand more 
human intervention.  It would also require the UUV to surface more often to correct 
for navigation errors and thus be exposed for observation.  This concept has been 
explored further through modeling and simulation and is detailed later in this report.   
 
b. The communication network and functionality can affect the ability of being detected 
by the number of communication attempts and method of communication with the 
vehicle.  If the communication network has a design with floating antennas, they 
could be detected by observation from the shore.  If the communication network has a 
large electromagnetic transmission, it could also be picked up, monitored and can 
give away system movement data.  This concept has been explored further in 
establishing communication networks for the individual architecture.  
 
c. The propulsion system of the vehicle can affect the UUV's ability to be clandestine by 
creating noise that can be detected. 
 
d. The power system of the vehicle can affect the ability of detection by not having 
sufficient endurance.  This creates the demand for human intervention to recover or 
refuel the vehicle and thus be exposed to detection. 
 
e. The neutralizer component can give away intentions by pre-maturely detonating 
mines that are within observation from the shore, thus giving away the intentions of 
the landing force.  
 
f. The launch and recovery of MCM vehicles from the Host Platform can compromise 
the detection of the vehicle.  For example the MCM vehicle could be observed when 
launched from a surface platform or dropped from an air platform.  However, the 
system may not be detected when it is launched from a subsurface platform, or when 
it is launched from an air or surface platform during times of limited visibility.  This 
report further suggests ways the vehicles can be launched, however, it does not go 
into depth on this subject as this area is beyond the scope of this report and is 
recommended for further investigation. 
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2. Navigation Requirement vs. System Components 
The MCM vehicle navigation sensors, computers, and propulsion system can affect the 
ability of the vehicle to track its heading, speed, velocity, acceleration, and latitude and longitude 
position.  The alternatives explored different ways the vehicle achieves navigation requirements 
while propulsion remains the same for all alternatives.  The communication system impacts the 
navigation for some of the alternatives since it is used to aid the navigation system.  It is 
imperative the Host Platform tracks the navigation results to plot mine contacts and vehicle 
status.   
3. Operational Mode Requirements vs. System Components 
The ability to perform autonomous operations has been allocated to the navigation 
systems, processors, and communications systems of the Advanced MCM system.  It is has been 
observed and noted from subject matter experts that the ability to process information and 
communicate has a direct effect on autonomous behavior.  The navigation system has been 
allocated to operation mode requirements because it directly affects the MCM system‟s ability to 
make decisions.  A system with a poor navigation solution cannot operate with a high level of 
autonomy and would require human intervention.  Therefore the alternative architectures 
explored different levels of autonomy and how it affects the overall system performance.  
4. Processing Capability Requirements vs. System Components 
The processing capability is allocated to the computer systems of the alternative 
architectures.  However, processing is also allocated to the communication system.  The 
communication and navigation systems have a direct effect on supplying information that must 
be processed for creating target reports and vehicle status information.  
5. Communication Requirements vs. System Components 
The processing capability is allocated to the computer systems, communication systems 
and command and control systems of the alternatives.  The different alternatives with different 
levels of autonomy are explored to show the effects on these components. 
6. Endurance 
Endurance is affected by the body shape, propulsion system and power system of the 
vehicle.  However, the navigation and processing system can affect the system endurance by 
optimally steering and adjusting the speed of the vehicle to increase its endurance.  The different 
alternatives were assessed for endurance through modeling and simulation and are discussed in 
later sections of this study.  
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7. Operational Environment vs. System Components 
All the components of the MCM vehicle are affected by the operational environment.  
However, the alternative architecture analysis did not evaluate the effects of the environment on 
the components.   
8. Deployment Distance Requirements vs. System Components 
Presenting solutions to satisfy deployment distance requirement is outside the stated 
functional boundaries and were not analyzed further in the report.  However, components that 
affect this requirement are given here for future consideration: 
 
a. Propulsion System, Power System, and Deployment Point.  It is assumed that the 
deployment point for the vehicle may be in the area of interest (AI) but not in the 
AO.  If the power system cannot support the power draw of the system while the 
vehicle transits from the deployment point to the AO and conducts its mission, the 
distance from the deployment point to the AO must be shortened. 
 
b. Communication system does not support the operation of the vehicle.  If the 
communication system does not support the communications between the vehicle 
and the Host Platform because the vehicle is out of communication range, the 
distance between the vehicle and the Host Platform must be shortened. 
 
c. Navigation error.  If error builds up in computing the navigation solution while 
the vehicle transits to the AO, the deployment distance must be minimized to 
support navigation offset requirements.  
9. MCM Mission Requirements vs. System Components 
The system components consisting of processing systems and communication systems 
affect the Advanced MCM System‟s ability to detect and classify mines.  It affects the ability to 
perform collaborative searches within the AO.  The alternatives architectures explored different 
options to meet these requirements. 
F. STANDARD VEHICLE CONFIGURATION  
The capability gaps explored were conducted assuming a standard vehicle system 
architecture description with variations on the configuration of components to enable autonomy 
and real time communication networks.  This scope was chosen to also not repeat previous 
research and to take a path that was not yet explored.  A standard vehicle description enabled a 
focus on exploring the technological demand that will be needed in the 10 to 15 year range to 
successfully field the system.   
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The main UUV system for the Advanced MCM System is the Self Propelled Underwater 
Detection System, or SPUDS.  The concept of SPUDS is to create a vehicle that maintains the 
envelope of a MK-46 or MK-50 lightweight torpedo while stored in a pre-launch state.  Keeping 
the standard vehicle within this envelop offers several advantages, of which, the primary 
advantage is interoperability.  The SPUDS vehicle enables aircraft and ships that are configured 
to launch and store torpedoes to be able launch the SPUDS vehicle with little or no modification 
or additional testing.  Figure 36 and Figure 37 show the physical envelop of the SPUDS vehicle 
which is identical to the MK-50 torpedo dimensions. 
 
Several other advantages were realized in using a torpedo shape.  The dimensions of the 
MK-46 and MK-50 lightweight torpedoes provide a familiar configuration for existing modeling, 
simulation, and analysis tools.  Altering the physical shape and size significantly from this would 
cause other factors that would then have to be considered during the alternatives analysis.  These 
factors could potentially be integration with a Host Platform, an increased logistical footprint, 
and changes in vehicle speed and endurance that could be achieved with a larger vehicle storage 
space for fuel.  It was also decided that the size of the underwater vehicle should be limited in 
size due to the need to be able to carry out operations in the VSW area necessitating a small to 
mid-sized platform.  Additionally, keeping the vehicle weight and center of gravity within the 
envelope of the Mk-46 and Mk-50 allows standard bomb racks such as the BRU-14 found on 
MH-60 helicopters to launch the vehicle.  It should also allow the program to skip captive carry 
and jettison testing on the MH-60R, SH-60B, and P-8 air platforms. 
Technological assumptions made for the future SPUDS platform include: 
a. Ability to fuse data from multiple sensors and subsystems (Data fusion) 
o This would allow the system to be able to combine data from multiple 
navigation and sensor components to provide more accurate positional and 
threat data than one component alone could provide.  SPUDS sensor data 
could be combined together and analyzed to increase the probability of 
detection and correct classification. 
b. Increase in the endurance ability of battery cells 





1. Standard Vehicle Details 
A depiction of the overall system‟s physical form is shown in Figure 35.  The vehicle 
should comply with the physical characteristics that the electric motors (as shown in Figure 35) 
would have to be retractable within the envelope of the system in its pre-launch state.  The same 
is true with stabilization fins, as these would also have to be equipped with a retraction feature.  
Any sensors would also have to be able to fit within the envelope.  
 
Figure 36, Figure 37 and Figure 39 further shows more details of the SPUDS vehicle.  It 
is envisioned that this vehicle can be launched from a variety of platforms and thus enable it to 
be seeded into the AO by subsurface, surface or air platforms.  The vehicle should weigh no 
more than 798 lb max.  This weight is derived on the weight of the Mk 46 or Mk-50 torpedo.  
 
 
Figure 35. SPUDS Deployed States 




Figure 36. SPUDS Pre-launch Side view 




Figure 37. SPUDS Pre-launch Rear View 
 
This figure shows the envelop dimension of the SPUDS vehicle in the prelaunch state. The prelaunch dimensions 
are essentially the same as a MK-46 torpedo allowing stowing in already existing torpedo racks.  
 
Figure 38 shows the recommended launch envelop for the SPUDS vehicle that was 
derived from the configuration control drawing for the MK-50 torpedo (Torpedo MK50 
Configuration Drawing, 1982).  The vehicle should be designed to be no less rugged than the 
Mk50.  In other words, it should be rugged enough to be launched from a surface vehicle using 
rocket assisted launch, much the same as an Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC) or dropped from 
air platform such as a P8 or MH-60 helicopter.  It should be noted here that an argument can be 
made that an air launched or rocket delivered SPUDS vehicle will compromise the stealth or 
clandestine operation requirement (REQ 1.0).  In the case of a rocket assisted or air launch, the 
standoff distance of the taskforce can be greatly increased while still allowing the SPUDS 
vehicle to transit undetected to the AO when it reaches a certain drop point.   
 
Figure 38. Launch Envelop for SPUDS vehicle 
 




Considering that employment of deception is a core fundamental to US military doctrine 
for amphibious breaching operations, the employment of less stealthy launch options such as 
surface, air, or rocket assisted launches are viable (Joint Publication 3-02, 2009).  SPUDS can be 
delivered into the AO when US forces are conducting activities such as bombing or cruise 
missile attacks during hours of limited visibility and remain dormant until needed.  Even if a 
SPUDS vehicle is observed entering the water during such an activity; it can be misinterpreted as 
a weapon system malfunction and thus mask its real intended purpose.  Again the argument 
could be made that a bombing raid will alert the enemy that something is coming.  However, US 
forces conduct bombing raids for a number of reasons to include deception.  A bombing raid 
does not necessarily signal or pin point a location where an amphibious operation is going to take 
place.  Ideally the best way to insert the SPUDS vehicle into the AO is to insert the vehicle via a 
submerged platform, such as a submarine.  However, if this is the only way to insert the vehicle; 
it limits the options for the Navy/Marine Corp team and takes away a much needed flexibility.   
 
Another argument can be made that a SPUDS vehicle cannot be made to survive an air 
delivery or rocket assist delivery system.  However, again we must consider the MK46 or MK50 
torpedo, from which this concept is derived.  The torpedo is an example of an autonomous 
vehicle with a much older technology that is able to survive these types of delivery systems.  
Therefore, the Navy should considered challenging industry to build a vehicle that can be 
inserted multiple ways to include rocket assist and air dropped deliveries systems.    
 
The pre-launch state of the SPUDS vehicle as shown in Figure 36 and Figure 37 allows it 
to be configured for rocket assisted launch.  When using the rocket assisted launch configuration, 
the vehicle is designed with a parachute deployment mechanism that allows a water entry 
velocity of 150 ft/sec at 90 degrees.  The parachute decelerates the vehicle from a speed of 800 
ft/sec to 150 ft/sec.  Once the vehicle transitions from prelaunch state to operational state it 
extracts its motors out of the housing as shown in Figure 39.  The motors are speed variable, 
reversible, and, independent to allow for steering and maneuverability. 
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Figure 39. SPUDS Top View Showing Conceptual Layout 
 
This figure shows the conceptual physical configuration layout of the SPUDS vehicle. 
 
 
It is expected that the endurance and speed of the SPUDS is at least that of the most 
current version of the MK18 UUVs.  Although this investigation has not performed a power 
analysis to confirm or deny that the SPUDS vehicle power system supports the number of 
components for the expected endurance, the assumption was made that technological 
developments will, in the next 10-15 years, allow the SPUDS vehicle to achieve these levels. 
2. SPUDS General Component Solutions 
Table 11 provides a general overview of the component solutions that were used in the 




Table 11. SPUDS Architecture Components 
 
Table 11 describes the various component solutions to the standard SPUDS physical architecture. 
 
SPUDS Architecture Components 
Component Sub Component USE 
Navigation 
Temperature Sensor 




Provides Heading, Speed, 3-dim velocity, 3-dim 
acceleration, and Lat/Long 
GPS 
Provides Heading, Speed, 2-dim velocity, 2-dim 
acceleration, and Lat/Long 
Doppler Velocity 
Log 
Provides Speed, Heading, Velocity 
Pressure/Depth 
Transducer 




or Interface Box 
Used to calculate mission profiles  
Communications 




Used to Communicate below water 
Recording System Used to record mission parameters and sensor data 
Propulsion 
Engine 
Has 4 DC reversible engines that articulate used to 
propel vehicle through water 
Steering/Retraction 
System 
Used to extend/retract engines into body.  Also 
articulates engines for steering 
Engine Controller Controls DC power to engines. 
Power 
Battery Primary Power source for vehicle 
Power Generator Secondary Power source for vehicle 
Power Switch 
Controller 













Extend Magnetic Sensors away from vehicle body. 
Optical Used to detect moored and bottom mines. 
Fwd Looking Sonar Used to detect moored mines 
Right Scan Sonar Used to detect Moored and bottom mines 
Left Scan Sonar Used to detect Moored and bottom mines 
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a. VSW Sensor Package 
The MCM sensor package as shown in Table 11 for the SPUDS vehicle is the same for 
all alternatives with a few minor exceptions.  Since in the VSW environment it is extremely 
difficult to detect and classify mines, the SPUDS vehicle employs multiple sensors to search, 
detect, classify, and identify mine-like objects.  The SPUDS vehicle contains real-time tracking 
magnetic gradiometers and laser scalar gradiometers to provide capabilities to map bottom and 
buried targets.  SPUDS contains forward looking and side scan sonar to search, detect, classify, 
and identify moored and bottom targets.  Multiple electro-optical sensors with infrared (IR) 
illumination provide SPUDS with situational awareness (SA) and identification capabilities.  The 
different alternatives further explored different methods of processing raw data, looking into the 
difference between on-board and off-board data processing.  Table 12 contains the general 
subcomponents of the SPUDS sensor package. 
Table 12. SPUDS Sensor Package 
 
This table shows the standard MCM sensor package on the SPUDS Vehicle. 
 
Sensor System Subcomponents Number 
Magnetic 
Gradiometer System 




Reeling Machine for Magnetic sensor 1 
Magnetic Controller Processor 1 
Sonar System Fwd Sonar Transducer 1 
Side Scan Sonar 1 
Optical System CCD/LED (LED will provide illumination) Alternative 
Dependent 
 
b. Propulsion System 
The propulsion system of the SPUDS vehicle consists of four DC electric reversible 
motors and is standard for all three alternative architectures.  This report does not address the 
size of the electric engines.  However, the engines should not be able to draw no more than 2 
amps at startup and should create 1.2 horsepower at peak.  The propulsion system has a motor 
controller to regulate the individual motor speeds and the directional spin (clockwise/counter-
clockwise) of each individual motor.  The motor controller also directs the steering/retraction 
system.  The steering/retraction system extends or retracts the motors from the SPUDS body.  It 
also articulates the motors to provide steering.  The motors are fitted with a propeller and shield 
to protect the propeller during operation.   
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c. Power Distribution System 
The power distribution system is composed of a battery unit, power generator system, 
and power switch controller.  The battery is the primary source of power for SPUDS, consisting 
of rechargeable Li-Ion batteries, or Li-Poly batteries.  The power system also contains a power 
switch controller to turn on and off systems and to regulate power usage.  This system must be 
able to communicate with mission processors for vehicle status and power management.   
 
A Fuel Cell Energy/Power System (FCEPS) augments the battery system with a refuel-
able charger to extend the endurance of the SPUDS vehicle.  Although fuel cell technology is not 
ready today to provide power for UUVs, the technology is plausible in the 10-15 year timeframe 
because of current commercial economic pressures to further develop electric and hybrid cars.  
In a report by the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute, it was indicated that the FCEPS look 
promising for near-future UUV applications (Davies & Moore, 2006).  Further research should 
be conducted into covertly refueling or recharging the SPUDS vehicle while underway to sustain 
its endurance as this was outside the scope of this project. 
d. Neutralization 
In an effort to propose a potential solution for the neutralization architecture, the 
following high-level concepts are recommended to accomplish the neutralization task: 
1. Map and Avoid the Mine:  A mine is effectively neutralized if its location is known and it 
can be avoided.  The tactical oversight will be responsible for developing a map showing 
locations of mines and routes around or through them.  This tactical map must be 
communicated to the amphibious force which will assign routes to individual landing 
craft vehicles.  The vehicles must have the ability to navigate the routes precisely with 
navigational aids originating inside the amphibious vehicles.   
2. Develop a low cost vehicle to neutralize the mines:  In some instances, it may not be 
possible to avoid the mines.  It is recommended that a separate expendable UUV with 
search and detect abilities should be considered for neutralization.  The constraints and 
potential adverse effects of the neutralizers (jamming, explosions, and battery drainage) 
on the UUV could be catastrophic.  As a result, a secondary vehicle is recommended to 
perform the neutralization.  In this case, SPUDS would have to be equipped with the 
ability to direct and even control the secondary vehicle, especially in the case of a fully 
autonomous system.  Neutralization in this case can be performed several ways.  The first 
option would be in the form of mini “torpedoes” that could be launched at the target.  A 
second option would be to use electronic warfare (EW) technologies to jam or disable the 
mine fuse or mine sensor via an expendable vehicle that would be equipped with 
jamming or electromagnetic disabling technology.  A third option of neutralization would 
use deflagration.  Deflagration is achieved when propellant, thermite, pyrotechnic, or 
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solid reactive materials penetrate a mine‟s case and burn the mine‟s main explosive 
charge (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005). 
3. Use existing assets to neutralize mines: Once routes have been determined from the area 
mapping, a precise targeted mine field location can be communicated to forces with 
neutralization assets.  For example the targeted mine field location can be communicated 
to Air Force or Navy assets that can drop JABS munitions to achieve neutralization. 
Due to the limited timeframe and focus of this project, developing mine neutralization 
methods was considered outside the scope of this project.  Undersea mine neutralization is a 
complicated and intricate subject to study and will need further attention in future efforts. 
G. LEVELS OF AUTONOMY 
To remove the man and mammal from minefield operations, future MCM vehicles must 
be designed to operate with some level of autonomy.  The National Institute of Standards & 
Technology (NIST) defined various levels of autonomy in Special Publication 1011(NIST, 
2004).  It defined autonomous as  
 
Operations of unmanned systems (UMS) wherein the UMS receives its mission 
from the human and accomplishes that mission with or without further Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI).  The level of HRI, along with other factors such as 
mission complexity and environmental difficulty, determine the level of 
autonomy for the UMS (NIST, 2004).   
 
There are four levels of autonomy in UMS which include: Fully Autonomous, Semi-
autonomous, Tele-operation, and Remote Control.  In this report, systems that were explored as 
recommended solutions for the problem statement are Fully Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous 
(Alternative One), Tele-operated (Alternative Two), and Tele-operated/Remote Controlled 
(Alternative Three). 
Table 13 shows definitions for autonomy in relation to unmanned systems.  The first set 
of definitions comes from the Unmanned System Integrated Roadmap FY 2011-2036 
(Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 2011), and the second from NIST 
Special Publication, Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework (NIST, 
2004).  For this report, both definitions were used since the Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap definition related to a more human-based definition and the NIST Special Publication 
definition relates more to the system aspect.  It is important to use both of these definitions 
because considerations for autonomy should include the role of the human and the system.  
Appendix D further details considerations for implementing different levels of autonomy in an 
MCM system. 
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Table 13. Levels of Autonomy 
The table compares definitions of autonomy from the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap to definitions by 
NIST Special Publication (Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 2011; NIST, 2004): Autonomy 
Levels for Unmanned Systems.  It is important to understand the approach of each definition and the relationship of 




Unmanned System Integrated 
Roadmap (2011-2036) 
NIST Special Publication, Autonomy Levels 
for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework 
1 
Full Autonomous Fully Autonomous 
The system receives goals from 
humans and translates them into 
tasks to be performed without 
human interaction. A human could 
still enter the loop in an emergency 
or change the goals, although in 
practice there may be significant 
time delays before human 
intervention occurs. 
This is a mode of operation of an unmanned 
system (UMS) wherein the UMS is expected to 
accomplish its mission, within a defined scope, 
without human intervention.  Note that a team of 
UMSs may be fully autonomous while the 
individual team members may not be due to the 
needs to coordinate during the execution of team 
missions. 
2 
Human Supervised Semi Autonomous 
The system can perform a wide 
variety of activities when given top 
level permission or direction by a 
human. Both the human and the 
system can initiate behaviors based 
on sensed data, but the system can 
do so only if within the scope of its 
currently directed tasks. 
A mode of operation of an Unmanned system 
(UMS) wherein the human operator and/or the 
UMS plan(s) and conduct(s) a mission that 
requires various levels of human-robot interaction 
(HRI). 
3 
Human Delegated Tele-operated 
The vehicle can perform many 
functions independently of human 
control when delegated to do so. 
This level encompasses automatic 
controls, engine controls, and other 
low-level automation that must be 
activated or deactivated by human 
input and must act in mutual 
exclusion of human operation. 
A mode of operation of a Unmanned system 
(UMS) wherein the human operator, using video 
feedback and/or other sensory feedback, either 
directly controls the actuators or assigns 
incremental goals, waypoints in mobility 
situations, on a continuous basis, from off the 
vehicle and via a tethered or radio linked control 
device. In this mode, the UMS may take limited 
initiative in reaching the assigned incremental 
goals. 
4 
Human Operated Remote Piloted 
A human operator makes all 
decisions. The system has no 
autonomous control of its 
environment although it may have 
information-only responses to 
sensed data. 
A mode of operation of a Unmanned system 
(UMS) wherein the human operator, without 
benefit of video or other sensory feedback, 
directly controls the actuators of the UMS on a 
continuous basis, from off the vehicle and via a 
tethered or radio linked control device using 
visual line-of sight cues. In this mode, the UMS 
takes no initiative and relies on continuous or 
nearly continuous input from the user. 
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H. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES  
1. Alternative One 
The Alternative One solution revolves around the concept that the MCM force deploys 
fully autonomous systems and activates them upon the start of MCM mission.  The fully 
autonomous systems can be launched from multiple platform types and lie dormant until the 
MCM Host Platform arrives on station.  It is envisioned that the Host Platform is a littoral 
combat ship and that Alternative One makes up a MCM mission module for the ship.  The ship 
(or Host Platform) monitors and assigns tasking to an underwater vehicle (UUV) via 




Figure 40. Alternative One: Operational Concept 
 
This figure depicts the operational concept of Alternative One derived from (Freitag, 2005). The underwater 
vehicle relays search information back to a MCM ship using a surface-tethered radio link. The data is first 
transmitted to an air platform, and then relayed back to a MCM ship. 
 
Central to this alternative is the idea that the SPUDS vehicle is a fully autonomous/semi 
autonomous vehicle.  It processes MCM/navigational sensor data in real-time to navigate, 
collaborate with other vehicles, and to search, detect, classify, and identify mines without human 
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intervention.  Real-time mine mission analysis (MMA) is processed on board the vehicle itself.  
This alternative leaves the option of PMA, in that sensor data is recorded onboard the vehicle to 
be retrieved at a later time.  The primary advantage of Alternative One is the reduced personnel 
and infrastructure to conduct MCM operations.  In this option the Host Platform can control 
many SPUDS vehicles with a minimum number of people and resources.  
 
Figure 41 depicts the Alternative One concept vehicle.  The human has no ability to 
physically see the vehicle while it is conducting its mission due to the MCM ship being in an 
OTH location.  For this reason, the underwater vehicle has navigational sensors and computer 
power to understand its location underwater.  This is done through navigation computer systems 
that regulate the vehicle‟s speed, direction of travel, and accelerations as it guides the vehicle 
through a MCM operation.  The Host Platform assigns patterns, waypoints and tasks to the 
vehicle, but it is the vehicle‟s responsibility to negotiate obstacles and determine best routes to 
accomplish the mission.  In order to accomplish this task, the navigation system depends on a 
number of schemes to keep the vehicle on course and on track.  The biggest obstacle to 
performing navigation is doing it covertly.  In order to meet the clandestine requirements, the 
vehicle must stay submerged for most of its mission.  In this concept, communication and 
navigation aids are provided by establishing an autonomous buoy field. 
 
 
Figure 41. SPUDS Vehicle: Alternative One 
 
This figure depicts the way the magnetic sensor is deployed from the Alternative One SPUDS vehicle. 
a. Alternate One: SPUDS Vehicle Concept 
The concept for the SPUDS propulsion system, power distribution system, and MCM 
sensor system remains the same the base MCM Advanced System.  However, the components of 
the navigation system, mission processing system and communication system differ from the 
other alternatives in redundancy.  Figure 42 shows the component diagram of Alternative One by 




Figure 42. Alternative One - Fully Autonomous SPUDS Component Diagram 
 




Alternative One utilizes three independent navigation systems that are weighed against 
each other to minimize navigation errors.  In this system there are 3 independent Inertial 
Navigation Systems (INS) that provide heading, 3-dimensional velocities, and latitude/longitude 
position.  The use of three independent systems provides the ability to use a voting system for 
navigation error correction.  This gives the ability to correct for one of the systems being 
incorrect.   If there were only two INS systems and they are in disagreement, there is no way to 
correlate which system is correct.  A minimum of three INS systems provides the ability to 
differentiate which system is out of tolerance and thus provide error correction and reliability.  
The INS computers interface to three independent mission computers as shown in Figure 43.  
The mission computers contain the main functionality for computing the navigation solution.  In 
addition to the INS computers, the mission computers interface to a Doppler Velocity Log 
(DVL) device, and pressure/temperature sensors.  The computers compare navigation solutions 
and create error corrections for the INS systems.  Since INS are prone to accumulative error drift 
for far distance and long time navigation, two different approaches are taken to compensate for 
errors by creating a synthetic navigation solution.   
 
The first approach utilizes information coming from MCM sonar and DVL and compares 
this information to a database model of the terrain to create a multi-beam bathymetric system 
(MBS).  This approach was suggested in a study using underwater synthetic navigation with INS, 
sonar, and a sequential similarity detection algorithm (Zhang, Meng, Zhao, & Shao, 2009).  This 
approach uses a technique to provide error correction to the INS of the UUV by matching the 
background field coming from the bathymetric data that is provided by the sensor system to a 
vehicle target location using virtue of matching algorithms.  A conceptual processing block 
diagram of this method is shown in Figure 44.   
 
The second method calculates the range to a known point as shown in Figure 43.  In this 
concept an acoustic/navigation buoy with a GPS receiver is planted in the AO.  The SPUDS 
vehicle queries the buoy and the buoy responds back with an encoded signal containing the 
buoy's latitude/longitude location.  The encoded location of the buoy is based on its position 
obtained from the buoy's GPS receiver.  The time between the SPUDS vehicle querying the buoy 
and the buoy's response can be used to calculate the distance between the SPUDS vehicle and the 
buoy.  The range can be more accurately calculated with the use of the SPUDS vehicle‟s depth 
pressure transducers and DVL.  With the position and range of the buoy being known, the 
SPUDS vehicle can use the information to correct errors in the INS.  This technique was proven 
to be successful in a simulated experiment and document in an IEEE Journal of Oceanic 




Figure 43. Alternative One Conceptual Schematic Block Diagram of SPUDS 
This figure depicts a block diagram model for Alternative One.  The figure shows the inputs and outputs to the system components.  The different colors of 





Figure 44. Alternative One INS/Multi Beam Bathymetric Navigation Processing 
 
This figure depicts a conceptual block diagram for comparing the seabed topography with database topography and 
calculated positions from 3 independent processors to correct INS drift errors (Zhang, Meng, Zhao, & Shao, 2009).  
The different colors are used to differentiate positional data outputs from the processors.  Essentially, the three 




Figure 45. Alternative One Acoustic Navigation Buoy  
 
This figure depicts the concept of correcting INS errors using navigation/communication buoys (Freitag, 2005). 
 
Using both techniques with three independent systems, the SPUDS vehicle should be 
able to obtain high navigation performance for long periods of time.  However, if the systems fail 
or acquire error, the SPUDS vehicle can surface to obtain a navigation location from its GPS 
receivers.  Once this is done, the SPUDS vehicle can align its INS systems with the coordinate 
and continue on with the mission.  If two of the three navigation systems fail, the SPUDS vehicle 
can augment its navigation solution with periodically surfacing to get a GPS fix. 
 
In addition to navigation, the MCM sensor systems outputs are interfaced to the three 
mission processors.  The mission processors independently fuse the sensor information and use 
auto-target recognition algorithms to detect, classify, identify, and locate the mines.  Once again 
the mission processors compare answers to confirm or deny suspected outcomes.  
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The SPUDS vehicle is able to communicate by radio or acoustically by modulating its 
sonar.  The underwater communications is established with creation of an underwater acoustic 
communication system.  In 2004, the REMUS project very successfully established 
communications using Frequency-shift-key/ frequency-hopped (FSK/FH) method in VSW/SZ 
area (Freitag, 2005).  The FSK/FH method employed a utility acoustic modem (UAM) operating 
with a default data rate of 80 bps with overhead error correction that enabled 25 kHz underwater 
communications with 4 kHz of bandwidth.  There is research being conducted that is exploring 
underwater communications with higher data rates and wider bandwidths.  Some experiments 
have created success in transmitting data rates from 3.7 to 11.6 kbps over distances of 300 to 
2500 meters (Goalic, Trubuil, Laot, & Beuzelin, 2010).   
 
However, it is anticipated that these higher data rate are not needed because the amount 
of data  in the form of positional data, mine contacts, mine locations, and mine types is low 
because the sensor data has already been processed. In other words, with the raw sensor data 
being already processed and the vehicle guiding itself autonomously with very sporadic 
communication needs, there is no need for high bandwidth communications.  The low bandwidth 
communications which adapts itself well to underwater communications should prove adequate 
as demonstrated by the REMUS project.  The primary communications are performed 
acoustically with the radio as backup communication source.  SPUDS communicates with the 
Host Platform through a buoy system detailed later in this section.  A SPUDS vehicle is also able 
to communicate acoustically with other SPUDS vehicles in performing collaborative search 
efforts through the same buoy system. 
b. Alternative One: Host Platform Concept 
 The Command and Control communication system used for the Host Platform is 
composed of a Wi-Fi compatible radio, server, recorder/playback system, switch and a video 
encoder as seen in Figure 46.  It should be noted that Wi-Fi is a registered trademark of the Wi-
Fi Alliance (Wi-Fi Alliance, 2012) and is being used here in a generic sense of promoting a 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) solution for communications.  Further discussion of this 
communications concept is found later in this report.  The Wi-Fi radio provides the radio link to 




Figure 46. Alternative One Host Platform Communication System Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform. 
 
Figure 47 depicts that the system only requires two operating stations, one oversight 
station, and one operating station to control multiple SPUDS vehicles.  Since, the vehicles 
themselves make decisions on routes, mines, and mission accomplishments, the command and 
control personnel are drastically reduced.  However, the human maintains a very high level view 




Figure 47. Alternative One Host Platform C2 Schematic Block Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform.  Red lines indicate power inputs/outputs from the 
different components, while black lines indicate signal input/output. 
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Figure 48 depicts the Host Platform Command and Control Processing System for 
Alternative One. Communication between the Host Platform and vehicles is very sporadic.  The 
host queries the vehicle(s) for location and status.  The vehicle responds with location, vehicle 
health status, mines detected, and mine locations when queried by the Host Platform.  Besides 
querying the vehicle for status, mission operators can give the vehicle(s) high level mission 
changes by reprogramming routes, search patterns, and waypoints.  Mission operators have the 
ability to take over guidance of a selected vehicle for short amounts of time.  Direct control 
requires a continuous transmission which would use up the bandwidth of the buoy network for 
communications.  Therefore, direct control should be limited to times when the vehicle is 




Figure 48. Alternative One Host Platform C2 Processing Component Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform MCM Command & Control Processing System. 
 
The MCM server stores and retrieves mission data for the MCM system.  The MCM 
switch routes updated tactical information to operating stations and the ship C2.  The tactical 
oversight position provides overall supervision of the MCM C2 system.  This position plans 
routes, neutralization strategies, and vehicle missions based on analysis of the incoming data.  
The tactical oversight overall responsibility is to develop the tactical map of the AO and 
communicate routes and mine field locations to the ship's C2.  The ship‟s C2 is responsible for 
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passing this information onto the amphibious force.  However, the ships net-centric capabilities 
give the amphibious force the ability to query the overall MCM status without human 
intervention.  
 
The fully autonomous features presented in Alternative One provide the capability to 
respond to higher order of directions from human operators.  It creates a situation in which the 
MCM operation can operate with an autonomous net-centric capability.  This alternative 
removes the humans from the control loop and puts them on-loop for making tactical decisions.  
It allows the MCM system to operate multiple MCM vehicles with the least amount of 
infrastructure in the form of ships and personnel. 
c. Alternative One: OTH Communications 
Alternative One‟s communication system relies on the deployment of low cost, 
autonomously operating communication/navigation buoys.  This concept calls for the creation of 
two different buoys to enable OTH communications between the MCM control ship and the 
vehicles as shown in Figure 49.     
 
Figure 49. MCM communication path 
 






Figure 50 depicts the vehicle-to-vehicle communications.  In this concept, one buoy type 
would serve strictly as an RF communication node, and the other as an RF/Acoustic 
communication/navigation node.  There are two different physical communication layers with 
this concept.  One physical layer involves communicating via an RF wireless data link and the 
other is by an underwater method using a FSK/FH.   
 
 
Figure 50. Communication/Navigation Buoy 
 
This figure depicts the communication concept for communication and communication/navigation buoys working 
with SPUDS vehicle. 
 
The communication buoys make up nodes that create a wireless integrated 
communications network with an underwater acoustic network.  With advancements in low-
power circuits and networking technologies, the RF network nodes can last up to three years with 
less than a 1% duty cycle working mode on 2 AA batteries (Yu, Prasanna, & Krishnamachari).  
However, this type of time frame is not needed for the MCM operation; but it shows the area of 
interest (AI) can be seeded with these types of buoys long before they are needed.  These buoys 
could be seeded covertly during times of low visibility in the AI and remain dormant until 
needed.  A number of means using the existing Navy infrastructure for dropping buoys such as 
by air as shown in Figure 51.  Dropped buoys are not recovered, but are designed to sink and 




Figure 51. Air Drop buoys 
 
This figure depicts different Host Platforms that could seed the buoy network field. 
 
The communication nodes are responsible for self-organizing an appropriate network 
infrastructure with multi-hop connection between sensor nodes.  The network is self-healing, 
dynamically reconfigurable, with a random topology.  The basic idea is that individual wireless 
buoy nodes are limited, but the aggregate power of entire network is sufficient for all types of 
communications.  The MCM Host Platform can retrieve information of interest by injecting 
queries and gathering results from the network.   
 
Each communication node has an individual IP address making it unique in the network.  
The communication nodes maintain location and positioning information obtained from GPS to 
enable localization techniques.  The communication nodes use the localization techniques to 
optimally transmit data between the MCM control ship and MCM vehicle as shown in Figure 49.  
This requires the buoy to not only be aware of its status, but the statuses of the buoys around it.  
As a result, the communication node is able to route data through the network until it arrives at 
its intended sink, which is the MCM control ship or MCM vehicle.   
 
Note that not all communication nodes will transmit data, thus allowing for a lower duty 
cycle on the sensor nodes, enabling power conservation.  When bandwidth is needed, data is 
aggregated across the network to expand the capabilities of communication.  It is beyond the 
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scope of this project to identify the optimal protocol for this network.  However, it is suggested 
that ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 protocol should be analyzed further for possible implementation 
because this protocol design supports a low data rate, low power consumption, low cost, design 
that targets automation and remote applications.  ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4‟s drawback is its range 
limitations, typically between 10 and 75 meters.  Data protocols such as IEEE 802.11 with the 
right kind of transmitter/receivers can handle ranges of up to 100m.  For ranges of up to 2Km, 
standards like GSM, IS-136, and IS-95 should be studied for applicability (Ergen, 2004). 
 
This report recommends using a Wi-Fi compatible radio for Alternate One.  As 
previously stated Wi-Fi is a trademark name for the Wi-Fi Alliances, which is a non-profit 
organization, whose goal is the adoption of high-speed wireless local area networking (Wi-Fi 
Alliance, 2012).  It is used here in the generic sense to create a wireless system which uses a 
radio that transmits and receives in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz frequency bands.  The bandwidth of 
these radios systems are 20 MHz.  However, using IEEE 802.11n which introduces the use of 
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) features, the bandwidth can be increased to 40 MHz 
with data rates up to 600 Mbits/s by the utilization of channel bonding, spatial division 
multiplexing and space time blocking coding (Friedrich, Frohn, Grrbner, & Lindermann, 2011).  
It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the pros and cons of using or militarizing a 
commercially-developed standard for wireless communications.  However, it should be pointed 
out that the commercial world is driving the development of creating hardware and software 
protocols with built-in security and error protection.  With the proliferation of this technology the 
economic pressures drives down the cost, size, and increases the availability of this technology.  
These COTS items can easily be re-packaged into a low-cost military application.  This 
technology is readily available to create a multi-hop communication wireless network.   
 
It can be argued that wide bandwidth and high data rates are overkill to control one to 
several autonomous vehicles.  This is especially true when the underwater communication needs 
calls low bandwidth communications.  However, a mesh buoy network system can serve more 
purposes than just providing underwater communications to MCM vehicles.  It can also be used 
for an Anti-Submarine Sensors Network that can alert an advance amphibious force to the 
presence of submarines near buoy locations.  US doctrine states that the enemy will employ 
submarines in creating an anti-landing defense (Joint Publication 3-02, 2009).  Therefore, the 
bandwidth and high data rate requirements can be leveraged to utilize the buoy network for other 
tasking such as to supplement communication needs and provide advanced reconnaissance 
information.  This is beyond the scope of this report and it is recommended for further study. 
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The buoy system is advantageous in that it is inherently clandestine due to its low visual 
and radar traceability.  Additionally, with the sporadic transmission times, when the MCM Host 
Platform must communicate with the vehicle, the system maintains a relatively small 
electromagnetic signature.  The buoys also have the advantage that they allow for larger amounts 
of data to be transmitted across the network.  Since the buoys are low cost, the MCM operation 
can create a deceptive operation by seeding buoys in an area that is not intended for the 
amphibious landing.  Thus it can be used to create an illusion of an impending amphibious 
operation in a location that is not intended to be attacked 
d. Alternative One: Equipment & Personnel  
It takes two people to operate Alternative One in the field; however, this analysis has not 
addressed the number of people needed to support the maintenance of the system.  We estimate 
that the number maintenance personnel needed will be at minimum three persons, which includes 
maintenance of SPUDS power and propulsion systems, maintenance of mission LRU's, and 
maintenance of Host Platform computer systems.  However, a level of repair analysis (LORA) 
and maintenance plan will be needed to accurately estimate the number of personnel needed to 
maintain and repair the system.  This is beyond the scope of this report, but a rough estimate of 3 
people is provided for cost estimating purposes.   It should be noted that Alternative One allows 
the operators to control more than one SPUDS without increasing the manpower or Host 
Platform C2 equipment requirements.  Table 14 is a summary of the equipment needed to deploy 


















Table 14. Alternative One Equipment List Summary 
 
This table summarizes the Alternative One components described in this section.  The number of buoys for the 
operation is dependent on distance and location of the MCM Host Platform from the AO.  This will have to be 
calculated for each mission. 
 
Platform Equipment Sub Component Number 
SPUDS 
Vehicle 
INS/GPS N/A 3 
Depth Pressure Sensor N/A 3 
Temperature Sensor N/A 3 
DVL N/A 1 
Wifi Radio N/A 1 





Recording System N/A 1 
Power Switching System N/A 1 
Power Generation System N/A 1 
Battery System N/A 1 
Magnetic Gradiometer 
Magnetic Controller Processor 1 
Magnetic Sensor 3 
Reeling Machine 1 
Optical Sensor CCD/LED Sensor 4 
Sonar System Forward Looking Sonar 
Transducer 
1 
Left Side Scan Sonar 1 
Right Side Scan Sonar 1 
Engine Controller N/A 1 
Electric Engine N/A 4 
Steering Retraction System N/A 1 
Host Platform WiFi Radio  N/A 1 
WiFi Radio Antenna N/A 1 
Server N/A 1 
Server Power Supply N/A 1 
Router/Switch N/A 1 
Recorder/Playback N/A 1 
Operator Computers  2 
Displays  4 
Keyboards  2 
Trackball  2 
Throttle Control  1 
Joystick Control  1 
OTH 
Communication 







e. Alternative One: Component Mapping to Functions & Requirements 
Table 50 and Table 51 in Appendix E contain the component mapping of Alternative One 
to the associated functions and requirements previously defined in this report to verify that the 
system has been properly designed.  It should be noted that the generic mapping was completed 
in Table 9 and Table 10 of this report. 
2. Alternative Two 
Alternative Two revolves around the concept that the MCM ship (or Host Platform) 
operates the SPUDS vehicle via a radio signal.  Central to this alternative is the idea that sensor 
outputs are transmitted to the human operators in real-time aboard the MCM ship.  Real-time 
mine mission analysis (MMA) can be done aboard the ship while the mine vehicle is in the 
search area.  This alternative does leave the option of PMA in that sensor data is recorded both 
on board the MCM ship, and inside the SPUDS, but it is advantageous to reducing the detect to 
engage timeframe by performing real-time MMA.  The MCM ship will be a littoral combat ship 
and Alternative Two provides the MCM mission module that is installed on the ship.  Figure 52 




Figure 52. Alternative Two: Operational Concept 
 
This figure depicts the operational concept of Alternative Two. The underwater vehicle relays search information 
back to a MCM ship using a surface-tethered radio link. The data is first transmitted to an air platform, and then 
relayed back to a MCM ship. 
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For Alternative Two, the human has no ability to physically see the vehicle due to the 
MCM ship being located OTH. For this reason, the underwater vehicle has navigational sensors 
and computer power to understand its location underwater.  Navigation is performed through 
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and GPS computer systems that relay the unit‟s speed, 
direction, accelerations, and global location (GPS).  Due to signal reception limitations when 
using GPS below the water, it is required that the SPUDS vehicle use an antenna that is on the 
surface by way of a wired tether.  As a backup, the INS is used to deliver other navigational data 
when the GPS antenna has trouble connecting to a satellite. 
 
The surface tether also serves the important function of transmitting sensor and location 
data back to the Host Platform in the form of radio signals.  Due to the longer distance that is 
imposed by an OTH operation, the radio signals first must be transmitted to an air platform in the 
area.  This is done by using a helicopter or UAV.  From the air platform, the data is then relayed 




Figure 53. SPUDS Vehicle Tethered Communications 
 
This figure depicts the way the tethered antenna will be used from the underwater vehicle.  This figure also shows 
the front view of the SPUDS with the embedded sensors. 
In Alternative Two, the SPUDS vehicle utilizes a communication system composed of 
Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) system.  The OTH Communication system component is 
accomplished using existing Navy assets such as an MH-60 or Fire-Scout UAV to provide the 




The sensor suite of the system is composed of magnetic gradiometers that have three 
magnetometer sensors, two optical sensors, and a sonar system composed of a forward-looking 
and two side scan sonar systems. 
 
The SPUDS vehicle's onboard processor provides a navigation solution and processes 
steering and propulsion commands.  However, the processor has a limited ability to process 
MCM sensor information.  This limited ability allows the processor to detect the presence of an 
undersea object, but does not have the ability to classify or identify a mine.  This functionality is 
assigned to the MCM Host Platform.  
 
This alternative carries the advantage that it is possible to complete the MCM operations 
in a clandestine manner.  Besides the possibility of detecting an aerial platform providing the 
communication network, there are no surface platforms or people that would be visible in the 
search area.  However, this alternative does carry a higher operational burden in the form of costs 
and required support aboard the MCM ship.  There has to be at least one operator that is 
controlling the SPUDS, while at least one analyst reviews the sensor and video data to determine 
if there are mines in the search area. 
a. Alternative Two: SPUDS Vehicle 
Figure 54 depicts the components of Alternative Two.  The Alternative Two SPUDS 
vehicle consists of navigation, mission processing, communication, power, sensor, and 
propulsion component systems. 
 
Figure 55 is a block diagram showing how Alternative Two functions as a tele-operated 
system.  As shown in the figure, sensor data from the optical, magnetic, and side scan sonars are 
fed into the UUVs mission professor.  The information is processed in the onboard computer 
allowing the system to understand and detect possible mine-like objects in the search area.  
These possible mines that are found are transmitted back to the MCM ship‟s operators using the 







Figure 54. Alternative Two - Tele-Operated SPUDS Component Diagram 
 




Figure 55. Alternative Two Conceptual Schematic Block Diagram of SPUDS 
 
This figure depicts a block diagram model for Alternative Two.  The figure shows the inputs and outputs to the system component.  The different colors of inputs 
and outputs from the various components help trace power requirements and signals.  The red color indicates a power input, while black and other colors show 
sensor inputs/outputs. 
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b. Alternative Two: Host Platform 
Figure 56, Figure 57, and Figure 58 depict the C2 and communication system of 
Alternative Two that is part of the MCM mission module on the Host Platform.  The 
communication system is composed of a Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL), server, recorder, 
switch and a video encoder. 
 
 
Figure 56. Host Platform Communication System Component Diagram 
 






Figure 57. Host Platform C2 Processing Component Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform MCM Command & Control Processing System.  For 





Figure 58. Host Platform C2 Schematic Block Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform. 
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The TCDL component of Alternative Two provides the radio link with the SPUDS 
vehicle.  The server stores and retrieves mission data for the MCM system.  The switch provides 
routing of information, and the video encoder encodes the analog video so that it is stored or 
routed to the operating stations.   
The system requires three mission analysts (MAs) to perform real time analysis of sensor 
data coming from the SPUDS vehicle.  The other stations include a pilot, co-pilot, and tactical 
oversight positions as depicted in Figure 58.   
The pilot's main focus is guiding or steering the SPUDS vehicle and maintaining 
situational awareness of the vehicle's status.  The co-pilot is the backup for guiding and steering 
the vehicle.  However, the co-pilot‟s main functions are to monitor and provide navigational 
guidance and monitor and control sensor inputs.  The Tactical Oversight position provides 
overall supervision of the MCM C2 system.  This person determines routes, neutralization plans, 
and vehicle missions based on analysis of data from the MA positions.  From there, the operator 
develops the tactical map of the AO and communicates routes and mine field locations to the 
ship's command and control, which is then passed on to the amphibious force.   
The tele-operated features present in Alternative Two allow the system to be able to 
follow a higher order of directions input by human operators than that of a remotely piloted 
UUV.  The human operators have the option to input way points and movement directions, and 
allow the vehicle to carry these out these orders independently using onboard sensors, 
navigation, and processing capabilities.   
The Alternative Two SPUDS is very limited in its onboard decision making and 
processing power.  The UUV does not have the ability to direct other UUVs, or create its own 
search operations without input from human operators.  This alternative relies on a separate 
neutralization platform to carry out neutralization operations.  The neutralization can be 
coordinated on the Host Platform. 
c. Alternative Two: Equipment & Personnel Summary 
It will take four to six people to operate Alternative Two; however, this does not include 
the number of people needed to support maintenance of the system.  It is estimated that three 
maintenance personnel will be needed to provide maintenance of the SPUDS power and 
propulsion system, mission LRU's, and the Host Platform computer systems.  It should be noted 
that Alternative Two could control up to two SPUDS vehicles without increasing the manpower 
or Host Platform C2 equipment requirements.  However, the OTH communication link will need 
to be further assessed to verify that it could support more than two vehicles.  Adding an 
additional vehicle may slow down the mission analysis unless the Host Platform includes auto 
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target recognition routines to assist with the analysis.  Table 15 is a summary of the equipment 
needed to deploy one SPUDS system in the Alternative Two configuration. 
Table 15. Alternative Two Equipment List Summary  
 
This table summarizes the Alternative Two components described in this section. 
 
Platform Equipment Sub Component Number 
SPUDS 
Vehicle 
INS/GPS N/A 1 
Depth Pressure Sensor N/A 1 
Temperature Sensor N/A 1 
DVL N/A 1 
TCDL N/A 1 
TCDL Tether  Antenna Sys N/A 1 
Recording System N/A 1 
Power Switching System N/A 1 
Power Generation System N/A 1 
Battery System N/A 1 
Magnetic Gradiometer 
Magnetic Controller Processor 1 
Magnetic Sensor 3 
Reeling Machine 1 
Optical Sensor CCD/LED Sensor 2 
Sonar System Forward Looking Sonar 
Transducer 
1 
Left Side Scan Sonar 1 
Right Side Scan Sonar 1 
Engine Controller N/A 1 
Electric Engine N/A 4 
Steering Retraction System N/A 1 
Host Platform 
TCDL N/A 1 
TCDL Tether  Antenna Sys N/A 1 
Server N/A 1 
Server Power Supply N/A 1 
Router/Switch N/A 1 
Recorder/Playback N/A 1 
Video Encoder N/A 1 
Operator Computers  6 
Displays  12 
Keyboards  6 
Trackball  6 
Throttle Control  2 
Joystick Control  2 
OTH 
Communication 
Existing Navy Assets 
 
MH-60 Date link As Rqd 
Fire-Scout - UAV As Rqd 
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d. Alternative Two: Component Mapping to Functions & Requirements 
Table 52 and Table 53 of Appendix E contain the component mapping of Alternative 
Two to the associated functions and requirements previously defined in this report to verify that 
the system has been properly designed.  It should be noted that the generic mapping was 
completed in Table 9 and Table 10 of this report. 
3. Alternative Three 
Alternative Three revolves around the concept that the underwater vehicle (SPUDS) is 
operated remotely by personnel locally within sight of SPUDS.  This requires a small team of 
operators (or local operators) performing the function of transiting SPUDS to the AO by a small 
rigid inflatable boat as seen in Figure 59.  The boat is equipped with the Navy Shipboard Single-
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARSs) or a Joint Tactical Radio System 
(JRTS) which communicates to the MCM platform through a communication relay on an existing 
Navy airborne platform such as a MH-60 or Fire-Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.  In this 
alternative, there is no real-time mine mission analysis (MMA).  The MMA must be done aboard 
the ship after the SPUDS vehicle conducts its search and the data is retrieved from the vehicle.   
 
Figure 59 depicts the local AO support team needed for Alternative Three.  While the 
MCM ship is in an OTH location, the local operator is responsible to relay information back to 
the ship. 
 
Figure 59. Local Operator Team 
 
This figure depicts the minimum number of people to control the remote piloted SPUDS vehicle. 
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The local operator team consists of one person dedicated as a boat driver or pilot, a team 
leader who commands the team and communicates with the OTH MCM host ships, and a MCM 
Vehicle Operator who controls the SPUDS vehicle. 
The MCM Local Operator (LO) system consists of the components shown in Figure 60.  
The system components consist of a low observable boat with all equipment necessary to run and 
operate the boat.  The MCM vehicle radio is used to transmit and receive information from the 
MCM vehicle.  The Control Panel Display and MCM vehicle control are used by the MCM 
vehicle operator to control SPUDS. 
 
Figure 60. Alternative Three MCM Local Operator System Components 
This figure depicts the components included in the MCM Local Operator System that operates the remote piloted 
SPUDS vehicle. 
 
Conceptual operator controls for the SPUDS vehicle are shown in Figure 61.  The control 
panel onboard the boat consists of a video display, which presents the optical images from either 
the front or the bottom cameras of the UUV.  The video display also shows the outputs from the 
pressure and temperature sensors.  A joystick and throttle to help steer the UUV and all the 
necessary functional controls to turn off and on the magnetic gradiometer, forward and side scan 
sonar, and optical sensors of the SPUDS vehicle.  Additionally, the LO has a sonar that pings the 
MCM vehicle to estimate range to the vehicle and assist in driving the MCM vehicle.  The LO 




Figure 61. Conceptual Local Operator Display Controls 
 
This figure depicts the conceptual local operator display controls for Alternative Three. 
 
The OTH Communication system component is accomplished through utilizing existing 
Navy assets such as an MH-60 or Fire-Scout UAV to provide the data-link communication.  The 
UUV utilizes a VHF/UHF radio to communicate with the local operator.  SPUDS will transmit 
location, heading, speed, and video to assist the local operator in driving the vehicle.  This is 
done using a tether that is similar to the one used in Alternative Two. 
 
The surface tether serves the important function of transmitting sensor and location data 
back to the LO.  Due to the longer distance that is imposed by an OTH operation, the radio 
signals first are transmitted to an air platform in the area.  From the air platform, the data is then 
relayed back to the Host Platform as shown in the tethered communications concept presented 
earlier in Figure 53. 
The sensor suite of the SPUDS vehicle is composed of a magnetic gradiometers that has 
three magnetometer sensors, two optical sensors, and a sonar system consisting of a Forward 
Looking Sonar and two Side Scan Sonar systems. 
 
The SPUDS vehicle has an interface box that performs dead reckoning navigation.  The 
operator programs the vehicle at startup and allows sufficient amount of time for the rate gyros to 
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align themselves.  The vehicle has no situational awareness functionality, and depends on the 
operator for guidance.  Alternative Three does not have the ability to real time detect, classify, or 
identify a mine.  The Advanced MCM system using this alternative must rely on PMA to detect, 
classify, and identify.  Therefore, the SPUDS's MCM sensor data is stored via a recorder that 
must be retrieved at the end of mission and transferred back to the MCM ship.  Figure 62 depicts 




Figure 62. Alternative Three: Operational Concept 
 
This figure depicts the operational concept of Alternative Three. The underwater vehicle relays search information 
back to a MCM ship using a surface-tethered radio link.  The data is first transmitted to an air platform, and then 
relayed back to a MCM ship. 
 
Figure 63 depicts the Alternative Three component diagram, breaking out the 
components of the system and how they relate to each other.  The vehicle consists of a 
navigation system, communication system, power distribution system, MCM sensor system, and 
propulsion systems. 
 
Figure 64 is a block diagram showing how Alternative Three's SPUDS vehicle functions 
as a remote controlled system.  As shown in the figure, sensor data from the optical, magnetic, 
and side scan sonar's will be fed into the UUVs recorder.  
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Figure 63. Alternative Three – Remote Control SPUDS Component Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the component diagram of Alternative Three. The vehicle consists of navigation, mission 
processing, communication, power, sensor, and propulsion systems.
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Figure 64. Alternative Three Conceptual Schematic Block Diagram of SPUDS 
 
This figure depicts a block diagram model for Alternative Three. The figure shows the inputs and outputs to the system components. The different colors of 
inputs and outputs from the various components help trace power requirements and signals.  The red color indicates a power input, while black and other colors 
show sensor inputs/outputs.
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Figure 65, Figure 66, and Figure 67 depict the C2 and communication for the Host 
Platform as part of the MCM mission module. The communication system is composed of a 
server, a recorder, a switch and a video encoder.  Since the Host platform does not receive MCM 
data real time, it is unnecessary to integrate a radio system.  It is envisioned that communication 
with local operator team will be conducted through the ship‟s existing communication system.  
The server stores and retrieves mission data for the MCM recorder playback system.  The switch 
provides routing of information and the video encoder encodes the analog video to enable it to be 




Figure 65. Alternative Three Host Platform Communication System Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform. 
 
Figure 67 depicts that the system requires six operating stations.  Alternative Three 
requires four mission analysts (MAs) to perform real time analysis of sensor data coming from 
the SPUDS vehicle (this could be reduced to one if the Host Platform processing had auto target 
recognition functionality).  One of the MA coordinates the communications with local operators.  
The Tactical Oversight position provides overall supervision of the MCM C2 system.  This 
person determines routes, neutralization plans, and vehicle missions based on analysis of data 
from the MA positions.  They develop the tactical map of the AO and communicate routes and 
mine field locations to the ship's command and control which is passed onto the amphibious 
force.   
This alternative must have at least one operator present per UUV that is being used in a 
search operation.  The UUV must also have at least one analyst that is fully dedicated to perform 






Figure 66. Alternative Three Host Platform C2 Processing Diagram 
 





Figure 67. Alternative Three Host Platform C2 Schematic Block Diagram 
 
This figure depicts the components of the host vehicle platform. 
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a. Alternative Three: Equipment & Personnel Summary 
It takes six to eight people to operate Alternative Three in the AO.  It is estimated that the 
maintenance personnel needed are at least 3 persons to provide maintenance for of the SPUDS 
power and propulsion system, mission LRU's, and maintenance of the Host Platform computer 
systems.  It should be noted that Alternative Three can only control one SPUDS vehicle without 
increasing the manpower or Host Platform C2 and Local Operator equipment requirements.  An 
addition of another vehicle will slow down the mission analysis due to several factors in 
coordinating retrieval of sensor data and performing analysis of the data.  Table 16 is a summary 





























Table 16. Alternative Three Equipment List Summary 
 
This table summarizes the Alternative Three components described in this section. 
 
Platform Equipment Sub Component Number 
SPUDS Vehicle 
Rate gyro/compass N/A 1 
Depth Pressure Sensor N/A 1 
Temperature Sensor N/A 1 
DVL N/A 1 
VHF/UHF Radio N/A 1 
Radio Tether  Antenna Sys N/A 1 
Recording System N/A 1 
Power Switching System N/A 1 
Power Generation System N/A 1 
Battery System N/A 1 
Magnetic Gradiometer 
Magnetic Controller Processor 1 
Magnetic Sensor 3 
Reeling Machine 1 
Optical Sensor CCD/LED Sensor 2 
Sonar System Forward Looking Sonar Transducer 1 
Left Side Scan Sonar 1 
Right Side Scan Sonar 1 
Engine Controller N/A 1 
Electric Engine N/A 4 
Steering Retraction System N/A 1 
Host Platform 
   
Server N/A 1 
Server Power Supply N/A 1 
Router/Switch N/A 1 
Recorder/Playback N/A 1 
Video Encoder N/A 1 
Operator Computers N/A 5 
Displays N/A 10 
Keyboards N/A 5 




Conducted by Local Operator 
communicating mission 
information to Host Platform. 
MH-60 Date link As Rqd 




Boat N/A 1 
MCM Vehicle Radio VHF/UHF N/A 1 
Control Panel Display/Computer N/A 1 per vehicle 
Throttle Controls N/A 1 per vehicle 
Joystick N/A 1 per vehicle 
Vehicle Ranging Equipment N/A 1 
GPS/Navigator N/A 1 
Vehicle Communication Radio N/A 1 per vehicle 
Self Protection Equipment 50 caliber MG or M240 & Ammo 2 
Protection Vests Per Person 
Personal Weapons & Ammo Per Person 
1st Aid Per Person 
Helmets Per Person 
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b. Alternative Three: Components Mapping to Functions & Requirements 
Table 54 and Table 55 of Appendix E contain the component mapping of Alternative Three to 
the associated functions and requirements previously defined in this report to verify that the 
system has been properly designed.  It should be noted that the generic mapping was completed 

































I. SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES 
 
Table 17 provides a high level comparison of the alternatives‟ capabilities and 
components.  
Table 17. Alternative Comparisons 
 
This table provides a comparison of the different alternatives. 
 
 Alternative One Alternative Two Alternative Three 
Autonomy Fully Autonomous Tele-Operate Hybrid Remote/ Tele-
Operate 
OTH Communication Fully Autonomous RF 
Buoy Network 




Local Operator  using 
SATCOM or data link 
via airborne platform 
Vehicle Communication Underwater Acoustic  RF TCDL - Tethered 
Antenna 








requires data words 
giving vehicle position, 
mine & mine type 
location status. 
Extremely High 
Bandwidth - Need to 
transmit All Vehicle 
Sensor data to Host 
Platform 
High Bandwidth - 
Vehicle transmits video 
to Local Operator 
Number of People to 
Operate Advance MCM 
System 
Two operators to 
operate anywhere from 
one to many vehicles 
simultaneously 
6 people for two 
vehicles 
12 people for 4 vehicles 
18 people for 8 vehicles 
- personnel requirement 
adds 6 people every 2 
vehicles added 
8 people per vehicle 
11 people per two 
vehicles 
16 people per three 
vehicles 
19 people per four 
vehicles 
24 people per five 
vehicles -  
Add 3 people on odd  
number of vehicles and 
add 8 on even number 
of vehicles  
Processing MCM data 
for Mine Detection, 
Classification, 
identification, location 
Vehicle - Real time 
Auto Target 
Recognition (ATR) 
Mission Analysis (MA) 
Host Platform - Real 
Time MA 
Host Platform PMA 
Vehicle Processors 3 1 None - Interface Box 
Vehicle Navigation 
Sensors 
3 1 1 
Host Platform Operator 
Stations 
2 6 per 2 vehicles 5 per 2 vehicles 
Optical Sensors 4 2 2 
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V. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
 
Modeling and simulation for this project used the previously defined MOEs of Area 
Coverage Rate, number of undetected mines, and stealth, as a technical evaluation tool to 
compare the system alternative architectures.  Modeling of the architectures utilized both 
Microsoft Excel and Imagine That‟s ExtendSIM depending on what combination of input and 
output characteristics were under evaluation.  Excel was used to analyze and model factors 
regarding stealth and navigation and was used to graph and perform a statistical analysis of the 
results.  ExtendSIM was used to model the probability of detection and classification, and the 
delays associated with the search method for each alternative.  The nature of the ACR and 
number of undetected mines lends them to mathematical models; however, stealth was more 
difficult to define.    
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS MAPPED TO FUNCTIONS 
To determine the parameters to be modeled, the developed metrics were mapped to the 
defined functions.  This process defined the relationship of each system metric to system 
functions and outlined how the parameter was to be modeled. 
 
Table 18 contains the mapping between the functions and the metrics with the parameters 
that were considered in the model.  After an analysis the functions of Deploy, Search, Detect, 
Classify, Identify, and Communicate were modeled.  The functions Search, Detect, Classify, 
Identify, and Communicate were included since they are part of the bounded system.  Although 
the Deploy function was outside the bounded system, it was selected since it had an effect on 
stealth.   The functions of Perform Planning, Recover, Transit, and Receive Maintenance are 
outside the bounded system.  These functions were reviewed, but since a significant effect on the 
metrics was not found, they were not modeled.  Although the Engage function was part of the 
bounded system, a specific model was not created.  The Engage function could be considered 
completed by either localizing a target so that it may be avoided or neutralizing the target.  It was 
determined that if the Engage function was completed for localizing the target, it would not add 
time to the DTE sequence.    Since our recommendation is that the neutralization be performed 
by a separate system, a model was not created for that system.  It is recommended that this 





Table 18. Mapping of Functions to Metrics 




1st Level Sub function 
SUB Function 








System Deployment Timeframe 
  X 
Deploy from Surface 
Craft 
FDE.8.2 
System Deployment Timeframe 
  X 
Deploy from Aircraft FDE.8.2 
System Deployment Timeframe 
  X 




Time to Navigate X   
System Exposure Above the Waterline 
  X 
Vehicle Ordered Speed 
X   
Support Equipment Required   X 
Environmental Current speed 
X   
Amount of time vehicle stops to 
communicate X   
Data Rate Utilized 
  X 
Detect – FD.1 
Receive Info. from 
Sensors Indicating 
Contact in Area 
FD.1.1 
Sensor Range  X  
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 
X   
Classify – FC.2 Process Sensor Input 
FC.2.1 
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 
X   
Identify – FI.3 
Determine if Mine like 
Contact is a Bottom 
Mine 
FI.3.1 
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 
X   
Determine if Mine like 
Contact is a Moored 
Mine 
FI.3.2 
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 
X   
Determine if Mine like 
Contact is a Drifting 
Mine 
FI.3.3 
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 
X   
Determine if Mine like 
Contact should be 
Avoided 
FI.3.4 
PdPc  X  
Time to Detect and Classify Mine 





Data Rate Utilized 
  X 
Amount of time vehicle stops to 




Data Rate Utilized 
  X 
Amount of time vehicle stops to 













FDE.8.1 System Deployment Timeframe  
 
X 
Deploy from Surface 
Craft 
FDE.8.2 System Deployment Timeframe  
 
X 
Deploy from Aircraft FDE.8.2 System Deployment Timeframe  
 
X 




Time to Navigate X  
 
System Exposure Above the Waterline  
 
X 
Vehicle Ordered Speed X  
 
Support Equipment Required  
 
X 
Environmental Current speed X  
 




Bandwidth Utilized  
 
X 
Detect – FD.1 
Receive Info. from 
Sensors Indicating 




















Time to Detect and Classify Mine X  
 
Identify – FI.3 
Determine if Mine like 
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B. MODELING PARAMETERS MAPPED TO ALTERNATIVES 
Once the functions were mapped to the metrics and the modeling parameters were 
determined, the modeling parameters were mapped to the components of the alternatives to 
ensure that the model accounted for any differences in the architectures that would affect the 
metrics.  Due to the complexities of factors present during the search and detection of sea mines, 
it was determined that only the differences in the alternatives that affected the metrics would be 
modeled.  With the limited time and resources available for the modeling and simulation, the 
focus of the models was placed on the factors that would be best able to allow a decision among 
the alternatives. Table 19 contains the definitions for the parameters used to create the models.  
The input parameters were chosen since they are the characteristics which dominate the behavior 


























Table 19. Definition of Input Parameters 
This table shows the definitions of the parameters used in the modeling and simulation portion of the project. 
 
ACR Parameters Definition 
Vehicle Ordered Speed 
The velocity at which the vehicle was ordered to travel.  With no current this is 
equal to the actual speed.  This was an input variable into the Excel navigation 
model which was used to determine the time to navigate. 
Environmental Current speed 
The velocity of the water surrounding the MCM vehicle.  This was an input 
variable into the Excel navigation model which was used to determine the time 
to navigate. 
Amount of time vehicle stops 
to communicate 
The amount of time the vehicle requires a suspension of the search for 
communication. This was an input variable into the Excel navigation model 
which was used to determine the time to navigate. 
Time to Navigate 
The amount of time the vehicle takes to travel though the entire minefield.  
This includes any stops to determine location, and time to correct the vehicle‟s 
course.  This was an output of the Excel navigation model and an input into the 
ExtendSIM model.  This was used to determine the ACR. 
Time to Detect and Classify 
Mine 
The amount of time between the sensors detecting an object and the object 






The usable range of the sensors from the vehicle.  This was an input to the 
Excel navigation model to determine which mines would be excluded from the 
ExtendSIM model due to navigation error. 
PdPc 
The probability of detecting and correctly classifying targets within a search 
pattern.  This was an input to the ExtendSIM model. 
Stealth Parameters Definition 
System Exposure Above the 
Waterline 
The amount of the system in the AO that would be observable above the 
waterline during the search period.  This was an input to the stealth analysis to 
determine the system exposure above the waterline rating. 
Data Rate Utilized 
The rate at which the required data is transferred during the search period.  
This was an input to the stealth analysis to determine the data rate utilized 
rating. 
Support Equipment Required 
The amount of equipment in the AO when the system is operating.  This was 




How early the system can be deployed.  This was an input to the stealth 





When considering the hydrodynamics of the VSW range, since the shape, the power 
system and propulsion system were the same for all the alternatives a detailed model was not 
constructed.  It was assumed that all the SPUDS would be able to accelerate and maintain their 
speed equally.  Along the same lines, however, the steady state current would have an effect on 
the SPUDS when navigation was considered.  If the SPUDS was unable to correctly determine 
its location it would be possible for a steady state current to push the SPUDS off course.  This 
would increase the time to navigate since the SPUDS would periodically need to adjust its course 
to return to the desired track.  The number of undetected mines was also affected if the error in 
navigation caused the mine to be outside the sensor range.  The navigation error would also 
affect the reacquire time for neutralization, but since the neutralization function is not considered 
in the bounded system. 
 
In considering the performance of the sensors, many of the sensors are the same, 
therefore, the focus of the model turned to the ability to use the sensor data to correctly identify 
an object as either a mine or a non-mine.  Since it is possible the system could detect a mine but 
not correctly classify it as a mine, the PdPc is used as one value.  If we assume that any object 
within the sensor range has a probability of detection of 100%, the system‟s inability to classify 
the object correctly would be equivalent to not detecting the object in the first place.  The sensor 
range was used as the distance at which the ability to correctly classify the object was unlikely.  
 
When considering the alternatives as they related to stealth, it was assumed that since the 
SPUDS exterior would look the same, they would be equally easy to observe in identical 
situations.  The behavior of the system, however, would allow the SPUDS or other portions of 
the system to be easier to observe. 
 
For the stealth analysis, all portions of the system which could be observed from the AO 
were considered in the analysis; for the ACR and the undetected mines the portions of the system 
outside the AO were considered when they would affect the behavior of the SPUDS in the AO.  
This behavior includes any actions taken by an operator that would cause a particular alternative 
to act differently from the other alternatives.  Table 20 maps the parameters that were modeled to 








Table 20. Mapping of Parameters to Components 
This table shows a mapping of the parameters to the system components and the metrics affected.  A=ACR, 
S=Stealth, and U=Undetected mines.  The blank spots indicate that either there are no differences in the 


































































Vehicle Ordered Speed A      
Environmental Current Speed A      
Amount of time vehicle stops to communicate   A    
Time to Navigate A      
Time to Detect and Classify Mine  A     
Sensor Range  U     
PdPc  U     
System Exposure Above the Waterline S      
Data Rate Utilized   S    
Support Equipment Required S S S S S S 















C. STEALTH ANALYSIS 
Stealth modeling and simulation evaluated each MCM system alternative‟s ability to 
remain undetected.  The MCM system includes the SPUDS, Host Platform (located OTH), and 
any necessary support craft to include; MH-60 helicopters, the UAV Fire-Scout, and a Local 
Operator High Speed Boat (LOHSB).  
 
Stealthiness is defined as “slow, deliberate, and secret in action or character” (Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, 2012).  The stealth metric unit of measure is Probability of Detection by 
Enemy, expressed as a percentage.  Since this value was difficult to model, an analysis was 
performed on the alternatives using general stealth parameters to rank each alternative‟s level of 
stealth. The stealth parameters defined a way to address stealth with the ranking indicating which 
alternative would have the lowest Probability of Detection by Enemy.  The stealthiest alternative 
was determined by evaluating each system on the following four parameters:  
 
1. System exposure above the waterline 
2. Data rate utilization 
3. Support equipment required 
4. System deployment timeframe 
1. System Exposure above the Waterline 
System exposure above the waterline was analyzed by evaluating each alternative‟s 
overall component footprint.  For example, Alternative One required the use of an RF Buoy 
Network, whereas Alternative Two and Alternative Three required the support of a MH-60 
Helicopter or Fire-Scout to conduct OTH communications.  Therefore, Alternative One had the 
least system exposure above the waterline and was considered the stealthiest MCM system based 
on system exposure above the waterline.   
 
Consideration was also given to the duration of time in which the alternative systems 
would be exposed above the waterline to conduct communication.  However, there was found to 
be little difference between alternatives as the exposure for each platform remained constant for 
the duration of the mission.  Therefore, the duration of time in which the alternatives would be 




a. Alternative One Rationale  
Alternative One is a fully autonomous system which utilizes a fully autonomous RF buoy 
network for OTH communications and an underwater acoustic system for vehicle to vehicle 
communications.  The RF buoy network would be present for the entire mission but the surface 
exposure of these buoys above the waterline would be minimal.  
 
Alternative One would be deployed without the additional support of surface platforms to 
support data transfer.  Since this alternative possesses an advanced GPS system, this would allow 
the system to remain sub-surfaced for extended periods of time and would reduce the number of 
surfacing events required during the mission.  Because Alternative One was designed with 
onboard data processing and targeting capability, the vehicle conducts identification and 
classification tasking real-time in the AO.  Once targets are processed, the vehicle would surface 
periodically to data burst information back to operators on the Host Platform.  
b. Alternative Two Rationale 
Alternative Two, being tele-operated, would utilize a tethered antenna system to connect 
the SPUDS vehicle to an airborne RF Data-Link TCDL system for OTH communications.  The 
airborne RF-Data-Link TCDL system would requires the support of an MH-60 or UAV Fire-
Scout to conduct OTH communications throughout the mission.  Either of these aerial systems 
would have a larger system exposure than Alternative One. 
c. Alternative Three Rationale 
Alternative Three, being a remote/tele-operated system, would utilize a tethered antenna 
and RF Voice Communications with local operators using SATCOMS or data links via airborne 
platforms like the MH-60 or Fire-Scout for OTH communications.  Alternative Three also 
requires the support of a Local Operated High Speed Boat (LOHSB).  The addition of the 
LOHSB to Alternative Three‟s overall MCM system increases the system‟s exposure to be larger 
than that of Alternative Two. 
d. System Exposure Results 
The stealth rating of each alternative based on system exposure above the waterline.  The 
order of stealthiness for these platforms from most stealthy to least stealthy is as follows; 




2. Data Rate Utilized 
The data rate utilized part of the stealth analysis examined the amount of required data 
transfer for each alternative to complete the mission.  The larger the data rate, the more likely an 
alternative would be detected while conducting the MCM mission.  For the bandwidth utilized, 
first the type of data required to be transmitted was identified, and based on the type of data 
required, a bandwidth value of low, medium, or high was assigned to the alternative. 
a. Alternative One Data Rate Analysis 
Alternative One possesses real time auto target recognition (ATR) and Mission Analysis 
capabilities (MA).  These functions enable SPUDS to detect, classify, identify, and locate mines 
without the assistance of the Host Platform.  Therefore, SPUDS and host platform need to 
transmit minimal amounts of data (low data rate) through a fully autonomous RF buoy system to 
complete the mission.  Alternative One would require the transmission of the vehicle location, 
health status, target location/identification/classification, and high level mission changes to the 
search plans.  This information would not require a high data rate because it can be transferred in 
the form of text.  Additionally, because the system is autonomous it does not require data 
transmission on a continuous basis.  Instead, Alternative One would be able to intermittently 
transmit data to the host platform reducing the chances of a transmission being intercepted by the 
enemy. 
b. Alternative Two Data Rate Analysis 
Alternative Two transmits all sensor data back to the host platform through the use of an 
airborne RF data link system.  Therefore, Alternative Two would be required to transmit high 
data rates on a continuous basis.  The requirement for a high data bandwidth and continuous 
transmissions means Alternative Two‟s transmissions are more likely to be detected than 
Alternative One‟s.  Alternative One would therefore be considered stealthier than Alternative 
Two.   
c. Alternative Three Data Rate Analysis 
Alternative Three would send video data to a local operator continuously but would not 
transmit video data OTH.  Instead the data is recorded on SPUDS and downloaded and analyzed 
on the host platform following the completion of the mission.  The communication system used 
to conduct SPUDS communications to the LOHSB would be RF UHF/VHF.  The 
communication system utilized for OTH communications would be RF Voice Communications 
with the local operator using SATCOM or data link via the airborne platform for mission 
direction.  The continuous video feed to the local operator requires a high data rate.  Since 
Alternative Three does not send all of its sensor data back to the local operator and stores this 
 183 
information in the onboard system, Alternative Three was found to be stealthier than Alternative 
Two based on total bandwidth utilized.  
d. Data Rate Analysis Results 
Based on the data rate transmitted the stealthiest MCM system was Alternative One 
followed by Alternative Three, and then Alternative Two.   
3. Support Equipment Required 
The support equipment required also affects the stealth of the overall system.  Support 
equipment affects the surface exposure above the waterline, acoustic detection, electromagnetic 
detections etc.  Due to the limited information available and the classification level of this 
analysis, electromagnetic and acoustic signatures were not analyzed.  The type of support 
equipment required, however, provides an unclassified method for addressing these detection 
parameters.   
a. Alternative One Support Equipment 
Alternative One would require a helicopter, plane, surface craft, or subsurface craft to 
deploy the UUV and the RF Buoy Network.  Once deployed, the system would not require any 
additional support equipment beyond the RF buoy network.  Therefore, minimal support would 
be needed, making the system very stealthy.    
b. Alternative Two Support Equipment 
Alternative Two could also be deployed in a similar manner as Alternative One.  
However, the system would not require the use of an RF buoy system, but instead requires a 
MH-60 or Fire-Scout for OTH communications during the mission.  Although not necessarily in 
the AO, the air support would increase the overall presence during the execution of the mission 
thereby reducing the stealth of the MCM system.  Because Alternative Two requires the MH-60 
or Fire-Scout for OTH communications throughout the mission, Alternative Two was less 
stealthy than Alternative One. 
c. Alternative Three Support Equipment 
Alternative Three would require the most support of the alternatives.  The system would 
require the support of a MH-60 or Fire-Scout for the entire mission and would require a LOHSB 
near the AO for the entire mission.  Alternative Three was found to be less stealthy than 
Alternative Two.   
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d. Support Equipment Results 
Alternative One was found to be the stealthiest MCM system followed by Alternative 
Two, and then Alternative Three in relation to support equipment required.   
4. System Deployment Timeframe 
The final parameter analyzed was the system deployment timeframe.  Early deployment will 
increase stealth of the system by decreasing the overall presence in the area of interest while the 
mission is underway.  Alternative Two and Three cannot be deployed prior to conducting the 
mission because both these alternatives require support platforms to operate the systems.  Based 
on system deployment timeframe, Alternative One was the stealthiest system followed by 
Alternative Two and Three being equally as stealthy.   
5. Stealth Summary 
The analysis of the stealth MOE took into consideration the scoring of the four components of 
stealth for each system, and determined that the stealthiest alternative was Alternative One 
followed by Alternative Two, and then Alternative Three.  This information was utilized to aid in 
the selection of the best alternative for the future system recommendation. The ranking of the 
alternatives in order of stealth is shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Ranking of Alternatives 
This shows the ranking of the alternatives based on Stealth. As a result, Alternative One is determined to have the 
most stealth of all the alternatives. 
 
Stealth Component Alternative One Alternative Two Alternative Three 
System Exposure Above 
the Waterline 
1 2 3 
Data Rate Utilized 1 3 2 
Support Equipment 
Required 
1 2 3 
System Deployment 
Timeframe 
1 2 2 
OVERALL RANK 1 2 3 




D. MODELING ACR AND NUMBER OF UNDETECTED MINES 
1. Method of Modeling 
For all alternatives, the same methodology was used to create the models.  In order to 
determine the amount of time the vehicle took to navigate the DRM minefields and the error in 
the location based on the various navigation systems, an Excel Visual Basic Macro was used.  
The prototype Excel macro was provided by NPS Professor Paul Shebalin (Shebalin, 2012).  
This Excel macro was used to control the ordered speed of the vehicle, the water current speed, 
and the range of the sensors.  The macro was programmed with the effect of water current on the 
vehicle speed, and the error in vehicle location based on the navigation system.  The vehicle 
location, after accounting for navigation error, was used to determine if a mine would be in range 
of the sensors, and how long the vehicle took to travel from one mine-like contact to another.   
 
The ExtendSim model assigned a delay to each contact equal to the time when the Excel 
macro determined the mine was intercepted.  As each contact was selected, the ExtendSim model 
then added a delay which was equal to the time required for detect and classify functions.  When 
the detect and classify delay was completed, the contact was chosen as either correctly detected 
and classified, or missed based on the PdPc.  An additional delay was added to Alternative Three 
to allow for the PMA.  The ExtendSim model performed 1000 simulations.  The data was 
collected and analyzed in Excel.  A further discussion of the model is in Appendix F. 
2. Assumptions 
For the Excel macro, all the architectures were set to 1.64 yards/sec, or 1.5 m/s, for their 
ordered speed.  This value was based off the speed that the MK-18 system would need to survive 
a collision.  This speed is 1.5 m/s (Pollitt, 2011).  The assumption was that if the MK18 UUV 
must survive a collision of 1.5 m/s, then it is likely the vehicle would normally be traveling at 
that speed.  Since the area designed as part of the DRM was measured in yards, this speed was 
converted and rounded to 1.64 yds/s.   
 
In order to verify our planned swath width, the ACR was calculated by taking the total 
distance the vehicle would travel in the minefield. Based on a 1.64 y/s speed, the time to 
complete this trip was calculated to be 1 hr and 9 minutes.  This would give an ACR of 0.0506 
n.m.
2
/hr.  This was compared to the value that was determined for the MK18 UUV during testing 
performed by Johns Hopkins University (JHU) as 0.25 km
2
/hr (Pollitt, 2011).  Converting the 
JHU value into English units, the value is approximately 0.0726 n.m.
2
/hr.  The difference 
between the calculated ACR and the JHU ACR could be based on the actual speed of the MK18 
UUV, or differences in the distance the MK18 UUV traveled for their search when compared to 
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the simulated search.  The final difference could be explained by a difference in their definition 
of ACR when compared to what was chosen for our simulation.  These values are presented in 
Table 22. 
Table 22. Values Used in the Production of the Models 
The table shows some of the values used when determining the validity of the models. 
 
Parameter JHU values 311-103O Simulated 
Vehicle Speed 
1.5 m/s (1.64 y/s) estimated 1.64 y/s 
ACR 0.25 km
2






4.85 km² in four days 
500 yards by 500 
yards 
Swath width 
40 meters 40 yards 
Sensor Range 
N/A 70 ft 
 
 
In the DRM minefields, it was decided that the swath for each pass of the architecture 
would be 40 yards.  Comparatively, the MK18 UUV testing by JHU used 40 meters as a swath 
(Pollitt, 2011). Since the DRM states the minefield area is 500 by 500 yards, this analysis kept 
the swath as yards in order avoid possible errors in the conversion.  Using a swath of 40 yards, 
the range of the sensors was set to 70 ft in the model.  This would have the simulated vehicle 
cover an area of ±20 yards on either side of the desired path, plus a 10 ft overlap for each vehicle 
pass.  It is assumed that the sensors would be able to detect mines at a greater distance, but in 
complex environments the sonar shadows and other measurement noise in the environment 
would greatly reduce the PdPc.  This range also allows for errors in the navigation to show up as 
mines not detected. 
 
The tidal current in the environment was selected based on what was documented in the 
DRM; this was set to 2.5 kts.  The direction of the current was set to 10 degrees off the X-axis of 
travel of the modeled architecture and was varied in the model.  The effect the angle had on the 
vehicle was that the component of the current that was in the direction of travel was added to the 
vehicle‟s forward speed.  When the vehicle‟s direction of travel was against the current, the 
vehicle‟s forward speed was reduced.  Any tangential component to the current caused a 
reduction in the line of travel speed.  It was assumed that in order to stay on course the vehicle 
would need to provide an equal and opposite force to counteract the tangential forces.  
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3. Creating and Validating the Model 
During the creation of the models for the ACR and Undetected mines, one concern was to 
be able to understand if the answers that were received were reasonable.  Whenever possible, 
values from the MK18 UUV testing were used as a comparison.  If there were factors that did 
not have a real world marker to be judged against, the results were analyzed to validate the 
model.   
One of the first factors to be validated was navigation.  While the models were being 
created, the values for the vehicle‟s actual location were compared to the desired course.  These 
values were plotted and reviewed to ensure that the desired results were achieved.   
 
The next factor that was validated was the speed of the vehicle.  This was done by 
calculating the time the vehicle should take to complete each DRM minefield without any 
current.  When the model was executed, the amount of time to complete the navigation was 
compared to the calculated value.  If the time to maneuver the minefield was similar to the 
calculated value it was deemed to be validated. 
 
When the effects of current were added to the model, the current was first set to 0 knots, 
and a simulation was performed to gain a baseline.  The current was then set to 2.5 knots with an 
angle of 0˚.  Another simulation was performed, and it was compared to determine if the current 
had the appropriate affect.  The simulation was repeated with the current‟s angle set to 90˚, 180˚ 
and 270˚ to ensure the vehicle‟s speed was reacting properly. 
 
The last factor to be validated was PdPc.  Since this was simply a percentage, the results 
were reviewed to verify the mean of the detected objects approximated the probability. 
4. Modeling Alternative One 
The navigation component for Alternative One was modeled as three systems, each with 
an error of 1% of the true location.  This assumption was based on Panish and Taylors‟s paper, 
which showed that highly accurate INS systems using Doppler Velocity Logs (DVL) can result 
in highly accurate navigation (Panish & Taylor, 2011).  These three values were averaged and 
the value was used as the actual location.  This error was calculated every time the simulation 
moved the vehicle. 
 
Since the alternative‟s communication takes place while the vehicle is in motion, the time 
to communicate has no affect on the ACR.  Therefore this time was not added to the ACR. 
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The PdPc was set to 0.9.  Because the sensor packages for all alternatives consist of very 
similar equipment, it was assumed that the value for the probability of detection would be equal 
for all systems.  Because there are extra optical sensors on Alternative One, and the classification 
of the mine is performed by algorithms, it was assumed that in 10-15 years the PdPc would be at 
least as good as the MK-18 Increment IV Objective value of 0.9 shown in the draft MK18 
Consolidated Requirements Document (CRD) (PMS 408, 2011). Although the CRD is a draft, 
prospective details in this document were given to this cohort as perspective requirements and 
performance expectations for future system development. 
 
Determining the amount of time it will take any system to detect and classify a mine in 
the type of environment stated in the DRM is a difficult task.  Informal top level discussions 
were held with Dr. Jake Wetzel (BCI Inc.), a subject matter expert in human systems integration 
working currently on MCM issues.  During these discussions it was discovered that an actual 
time was unable to be determined.  The discussion showed that it is generally thought that the 
time to complete the task is situation dependent (Wetzel, 2012).   
 
However, since a time was required for determining the ACR, an assumption was made 
that the mean time to detect and classify was 60 seconds with a standard deviation of 20 seconds 
using a lognormal distribution.  The assumption for the amount of time was based on the 
assumption that a computer with correctly programmed image detection algorithms in 10-15 
years would be quicker than a human, with much less variation in the amount of time to 
complete the task.  The distribution was based on the task of classifying a mine being of unequal 
frequency and duration (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).   
Because the times for the ACR were not able to be accurately predicted a sensitivity 
analysis was performed.  In order to evaluate the performance of the alternatives against each 
other, the same time and standard deviation combinations were used.  The mean times for detect 
and classify were selected to be 60 s, 120 s and 240 s.  These were combined with the standard 
deviations of 20 s, 40 s, and 60 s.  This presented 9 different combinations for each alternative.  







5. Modeling Alternative Two 
The navigation system of this alternative consists of a GPS system that is backed up with 
a DVL and INS system.  The technical specifications of the Photonic Inertial Navigation System 
(PHINS) system shows this set up would be three times better than GPS alone (IXSEA, 2011).  
Since a standard GPS can have an error between 1-10 meters, and the INS can improve this by 
three times, the navigation error was modeled as a normal distribution around the desired course 
with a standard deviation of 1.111 ft (Snively, 2011; IXSEA, 2011).  The error was calculated 
every time the simulation moved the vehicle. 
 
Since this vehicle is in constant contact with the Host Platform, the alternative does not 
stop to communicate so times associated with communications were not factored into the ACR. 
 
The PdPc was set to 0.8.  Since the sensor packages for all alternatives consist of very 
similar equipment, it was assumed that the value for the Probability of Detection would be equal 
for all systems.  Without the number of optical sensors Alternative One has, and the fact the 
classification would be performed real time by a human, it was assumed that the PdPc would be at 
least equivalent to the MK18 UUV Increment II Threshold shown in the CRD (PMS 408, 2011).  
This value is 0.8 with the limiting factor being the ability for a human or group of humans to 
recognize the mines based on the data provided. 
 
Determining the amount of time it takes to detect and classify a mine in the VSW is a 
challenge for any system.  It was assumed that the mean time to detect and classify was 300 
seconds with a standard deviation of 150 seconds using a lognormal distribution.  When 
compared to a computer, it was assumed that the human would be much slower, and the variation 
would be much greater.  The distribution was based on the task of classifying a mine being of 
unequal frequency and duration (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).  Informal top level discussions 
were held with Dr. Jake Wetzel (BCI Inc.), a subject matter expert in human systems integration 
working current with MCM issues.  During these discussions it was discovered that the human 
would be considered better than a computer at reducing the false alarm rate of classifying non-
mines as mines, but as this was not one of the metrics, this analysis was not continued (Wetzel, 
2012).  The rationale for this was that it would be better to have a false positive rather than a 
false negative.  The addition of false positives would change the engagement function as another 
path may be chose through the minefield, or the mines to neutralize would be different 
depending on the detections. 
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In the same manner as Alternative One, a sensitivity analysis was performed using the 
model for Alternative Two.  This consisted of using the same combinations of times and standard 
deviations as the analysis for Alternative One.  
6. Modeling Alternative Three 
The navigation system of this alternative consists of a Rate Gyro Compass with a DVL.  
The error in the rate gyro compass was assumed to be a normal distribution with a standard 
deviation of 1 degree (Boaters Land Discount Marine Supplies, 2011).  The error in velocity was 
considered to be 1.9 cm/s based on the Teledyne RD Instruments Explorer PA technical 
specification (Teledyne RD instruments, 2011).  The error for the direction was recalculated 
when the system changed direction and the error in the distance was calculated for each 
simulated movement. 
 
Since this vehicle is in constant contact with the controlling platform, the alternative does 
not stop to communicate.  Thus, times associated with communications were not factored in to 
the ACR. 
 
The PdPc was set to 0.8.  Since this system has the same sensor package as Alternative 
Two, and a human will be analyzing the data, the PdPc was kept the same. 
 
Because the classification of the contacts will be performed the same way as Alternative 
Two, the time for this classification remained equal.  However, since the vehicle would need to 
be recovered and have the data transferred to the personnel performing the analysis, an additional 
time was added to each contact.  A delay equal to the time the vehicle took to search the 
minefield was added.  This assumes that once the system has competed searching the minefield 
the PMA can begin.  The PMA was estimated to take just as long as the in-mission analysis 
would take.  
In the same manner as Alternative One, a sensitivity analysis was performed using the 
model for Alternative Three.  This consisted of using the same combinations of times and 





7. Results for ACR and Undetected mines 
Figure 68 depicts the ACR modeling results for each alternative in Minefield 1.  
Alternative One has a much greater ACR than the other two alternatives when performing a 
search in Minefield 1.  Since the amount of time for each system to navigate the minefield was 
similar, this reflects that the difference in ACR is driven by the amount of time taken to perform 
detect and classification tasks.  
 
Figure 68. ACR Comparison of the Architectures in Minefield 1 
This figure shows the ACR for each of the alternatives in Minefield 1.  The units for the ACR are in square 
nautical miles per hour.  The ACR was calculated using area searched divided by the time the architecture required 
to complete the area.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated, the 
boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median 































ACR Minefield 1 
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  Figure 69 depicts the ACR modeling results for each alternative in Minefield 2.  Since 
there were 100 fewer mines in Minefield 2, the ACR for each of the alternatives was better than 
that received in Minefield 1.  Since Alternative One had the shortest detect and classify time, the 
difference is not as obvious as the other alternatives, but there is still a difference.  This confirms 
the amount of time to perform detect and classify is the driving factor for ACR.  A more detailed 
comparison of how the alternatives performed in the minefields can be seen in Appendix F. 
 
 
Figure 69. ACR Comparison for Minefield 2 
This figure shows the ACR for each of the alternatives performed in the Minefield 2.  The units for the 
ACR are in square nautical miles per hour.  The ACR was calculated using area searched divided by the time the 
architecture required to complete the area.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum 
values calculated, the boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where the boxes change 




























ACR Minefield 2 
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In order to determine the effect of vehicle speed on the ACR, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed using ordered speeds of 3, 4, 5, & 6 knots.  Figure 70 depicts this analysis and that 
unless the ordered speed is close to the water current‟s speed, there is limited statistically 
significant difference between the ordered speeds of the vehicle.  Appendix F contains the 
detailed sensitivity analysis that was performed. 
 
Figure 70. Speed Sensitivity analysis of Alternative One 
This figure shows that for Architecture one the speed of the vehicle is not the limiting factor when it comes 
to the amount of time required to complete the minefield sweep.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum 
and the maximum values calculated, the boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where 
















A sensitivity analysis was performed on each of the three alternatives for the time to 
detect and classify, and the effect on ACR.  Using mean times of 60 s, 120 s, and 240 s, and 
standard deviations of 20 s, 40 s, and 80 s, 1000 simulations of the three alternatives were 
performed for each combination of times and standard deviations.  It was discovered that with a 
mean of 60 s with a standard deviation of 20 s, the ACR for all alternatives was statistically 
different.  As either the standard deviation or the mean time was increased, the ACR for 
Alternative One and Alternative Two became statistically similar using the same mean and 
standard deviation.  For all combinations of means and standard deviations, Alternative Three 
had a lower ACR.  Figure 71 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis for the 60 s mean time 
for detect and classify.  Additional information on the sensitivity analysis can be found in 
Appendix F. 
 
Figure 71. Sensitivity analysis for the alternatives using a mean of 60 seconds 
This figure shows the results of the sensitivity analysis using a mean time of 60 seconds to detect and 
classify.  The standard deviations used were 20 s, 40 s, and 80 s.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum 
and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where 
the boxes change color shows the median value of the data. 
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For the metric of Undetected Mines, the analysis shows that Alternative One is 
statistically better than either of the other two alternatives.  Figure 72 displays the results for the 
undetected mine metric for Minefield 1, and Figure 73 displays the results for the undetected 
mine metric for Minefield 2.  The results of Alternative One and Alternative Two clearly show 
the difference in the PdPc.  Although the difference between Alternative Two and Alternative 
Three is not statistically significant, it was demonstrated that when Alternative Three performed 
the search of the minefield, the error of the navigation caused a few mines to be outside of the 
sensor range.  
 
 
Figure 72. Undetected Mines in the Minefield 1. 
This figure shows the percentage of undetected mines remaining after a single sweep of the minefield.  This 
value is driven both by the PdPc and the error in navigation.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and 
the maximum values calculated, the boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where the 
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Figure 73. Undetected Mines in the Minefield 2. 
This figure shows the percentage of undetected mines remaining after a single sweep of the minefield.  This 
value is driven both by the PdPc and the error in navigation.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and 
the maximum values calculated, the boxes themselves cover the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.  Where the 
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E. NUMBER OF SYSTEMS NEEDED 
The requirements analysis found that the threshold ACR of the system needs to be 0.083 
n.m.
2
/hr, with an objective of 0.125 n.m.
2
/hr.  These values were determined by taking the entire 
possible area of coverage divided by the amount of time that would be available to search before 
an amphibious assault.  The results for the simulated ACR, for all architectures, were determined 
for one vehicle in the 500 yard by 500 yard test area.  The difference between the requirements 
and the simulated results found that one vehicle would not be able to complete the entire mission 
in the required time. 
In order to determine the number of systems required to achieve the capability for the 
entire mission, the required ACR was divided by the alternative‟s minimum modeled ACR.  
These values were rounded up and can found in Table 23.  From this calculation, it was 
determined that 6 systems were needed for Alternative One, 29 systems for Alternative Two, and 
34 systems for Alternative Three.  With the wide variety in the required number of vehicles, a 
decision needed to be made as to which values would be used for further analysis.  The basis of 
this decision was that the threshold was the minimum required value for a system to be deemed 
acceptable. 
Table 23. Number of Vehicles Need to Achieve Capability 
This table shows the number of vehicles needed in the search area in order to achieve the threshold of 0.083 n.m.
2
/hr 
and objective of 0.125 n.m.
2









Number of vehicles needed to reach Threshold 6 29 34 
Number of vehicles needed to reach Objective 9 44 51 
Minefield 2 
Number of vehicles needed to reach Threshold 6 17 23 
Number of vehicles needed to reach Objective 9 25 34 
 
The performance of a vehicle in Minefield 2 was found to be better than in Minefield 1.  
If the performance of the system could achieve the required threshold for Minefield 1, it would 
follow that for Minefield 2 the performance would exceed the required threshold.  In order to 
ensure that 99% of all searches were capable of meeting the threshold, the minimum ACR value 
from Minefield 1 was selected as the value to compare to the requirement threshold.  This was 
because the ACR data had a normal distribution with the minimum being within two standard 
deviations from the mean.  Without improvements to the vehicle performance, the only way to 
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reach the objective was to use additional vehicles which would not only increase the total overall 




VI. LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATE 
A life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for each alternative was prepared in order to analyze 
the total cost for acquisition and ownership of the MCM system over its useful life.  This life-
cycle cost (LCC) includes the cost of research and development, testing, acquisition, production, 
facilities, operations, maintenance, personnel, environmental compliance, sustainment, and 
disposal. 
 
These LCC costs for each MCM system alternative are subtotaled in the following 
lifecycle phases: research and development (R&D), investment, operating and support (O&S), 
and disposal. 
 
I. R&D: This category includes the cost of all research and development, from 
program initiation through the Full Rate Production (FRP) decision. 
II. Investment: The total cost of the investment phase is included in this category.  It 
includes total cost of procuring the prime equipment, related support equipment, training, initial 
and war reserve spares, pre-planned product improvements and military construction. 
III. O&S: The bulk of life-cycle costs occur during this category, which covers the 
cost of operating and supporting the fielded system.  O&S includes all direct and indirect costs 
incurred in using the system, e.g., personnel, maintenance, and sustaining investment 
(replenishment spares). 
IV. Disposal: This category includes all costs related to disposing of the MCM system 
at the conclusion of its useful life.  It includes demilitarization, detoxification, long-term waste 
storage, environmental restoration and related costs. 
A. APPROACH  
The LCCE was initiated utilizing recommended research provided by RDML Richard 
Williams, USN (RET).  His recommendation included utilizing the LCCE Breakdown Structure 
out of Chapter 17 in Blanchard and Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, Fifth Edition 
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).  This provided a Cost Breakdown Structure (CBS) enabling cost 
analysis down to the subcategory level. 
In order to begin the LCCE process, we began by assuming the MCM program was 
currently in the materiel solution analysis (MSA) systems engineering phase in accordance with 
the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Life Cycle Management System.  During 
this phase, the analysis of alternatives was completed to assess potential materiel solutions to the 
capability need, identify key technologies and estimate life cycle costs.  Continuing to follow the 
DoD Life Cycle Management System, the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 
funding was used to support development efforts throughout the system lifecycle from advanced 
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technology development, lasting through Milestone (MS) A decision; advanced component 
development and prototypes, lasting from the MS A decision through the MS B decision; the 
systems development and demonstration, from the MS B decision through the MS C decision; 
and management support, lasting through FRP. 
Next, the procurement (PROC) funding was used to finance investment items and should 
cover all costs integral and necessary to deliver a useful end item intended for operational use or 
inventory.  This funding would be used from the MS C decision through FRP or deployment. 
The operations and maintenance (O&M) funding was used to finance things that derive 
benefits for a limited period of time, including expenses, rather than investments.  O&M funding 
would be used from FRP through disposal.  Some examples include: headquarters operations, 
civilian salaries, travel, fuel, expenses of operational military forces, training and education, 
depot maintenance, and base operations support. 
The R&D cost category utilized available RDT&E funding.  Likewise, the investment 
cost category, (which were noted as acquisition, production and construction), utilized available 
PROC funding.  The O&S and disposal cost categories utilized available O&M funding. 
The MCM program is currently nearing completion of the systems engineering MSA 
phase.  It is anticipated that it will take an additional six months before a MS A decision is 
reached.  This program will take one year to complete the systems engineering technology 
development phase and obtain a MS B decision.  The engineering and manufacturing 
development systems engineering phase will take a total of approximately 2.5 years before a MS 
C decision is reached.  The System Integrated Design will take approximately one year; followed 
by the system capability & manufacturing process demonstration, which will take another 1.5 
years to complete.  It is anticipated that the duration of the production and deployment phase will 
be 5 years total: two years to complete low rate initial production (LRIP) and three years to reach 
a full-rate production (FRP) and deployment decision.  The O&S phase will last approximately 
12 years.  Life cycle sustainment will last approximately 8 years followed by 4 years for system 
disposal.  The overall MCM system life-cycle is estimate to conclude in 20 years based off 
information from the MK 18 LCCE (Tecolote Research, Inc., 2008). 
Continuing the Life Cycle Cost Analysis, the CBS was developed.  The ROM life-cycle 
cost estimate was generated by referencing the MK18 UUV service based contracts estimation 
related reports (Tecolote Research, Inc., 2008; PMS 408, 2011).  The cost information from the 
MK18 was obtained from multiple sources, including service contracts, subject matter experts 
(SME), and limited available reference documentation. 
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Technical skill and ability for this project has been estimated at a GS-13 level for all 
labor categories throughout this project including, but not limited to the project manager, 
software engineer, and technicians throughout the lifecycle.  The average labor rate was 
estimated at $200K per man year, based upon loaded rates for NAVSEA in the Newport area 
(Castonguay, 2011).  The labor throughout the LCCE was adjusted to include an estimated 4% 
annual inflation rate based on predicted six year inflation up trend (McMahon, 2012). 
The material costs were estimated using a combination of quotes, open literature vendor 
data, GSA schedule database like IHS Haystack (IHS Inc., 2012), and PMS 408 (EOD) program 
office.  The majority of required materials were identified for cost estimation, however not all 
materials for a complete system were identified.  In addition to the materials, the facility costs 
were based off a $10 per square foot estimate.  The total cost for facilities was based on the total 
estimated area required for each system.  The material and facility costs throughout the LCCE 
were also adjusted to include the estimated 4% annual inflation rate (McMahon, 2012). 
B. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE COSTS 
This section presents the estimated costs over the projected life-cycle of each alternative.  
These life-cycle costs were used in order to perform a cost analysis and determine the preferred 
alternative.  A bottom-up cost estimate was conducted for each alternative with a modular 
approach accounting for the MCM vehicle, control station, and support equipment/facilities to 
arrive at a total MCM system cost.  A detailed costs breakdown for each alternative can be found 
in Appendix G. 
1. Alternative One Costs 
The LCCE analysis for this alternative was based on a system consisting of six vehicles to meet 
the threshold requirements for a worst case scenario (minefield 1) as shown in Table 23.  The 
estimated total cost for Alternative One was calculated at $100.45M.  The following paragraphs 
detail the overall cost for each phase of the system lifecycle. 
a. R&D Costs 
The R&D phase is four years (FY-1 through FY-4).  The total cost estimation for this 
phase is $39.49M as shown in Table 24.  The R&D phase was broken into six categories to 
determine the R&D costs: System/Production, Product Planning, Product Research, Engineering 
Design, Design Documentation, and System T&E.  Each of these categories was also broken 
down into subcategories.   The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be found in 




Table 24. Summary of Alternative One R&D Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative One R&D costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets generated 
using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
R&D Category Cost 
System/Production $1.83M 
Product Planning $0.21M 
Product Research $0.89M 
Engineering Design $23.38M 
Design Documentation $0.87M 
System T&E $12.31M 
Total $39.49M 
 
System/Production costs included paying a Project Manager for FY 1-4 one man year 
(MY) each year, a Production Manager for FY 3-4 one MY each year, a Logistics Support 
Manager for FY 1-2 one quarter MY each year, and a Logistics Support Manager for FY 3-4 one 
MY each year.  Each of these managers were estimated at an average rate of $200K, plus an 
inflation rate of 4% for each year past FY 1.  The Project Manager would be required from the 
onset of the project.  The Production Manager was deemed necessary once the designs had taken 
shape and requirements started.  The Logistics Support Manager would be need part-time from 
day 1 and would ramp up to full-time starting in year three for the same reasons the Project 
Manager is needed at that same time. 
 
The main factor of cost in R&D was the Engineering Design.  Engineering Design was 
broken up into several phases/categories:  Systems Engineering, Conceptual Design, Preliminary 
Design, Detailed Design, Design Support, Design Review, and Software Engineering.  The 
$200K average work-year rate was also utilized for all of the personnel working these phases.  In 
FY 1&2, a System Engineer would be used to help arrange the design efforts and work with the 
Project Manger to develop the plan for design phase.  The Conceptual Design was performed in 
FY 1&2 by two designers.  The Preliminary Design was estimated to be performed in FY 2&3 
by two different designers.  The Detailed Design was planned in FY 3&4 by another set of 
designers.  Design Support was also estimated to be required in FY 3&4.  Design Reviews were 
scheduled to occur in FY 2, 3, and 4.  During FY 4, the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and 
Critical Design Review (CDR) were estimated to take place, which resulted in an increase of cost 
incurred during FY4 when compared to other years.  The Software Engineering was the largest 
single cost factor for the Alternative One R&D phase.  The amount of the lines of code was 
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considerably larger for this design than what would be needed for the other two alternatives due 
to the large amount of internal processing required. 
 
 
b. Investment (Acquisition/Production/Construction) Costs 
The total cost estimation for the investment phase was found to be $26.04M as shown in 
Table 25.  The Investments phase is five years (FY-5 through FY-9) long and was broken into 
the following five categories to determine the respective investment costs: Industrial 
Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction, Quality Control, and Initial Logistics Support.  Each 
of these categories was also broken down into subcategories.  The breakout of these categories 
into subcategories can be found in Appendix G.  The values shown in Table 25 are summations 
of each its subcategories. 
Table 25. Summary of Alternative One Investment Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative One investment costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
Investment Category Cost 
Industrial Engineering $9.50M 
Manufacturing $11.89M 
Construction $2.85M 
Quality Control $0.76M 
Initial Logistics Support $1.04M 
Total $26.04M 
 
Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing were the largest two contributors to the 
Investment Costs.  The Industrial Engineering Costs were broken out into Plant Engineering, 
Manufacturing Engineering, Methods Engineering, Production Control, and Sustaining 
Engineering.  For each of the alternatives, the original values were based upon one supporting 
person working each phase.  It was determined later that Alternative One would be more 
expensive due to the additional requirements of implementing the software during the integration 
period. 
     The Manufacturing Costs were comprised of the Tooling/Test Equipment, Fabrication, 
Material, Subassembly/Assembly, Inspection & Test, Packing & Shipping, and Manufacturing 
Rework.  The values for each of these sections were based upon previous manufacturing 
experience from members of the cohort.  The material was the only line item that was based 
upon the actual material costs and quantity of assemblies required to make one complete system 
(Alternative One = 6, Alternative Two = 29, and Alternative Three = 34).  
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c. Operating & Support Costs 
 The total cost estimation for the Operating and Support phase is $30.57M and is broken 
out in Table 26.  The O&S phase is eight years long (FY-10 through FY-17) and was broken into 
the following categories: System/Product and Sustaining Costs.  Each of these categories was 
also broken down into subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be 
found in Appendix G.  The values shown in Table 26 are summations of each its subcategories. 
Table 26. Summary of Alternative One O&S Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative One O&S costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets generated 
using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 





The System/Product costs were broken out into Operating Personnel, Operator Training, 
Operational Facilities, and System Maintainer categories.  The costs per person per year for this 
section were $100K.  The Operator Training was estimated at $5K (for roughly two weeks per 
year) per person.  The facility requirements (i.e. production, storage, etc) for Alternative One 
were estimated at 5000 sq. ft. and averaging $10 per sq. ft. per year (National Reality, 2012).  
These were both based upon average costs of renting facilities and the area needed was based 
upon previous area requirements of systems built and operated by members of the cohort.  For 
Alternatives Two and Three, the amount of area was doubled due to the larger number of the 
components needed.  The amount of area needed was not based solely on sq. ft per system, but 
also additional factors such as required support personnel to work in the facility to support each 
alternative.  
d. Disposal Costs 
 The total cost estimation for the Disposal phase is $4.34M.  The disposal will consist of 
the following categories: logistics support requirements, equipment support, transportation & 
handling support, facilities during a four year period, from FY-18 through FY-21. 
 
The Disposal costs were based upon the need of one person to perform logistics support 
requirements full time for four years.  An additional person would be needed for personnel 
support.  Each of these personnel would be paid the $200K average yearly rate.  Since these 
values are 18 years out, the 4% inflation rate assumed each year almost doubles their current 
dollar equivalent.  The equipment support and transportation/handling support costs were based 
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upon current shipping costs and equipment rental.  Values were obtained from cohort member 
experience.  The Facility requirements were based on 5000 sq. ft. at $10 per sq. ft. per year. 
 
The remaining Alternative Two and Three costs were determined by the above mentioned 
methods.  Variations between some of the alternative costs have been discussed previously.  
Major differences in costs have been primarily attributed to quantities of people required 
(example:  Alternative Two requires 29 vehicles with 6 people supporting every two vehicles and 
Alternative Three requires 34 vehicles with 8 people supporting every two vehicles) amount of 
work needed to perform the action (example:  Software Engineering in Alternative One). 
2. Alternative Two Costs 
The LCCE analysis for this alternative was based on a system consisting of twenty-nine 
vehicles to meet the threshold requirements for a worst case scenario (minefield 1) as shown in 
Table 23.  The performance of a vehicle in Minefield 2 was found to be better than in Minefield 
1.  If the performance of the system could achieve the required threshold for Minefield 1, it 
would follow that for Minefield 2 the performance would exceed the required threshold.  In order 
to ensure that 99% of all searches were capable of meeting the threshold, the minimum ACR 
value from Minefield 1 was selected as the value to compare to the requirement threshold.  This 
was because the ACR data had a normal distribution with the minimum being within two 
standard deviations from the mean.  Without improvements to the vehicle performance, the only 
way to reach the objective was to use additional vehicles which would not only increase the total 
overall system cost, but have a negative effect on the total logistical footprint of the system. 
 
  The estimated total cost for Alternative Two was calculated to be $285.08M.  The 
following sections detail the overall cost for each phase of the system lifecycle. 
a. R&D Costs 
The R&D phase is four years long (FY-1 through FY-4) and is estimation to cost 
$24.96M as shown in Table 27.  The R&D phase was broken into six categories to determine the 
R&D costs: System/Production, Product Planning, Product Research, Engineering Design, 
Design Documentation, and System T&E.  Each of these categories was also broken down into 
subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be found in Appendix G.   
The values shown in Table 27 are summations of each its subcategories. 
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Table 27. Summary of Alternative Two R&D Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Two R&D costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
R&D Category Cost 
System/Production $1.83M 
Product Planning $0.21M 
Product Research $0.89M 
Engineering Design $11.23M 
Design Documentation $0.87M 
System T&E $9.93M 
Total $24.96M 
 
b. Investment (Acquisition/Production/Construction) Costs  
The total cost estimation for the Investments phase is $50.20M as seen in Table 28.  The 
Investments phase is five years (FY-5 through FY-9) long and was broken into the following five 
categories to determine the respective investment costs: Industrial Engineering, Manufacturing, 
Construction, Quality Control, and Initial Logistics Support.  Each of these categories was also 
broken down into subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be 
found in Appendix G.  The values shown in Table 28 are summations of each its subcategories. 
 
Table 28. Summary of Alternative Two Investment Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Two investment costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
Investment Category Cost 
Industrial Engineering $6.34M 
Manufacturing $31.40M 
Construction $5.30M 
Quality Control $3.02M 
Initial Logistics Support $4.15M 
Total $50.20M 
 
c. Operating & Support Costs 
The total cost estimation for the Operating and Support phase is estimated at $204.54M 
and is detailed in Table 29.  The O&S phase is eight years long (FY-10 through FY-17) and was 
broken into the following categories: System/Product and Sustaining Costs.  Each of these 
categories was also broken down into subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into 
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subcategories can be found in Appendix G.  The values shown in Table 29 are summations of 
each its subcategories. 
Table 29. Summary of Alternative Two O&S Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Two O&S costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets generated 
using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 





d. Disposal Costs 
The total cost estimation for the Disposal phase is $5.38M.  The disposal will consist of 
the following categories: logistics support requirements, equipment support, transportation & 
handling support, facilities during a four year period, from FY-18 through FY-21. 
 
3. Alternative Three Costs 
The LCCE analysis for Alternative Three is based one system consisting of thirty-four to 
meet the threshold requirements for a worst case scenario (minefield 1) as shown in Table 23.  
The estimated total cost for Alternative Three was estimated to be $326.33M.  The following 
paragraphs detail the overall cost provided for each phase of the system lifecycle. 
a. R&D Costs 
The R&D phase is four years long (FY-1 through FY-4) and the total cost is estimated to 
be $23.97M, shown in Table 30.  The R&D phase was broken into six categories to determine 
the R&D costs: System/Production, Product Planning, Product Research, Engineering Design, 
Design Documentation, and System T&E.  Each of these categories was also broken down into 
subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be found in Appendix G.   
The values shown in Table 30 are summations of each its subcategories. 
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Table 30. Summary of Alternative Three R&D Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Three R&D costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
R&D Category Cost 
System/Production $1.83M 
Product Planning $0.21M 
Product Research $0.89M 
Engineering Design $11.23M 
Design Documentation $8.94M 
System T&E $4.84M 
Total $23.97M 
 
b. Investment (Acquisition/Production/Construction) Costs 
 The total cost estimation for this phase is $41.48M shown in Table 31.  The Investments phase 
is five years (FY-5 through FY-9) long and was broken into the following five categories to 
determine the respective investment costs: Industrial Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction, 
Quality Control, and Initial Logistics Support.  Each of these categories was also broken down 
into subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be found in 
Appendix G.  The values shown in Table 31 are summations of each its subcategories. 
Table 31. Summary of Alternative Three Investment Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Three investment costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 
Investment Category Cost 
Industrial Engineering $6.34M 
Manufacturing $22.67M 
Construction $5.30M 
Quality Control $3.02M 
Initial Logistics Support $4.15M 
Total $41.48M 
 
c. Operating & Support Costs 
 The total cost estimation for this phase is $255.50M illustrated in Table 32.  The O&S phase is 
eight years long (FY-10 through FY-17) and was broken into the following categories: 
System/Product and Sustaining Costs.  Each of these categories was also broken down into 
subcategories.  The breakout of these categories into subcategories can be found in Appendix G.   
The values shown in Table 32 are summations of each its subcategories. 
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Table 32. Summary of Alternative Three O&S Costs 
Summary of the MCM Alternative Three O&S costs.  The table was compiled from the LCCE spreadsheets 
generated using multiple sources for cost estimation. 
 





d. Disposal Costs 
The total cost estimation for this phase is $5.38M.  The disposal will consist of the 
following categories: logistics support requirements, equipment support, transportation & 
handling support, facilities during a four year period, from FY-18 through FY-21.   
C. LCCE COMPARISON  
The analysis of the cost is based on the LCCE for each alternative.  The key drivers 
impacting the overall cost are analyzed by life-cycle phase.  The total costs for each alternative 
are presented in Table 33 and illustrated in a stacked bar in Figure 74.  
Table 33. Life Cycle Cost Estimation Summary for each Alternative 
Summary of the overall total costs for each MCM alternative broken down by R&D, investment, O&S and disposal 








R&D $39.49M $24.96M $23.97M 
Investment $26.04M $50.20M $41.48M 
O&S $30.57M $204.54M $255.50M 
Disposal $4.34M $5.38M $5.38M 




Figure 74. Total Stacked LCCE Costs for MCM Alternatives 
 
The overall total costs (shown in $K) for each MCM alternative are compared, stacking R&D, investment, O&S and 
disposal for each.  The total cost for each alternative is: $100,450K (Alternative One), $285,080K (Alternative 
Two), and $326,330K (Alternative Three).  The largest impact on total cost for Alternatives Two and Three is noted 
during the O&S phase.  The largest impact on total cost for Alternative One is during the R&D phase.  
 
1. R&D Cost Comparison 
The labor impacted the total cost between each alternative with the most significant labor 
driver in design and building the prototypes.  The design labor required to create the software for 
Alternative One was approximately three times as expensive as the other two alternatives.  The 
amount of processing required for this fully autonomous alternative requires more lines of code, 
thus more software engineers are needed as commuted by COCOMO II web-based software 
estimation tool (Madachy, 2012).  The other two alternatives will have more operational 
personnel working with the systems and will require less processing/less lines of code.  The 
major differences in building prototypes are the number of vehicles required to build.  In 
Alternative One, six vehicles are required, twenty-nine are required for Alternative Two, and 
thirty-four are needed for Alternative Three.  In addition to labor, materials significantly 
impacted the total cost.  In summary, the R&D costs for Alternative One, Two, and Three are, 
respectively: $39.49M, $24.96M, and $23.97M.  The Alternative One R&D cost is 
approximately $15M and $16M higher than Alternatives Two and Three, respectively.  As stated 
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above, this is mainly due to the increased software labor needs and the system complexity of 
Alternative One‟s fully autonomous requirements. 
2. Investment (Acquisition/Production/Construction) Cost Comparison   
The major driver between alternatives is the quantities of vehicles per system affecting 
the construction and production costs.  Other major costs included in each alternative are the 
facility, area, and material.  In summary, the total investment costs for Alternative One, Two, 
and Three are, respectively: $26.04M, $50.20M, and $41.48M.  The cost per vehicle for each 
alternative are: Alternative One = $4.34M/vehicle ($26.04M/6 vehicles), Alternative Two = 
$1.73M/vehicle ($50.20M/29 vehicles), and Alternative Three = $1.22M/vehicle ($41.48M/34 
vehicles).  Even though the price per vehicle is more for the Alternative One, the quantity of 
vehicles needed is only six and this results in a total cost considerably less than the Alternatives 
Two and Three.  The Alternative Two investment costs are just short of $9M higher than 
Alternative Three, and just over $24M more than Alternative One.  Although, the Alternative 
Two number of systems is lower than Alternative Three, the materials costs per system are 
higher.    
3. O&S Cost Comparison 
 The most significant impact to alternative costs is the number of operators and 
maintainers required.  In order to support the number of vehicles (Alternative One = 6, 
Alternative Two = 29, and Alternative Three = 34) and keep each alternative system fully 
operational, functional, and continuously supported, the following number of personnel are 
required:  Alternative One = 12 operators (2 operators per vehicle  6 vehicles) and 2 
maintainers total; Alternative Two = 87 operators (3 operators per vehicle  29 vehicles) and 8 
maintainers total; and Alternative Three = 136 operators (4 operators per vehicle  34 vehicles) 
and 10 maintainers total.  In summary, the O&S costs for Alternative One, Two, and Three are, 
respectively: $30.57M, $204.54M, and $255.50M.  The Alternative Three O&S costs are 
approximately $51M higher than Alternative Two, and nearly $225M more than Alternative 
One.  
4. Disposal Cost Comparison  
The significant impacts to cost are the transportation and facility requirements for each 
alternative.  In summary, the disposal costs for each alternative are: $4.34M, $5.38M and 
$5.38M.  The disposal costs for Alternative Two and three are nearly $1M more than Alternative 
One mainly due to the total number of vehicles in the fleet. 
 212 
D. LCCE RESULTS 
Based on the cost comparison, Alternative One provides the lowest lifecycle costs as 
compared to Alternatives Two and Three.  The difference in total costs between Alternative One 
and Two is just under $185M.  The difference between Alternative One and Three is 
approximately $226M.   
 
Figure 74 illustrates that the 8 year O&S life-cycle phase is the largest driver of cost for 
Alternatives Two and Three and the 4 year R&D life-cycle phase impacts cost the most for 
Alternative One.  If longer sustainment is necessary, then Alternative One would have a 
substantial cost benefit over the other alternatives based on the LCCE performed. 
 
The final key variable to cost is the number of vehicles required per system in each 
alternative to support the mission.  The material and facilities costs are major cost impacts due to 
the number of required vehicles for alternative systems.  Because Alternative One requires fewer 
vehicles in its system configuration, it will have a lower cost related to materials and facilities.  
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VII. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
To complete the overall assessment of each alternative, a benefit analysis was performed 
to compare the effectiveness and lifecycle cost factors.  The objective of the analysis was to 
select the best recommended system by examining all the factors to understand what alternatives 
have the most benefits and the least amount of detractors. 
1. Effectiveness Evaluation  
The effectiveness analysis was conducted on the three Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) 
of ACR, stealth, and undetected mines.  Since the model was based on one vehicle for each of 
the alternatives to calculate the MOEs, the evaluation of the number of vehicles will have to be 
applied to each alternative to get a whole system to whole system comparison.  The assessment 
considers the total number of MCM vehicles required for each alternative system. 
 
The Alternative One architecture achieved the best performance scores for the MOEs 
over the other architectures in modeling and simulation.  Alternative Two received the second 
best score, while Alternative Three showed the lowest scores in all three MOE categories.  Table 
34 summarizes the rank-ordered scores for each alternative in the effectiveness analysis. 
Table 34. Rank-Ordered Scores of Alternatives 
This table shows the rank-ordered scores of the alternative systems for each MOE assessed. A score of 1 is the best 
while a score of 3 is the worst. 
 





One Two Three 
Area coverage Rate  (n.m.
2
/hr) Rank Test 1 2 3 
Stealth (%) Rank Observed 1 2 3 
Undetected Mines (%) Rank Test 1 2 3 
                                                       
Modeling and simulation also calculated the number of vehicles required to meet the 
mission need for each alternative.  While the number of vehicles for each system increased, it did 
not affect the performance ranking of the systems.  This is due to the fact that the number of 
vehicles increased more for the lower ranked alternatives.  It is understood that while the metrics 
of ACR, stealth, and undetected mines may change due to the addition of more vehicles to cover 
the entire mine field in the required time frame, the resulting effect is that the gaps between the 
systems‟ performance will only increase.  Based on the number of required vehicles for each 
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alternative, it was determined that there is no impact on the rank-ordering of alternatives 
presented in Table 34.  
2. Cost Evaluation  
Cost is a major factor in the decision for selecting the best alternative from the three 
alternatives.  Table 35 summarizes the total Life Cycle Cost estimate of each alternative taking 
into account the number of vehicles required at the system level. 
Table 35. Life Cycle Cost Estimation Summary for Each Alternative 





One Two Three 
R&D $39.49M $24.96M $23.97M 
Investment $26.04M $50.20M $41.48M 
O&S $30.57M $204.54M $255.50M 
Disposal $4.34M $5.38M $5.38M 
TOTAL $100.45M $285.08M $326.33M 
 
It is evident from Table 35 that Alternative One is overall the least costly system, 
followed by Alternative Two and Alternative Three as the most costly. 
3. Benefit Analysis Process 
In an attempt to determine which alternative was comparatively the better choice, a 
benefit analysis was performed to compare each system‟s cost and performance.  This evaluation 
shows which alternative results in the best combination of cost and effectiveness.   
 
Figure 75 displays each of these alternatives with their overall performance and total cost.  
Alternative One has the lowest cost and with the highest score for each MOE.  Alternative Two 
has the second best cost and performance scores while Alternative Three was the worst 
performing system with the highest cost.  Therefore Alternative One possesses the highest 
performance of the three alternatives as well as the lowest Life Cycle Cost and is our best 
selection from the alternatives evaluated. 
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Figure 75. Decision evaluation chart 
The total lifecycle costs (shown in $M) and overall performance for each MCM alternative are displayed to aid in 
the comparative analysis for making a best selection.  The dashed lines separate the MOEs evaluated for each of the 
alternatives allowing the comparison to remain on one chart. 
 
B. BENEFIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
To provide a final system recommendation, a benefit analysis was conducted based on 
the analysis of the performance and cost of the alternatives.  Alternative One has a much higher 
R&D phase cost than the other alternatives shown in Table 35, but due to its considerably lower 
O&S costs it remains as the lowest cost option.  Based on cost it was still the most favorable 
choice when compared to Alternatives Two and Three.  If the O&S phase was shorter than 8 
years, Alternative One would not be the lowest cost; however the O&S duration is considered 
conservative and less than 8 years is not a reasonable estimation.  Since the results for both the 
effectiveness and lifecycle cost analyses had the same top candidate, the benefit analysis 
confirmed that Alternative One was the best selection providing the most affordable system with 









































The comparison of Alternative One, Two and Three displayed the benefit of each of the 
recommended capability gap solutions.  The overall system recommendation, Alternative One, 
was a system that included fully autonomous capabilities, onboard real-time data fusion and 
processing, and a real-time communications network with an OTH capability.  The other 
alternatives were found to be able to the complete MCM mission, but did not always meet 
developed stakeholder requirements.  For example, Alternative Two did provide a reduction of 
DTE time by using a real-time communications network, but the burden of identifying, 
classifying and processing targets was still placed upon human operators requiring increased 
manpower support compared to Alternative One.  Alternative Three did not utilize real-time 
communications or processing, required small craft support in order to operate, and PMA was 
needed to detect mines in the area of concern. 
 
This capstone project has identified and evaluated capability gaps in the MCM DTE 
sequence performed in the VSW zone in areas of denied access in support of amphibious 
operations.  Realistic material solutions to bridge the gap in the 10-15 year timeframe have been 
developed and the best alternative has been recommended that reduces the DTE time, removes 
the man from the minefield, reduces burden of MCM operations on humans, and removes PMA.  
The comprehensive methodology utilized by this research can be used by the Navy for further 
development of future MCM systems.  Although a final architecture recommendation has been 
made, further investigation is needed in key areas before the concept can be realized.  These 
areas include the technical development of autonomous capabilities, research and investment in 
developing real-time OTH communication capabilities, data fusion from multiple sensors for 
mine detection and identification, and research into the best energy source for the recommended 
alternatives.   
 
At the start of this project, six questions were articulated to guide the research to support 
finding a solution to the capstone problem.  The following summarizes the answers that were 







1. Is it possible to completely remove the man/mammal from the minefield during UMCM 
operations? 
 
As shown in Alternatives One and Two, removing the man and mammals from the 
minefield is possible.  This can be accomplished using UUV technology in fully/semi-
autonomous and tele-operated modes with a real-time communication network. 
 
2. Is it possible to have a system or system of systems that can detect and clear a minefield 
path for amphibious landings within the required CONOPS time specifications? 
 
A system of systems composed of Alternative One vehicles along with a separate 
neutralization vehicle would be able to detect and clear a minefield within timeframe 
requirements.  Alternative One vehicle concepts can map a path through the minefield 
without having to physically disable any mines so that the amphibious landing force can 
make its way through and then at a later point effectively clears necessary targets in the 
minefield. 
 
3. Will the MCM solutions present today or planned in the near future be able to handle 
current and future threats? 
 
As shown through this report, the systems today can conduct limited MCM search, detect, 
identification and classification.  Based only on the available open literature, it is unlikely 
that the current solutions and those planned for the near future will meet the need for 
conducting full DTE MCM operations.  
 
The task of physical neutralization, not including avoidance techniques, in the VSW zone 
today is also a limited capability not only in technology but with doctrinal restraints.  
There are plans for developing UUV neutralization in the VSW zone that is projected to 
be available within the next few years.  Based on available open literature it was 
determined that our system would be effective against future threats.  This report has 
recommended an architecture that will be able to handle both current and future threats 
with the imposed requirement of stealth to support amphibious operations. 
 
4. What is the greatest obstacle in reducing the DTE sequence timing? 
 
At this point in time the greatest obstacle to reducing the detect-to-engage sequence 
timing is the lack of real-time analysis of the minefield.  As shown by the results of the 
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research in this project, this can potentially be overcome by investing in establishing a 
real-time network capability through a buoy network or similar communications and data 
processing systems. 
 
5. What alternatives exist to overcome obstacles to reducing the DTE sequence timing? 
 
As noted in the response to question four, one method for reducing the DTE sequence is 
establishing a real-time communication network to enable in-the-loop mission analysis.  
This effectively could reduce the time required for target analysis portion of the mission 
by half. 
 
Another method for reducing the DTE sequence time would be the use of autonomy 
during target processing.  It has been noted by stakeholders and professionals in the 
MCM community that humans conducting mission analysis puts a huge burden on the 
operators and can be time intensive, inconsistent (dependent on the training the operator 
received), and at times produces an abundant amount of false targets.  The introduction of 
data fusion, automated target recognition software could prove to reduce the time it takes 
to identify and classify a target. 
 
Additionally it was found in this report that in order to search, detect, classify, identify, 
map and neutralize the minefield in the required 48 to 72 hours, multiple vehicles would 
be required. 
 
6. For an implemented solution, what are the risks and benefits? 
 
A risk identified using an autonomous based platform is that divers may not be allowed 
or available to visually identify and confirm a mine prior to having the mine being 
neutralized.  This risk could be mitigated by ensuring maturity of the technology through 
proven capability and performance 
 
A second risk of the recommended solution is false-negative or false positives reporting, 
in that the vehicle incorrectly identifies an object as a non-mine, when in fact it is a real 
mine or it identifies a non-mine as a mine.  This risk could be mitigated by fine tuning 
sensors and detection algorithms based on environmental conditions and proofing out the 
performance to ensure target identification is accurate. 
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The main benefit from using an autonomous based platform is that it enables the removal 




The following recommendations are made: 
 
1. Invest in development and employment of autonomy to remove operator burden. 
2. Identify and invest in methods and structures to provide real-time communication 
specific to MCM operations.  
3. Continue to research methods and solutions for OTH capabilities. 
4. Invest in efforts to increase power availability and power management architectures. 
5. Continue research methods for DTE reduction and identifying methods of efficiency for 
current system solutions. 
6. Identify a Lead Systems Architect to manage MCM system interoperability.  
7. Update MCM operational doctrine to reflect the current state of technology.   
C.  SUMMARY 
 
The VSW environment has been identified as a difficult, diverse environment.  There are 
unique challenges that a system design must meet to be capable of conducting the MCM mission 
with reliable results.  The solutions of the future must be designed and managed to meet the 
needs of the stakeholders as well as be able to reliably perform as an affordable solution. 
 
As technology of the enemy progresses, MCM technology design must change to meet 
this challenge.  With a lead system architect identified it will ensure that an effective solution is 
achieved to enable interoperability among systems, rather than having several program offices 
and branches working individually on the same effort.   The lead systems architect should have 
the oversight of the development of SoS for MCM operations and can liaison with Marine Corps 
representatives to ensure the developed MCM capability sufficiently addresses their needs. 
  
Although stakeholders have indicated the need for DTE reduction and systems that 
enable single pass DTE operations, it has been assessed that neutralization should be completed 
separately.  Minefield neutralization is complex and in order to support in-stride neutralization in 
the future, the neutralization platform will need to be a separate system in order to continue and 
complete the search, identification and classification of the entire AO. 
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As technology in search, identification, and classification progresses, it is necessary to 
continually reassess technology readiness in order to enable a change in MCM doctrine to allow 
for auto target recognition and neutralization.  Current doctrine restricts certain aspects of 
autonomy and auto target recognition capabilities because of the requirement for targets to be 
identified and confirmed by divers before they can be authorized to be neutralized.  Auto target 
recognition and autonomy algorithms are becoming more prevalent today and are on the verge of 
becoming a mature technology.  The MCM community must be willing to accept this technology 













































APPENDIX A: CURRENT AND FUTURE MCM SYSTEMS 
A. CURRENT SYSTEMS 
1. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
a. MK 18 MOD 1 
Figure 76 displays the MK18 Mod 1 Swordfish, a small, two-person portable, low-cost 
UUV support craft tasked to locate bottom and tethered mine-like objects in specific lanes 
through the VSW zone.  This UUV system utilizes integrated sensors and navigation technology 
and is launched to map the potential mines in the VSW zone for avoidance, or later clearance by 
other MCM assets.  The MK18 Mod 1 Swordfish provides rapid object localization for confined 
areas (inlets, berthing areas, between piers and pilings, confined channels and rivers) and open 
areas (large open channels, harbors and anchorage areas) in up to 300 Feet of Sea Water (FSW).  
This UUV system is identical in configuration to the VSW Mine Countermeasures (MCM) MK 
18 Mod 1 Swordfish Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) system and has an endurance of 10 
hours at 4knots.  The project office for the MK18 Mod 1 Swordfish/ Bottom Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicle Localization System (BULS) is PMS 408 (EOD). 
 
Figure 76. MK 18 MOD 1 Swordfish UUV System 
The MK18 Mod1 Swordfish shown has the advantage that it is of low cost and can be used on missions to locate 
mine-like objects in the VSW zones.  This system requires a two person team to launch and recover the unit 
(AUVAC, 2007). 
 
The MK 18 Mod 1 Swordfish is capable of navigating via acoustic transponders in long-
baseline or ultra-short-baseline mode or via P-coded GPS.  Upward and downward looking 
acoustic digital velocity log improves dead-reckoning accuracy.  Onboard sensors include water 
turbidity, water temperature and conductivity, side-scan sonar, and downward-looking camera 
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(AUVAC, 2007).  A disadvantage of dead reckoning is that any errors and uncertainties of the 
process are cumulative (since new values are calculated exclusively from previous values); 
therefore, any error or uncertainty in the value increases with elapsed time. 
 
The MK18 Mod 1 has a thruster propulsion system that can sustain a nominal speed of 
approximately 1.5 m/s for 22 hours.  It is limited to a maximum forward speed of 2.6 m/s for 
approximately 8 hours.  The system is capable of a maximum depth of 100 meters and can be 
delivered by hand or a vessel of opportunity (AUVAC, 2007). 
b. AN/AQS-20 Mine Hunting Sonar System 
The AN/AQS-20 Mine Hunting Sonar System, shown in Figure 77, is a towed sonar 
mine-hunting system that can detect and classify drifting, moored, and bottom mines in deep and 
shallow water (AN/AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar System, 2008).  It includes ahead-looking 
search, volume search, gap-filler, side-looking classification sonar, and an electro-optic 
identification device (Naval Mine Warfare, 2001).  The AN/AQS-20 automatically localizes 
mine-like objects and provides the operator with a visual image and a contact data list.  All 
mission data is recorded for post-mission analysis (AN/AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar System, 
2008).  Since the AN/AQS-20‟s sonar suite was designed for depths greater than 40 feet, it is 
considered ineffective in the VSW (Keller, 1 AUG 2007).  
 
 
Figure 77. AN/AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar System 
The AN/AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar System has the capability to detect and classify moored and bottom mines.  
The system however cannot neutralize threats (AN/AQS-20A Minehunting Sonar System, 2008). 
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c. Variable Depth AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar System 
The AN/SQQ-32Minehunting Sonar System, seen in Figure 78, can be considered a 
surface MCM system since it is used as part of the onboard systems in the MCM-1 Avenger 
class.  The system helps ship to detect and classify modern moored and bottom unburied mines 
at both deep and shallow waters over a wide range of bottom conditions and distances 
(AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar System, 2005).  However, the AN/SQQ-32 system is not 
effective in the VSW zone as it is not optimized for harsh littoral environments against stealthy 
bottom mines.  Typically, after a mine is detected by the AN/SQQ-32 system, it relies on a 




Figure 78. AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar System 
The AN/SQQ-32 has the ability to detect and classify moored and unburied bottom mines.  The system carries the 
advantage in that it detect mines in a wide range of conditions (AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar System, 2005). 
2. Diver Systems 
Current diver systems include the use of the MK 15 Mod 1 Underwater Imaging System 
(UIS), the AN/PQS-2A handheld sonar, and the MK 16 Mod 1 Underwater Breathing Apparatus.  
Although the diver systems present advantages in that they are easily launched, recovered, and 
can be used in a covert manner, they have the distinct disadvantage in that they put a diver, or 





a. Underwater Imaging System (UIS) MK 15 MOD 1 
The Underwater Imaging System (UIS) is coupled with the Diver Visual Information 
System (DVIS) and provides divers with the unique capability of a handheld sonar system that 
provides navigational capabilities for MCM operations.  The system comes equipped with the 
capability to record the detection and classification images of mine-like objects (Stuart, 2005).  
The system is capable of presenting, storing, and transferring digital target location, depth, and 
imaging data in a format similar to, or compatible with, current MCM Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) formats (Stuart, 2005).  The system was 
launched in January 2005 and replaced the AN/PQS-2A hand-held sonar (Carson-Jelley, 2011). 
In the area of VSW and bottom mines, the underwater imaging systems 
integration with a diver should allow for real-time classification and images of the objects based 
on the described capabilities.  This allows for quick and easy deployment of mine 
countermeasure operations.  
b. Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA) 
The UBA is a special breathing suit designed to help divers perform MCM operations.  It 
has a closed-circuit which recycles the air in the dive cylinders without producing bubbles to 
keep a clandestine profile.  The UBA also has low acoustic signature and low magnetic signature 
that allows divers to safely approach acoustic and magnetic influence triggered ordnance 
underwater.  The MK16 Mod 1 UBA version weighs 64 pounds and allows diver to operate 
underwater for up to 300 minutes (depending on initial pre-dive pressure, required reserve 
pressure, oxygen consumption by the diver, effect of cold water immersion on flask pressure).  It 
can help divers to operate to a maximum depth of 300 feet of sea water (FSW) (US Navy Diving 
Manual Revision 6, 2008).  Improvements in gas usage, dive duration, and depth capabilities 
provided by the UBA greatly increase the underwater duration to 4-6 hours (MK 16 Underwater 
Breathing Apparatus, 2007).  PMS-EOD has already developed MK 16 Mod 2, an improvement 
of Mod 1, which includes Stealth EOD-M and VIPER-E (Stuart, 2005; Cobham Life Support, 
2009) shown in Figure 79.  Other UBA currently used by Navy divers are the MK 25 and its 
upgraded MK 25 Mod 2.  
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Figure 79. MK16 MOD2 
The MK 16 Mod 2 has the direct advantage that it can complete the detect-to-engage clearance process, although it 
places the man in the minefield (Stuart, 2005).  
c. Diver System Limitations 
The use of divers in MCM operations has the advantage in that it allows for logical 
thought and hands-on processes through the mine hunting operation.  The main concern with 
utilizing a diver system is the risk incurred by exposing the diver or team of divers to the dangers 
of the minefield.  However, there are other limitations that affect the usefulness of a diver 
system.  
 
The first of these limitations is the safety zone required for divers.  Figure 80 shows the 
typical zone of safety that the diver must operate within to maintain a safe transit height above 
the ocean floor to avoid dangers from marine life and ground obstacles.  This zone includes six 
feet below the surface of the water to make sure there is plenty of clearance from surface crafts.  
There is also a limitation of how close the diver can get to the ocean bottom; typically this value 
is two feet (Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011).  Due to the safety 
zone requirements, a diver requires a minimum operating depth of at least 10 FSW (Marine 




Figure 80. Diver Safety Zone Margins 
Safety zone depiction for MCM divers.  The diver‟s search depth is limited from the surface by proper clearance 
from surface ships above.  The diver is also constrained to maintain an elevation of two feet from the sea bed to 
avoid marine life and obstacle hazards.  (Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011) 
 
A second limitation of diver systems is the physical capabilities of the divers themselves.  
The speed, endurance, and air the diver can maintain factors greatly into the mission time.  It can 
take upwards of 5 hours and 45 minutes for a diver to complete a sweep of a 250,000 yard
2
 area 
under typical conditions (Marine Corps System Command Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011).  
Similarly, sea state may also play a role in deciding if a diving MCM mission can be carried out 
due to physical constraints and safety factors. 
Further, despite its benefits in helping divers have better performance in MCM 
operations, closed-circuit oxygen diving presents a degree of risk to causing medical problems to 
divers such as central nervous system oxygen toxicity and convulsions, oxygen deficiency, 
carbon dioxide toxicity, middle ear oxygen absorption, and water leaking into the canister 
causing chemical injury (Stealth CDLSE, 2009).  Systems such as the MK16 UBA, limits divers 
to operating in currents of less than 0.85 knots (US Navy Diving Manual Revision 6, 2008). 
Because of these drawbacks, diver units are limited in performance compared to other 
systems and cannot satisfy large demands for rapid mine clearance to support amphibious 
landings.   
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3. Marine Mammal Systems 
The US Navy currently has five Marine Mammal Systems (MMS) that are being used for 
MCM operations.  These systems include the MK 4, MK 5, MK 6, MK 7, and MK 8.  These 
systems involve training dolphins, sea lions, or a combination of both and integrating them with 
a team of humans to carry out sea mine hunting operations.  MMS are advantageous because 
mammals have greater agility and endurance than most human divers, and also help in taking the 
man out of the minefield.  However, mammals‟ lives are still being put at risk, as well as the 
human team that is working on the surface with the mammals.  Due to increasing ethical issues, 
marine mammal systems have become more challenging to maintain proper training.  These 
marine mammal systems also have the inherent risk of error due to the marine mammals‟ lack of 
understanding the situation that can sometimes lead to catastrophic ends. 
a. MK 4 (Dolphins, Trainers) 
The MK 4 system shown in Figure 81 utilizes dolphins for the detection, classification, 
and marking of sea and ocean mines (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The MK 
4 system is used for mines that are secured to the ocean floor by taking advantage of the 
dolphin‟s echolocation ability (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
In the area of VSW and bottom mines, the MK 4 carries the advantage over sophisticated 
electronic acoustic devices in that it can be used in muddled seabed, marine growth, and other 
acoustically challenging areas where applications of technology may be deficient and harder to 
use (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
 
Figure 81. MK 4 System 
The MK 4 system utilizes dolphins to detect, classify, and mark possible threats in the VSW zone.  This system can 
be used in the shallower areas of the VSW zone because of its effectiveness in marine growth areas and acoustically 




b. MK 5 (Sea Lions, Trainers) 
The MK 5 system in Figure 82 consists of a surface watercraft, a sea lion, and two 
handlers and is considered a “Quick Find” recovery system (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet 
Systems, 2011).  The MK5 system operates by arriving at a threat recovery site and releasing a 
sea lion to the mine with a rope and mounting device.  The sea lion attaches the mounting device 
to the mine and swims to the surface with the rope, where the object is pulled to the surface by 
the crew (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The MK 5 system was developed by 
the Navy as a way to overcome the limitations of divers in the threat recovery area (Marine 
Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
 
Figure 82. MK 5 
MK 5 system is in the process of recovering a threat object.  The possible sea mine is being mounted with a rope by 
a sea lion.  The system has the advantage of low cost, speed, and agility (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 
2011). 
 
This system is considered to be relatively inexpensive compared to dive teams and 
underwater remotely operated vehicles.  The MK 5 system takes advantage of the sea lion‟s 
swimming speed and agility to expeditiously recover objects (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet 
Systems, 2011). 
Specific to the area of VSW and bottom mines, the MK 5 system presents the capability 
of longer endurance times than humans and the capacity to operate in poor visibility and currents 
(Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The system has proven to have a very high 
recovery rate of over 95% (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The exact system 
 231 
capability and limitations in terms of endurance and speed are unknown for the purpose of this 
report. 
c. MK 6 (Dolphins, Sea Lions, Trainers) 
The MK 6 system is classified as a rapidly deployable force protection system that has 
been specifically trained with the unique ability to identify and find water-borne threats 
(divers/swimmers) that are near sea assets (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  
The system consists of a system of dolphins, sea lions, and human trainers (Marine Mammal 
Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The MK 6 has the ability to operate either as a roving patrol or 
as a sentry as shown in Figure 83.  The system has most recently been used to support missions 
in operation Enduring Freedom (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The system 
has the advantage that it can be easily and rapidly deployed in VSW zone.  The exact system 
capability and limitations in terms of endurance and speed are unknown for this report. 
 
 
Figure 83. MK 6 
The MK 6 MCM system uses dolphins, sea lions, and human trainers to identify and find threats in the VSW zone.  
The system is easily deployed, but puts the mammal and human trainer at risk in forward deployed areas (Marine 
Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
 
d. MK 7 (Atlantic Bottle Nose Dolphins) 
The MK 7 system utilizes Atlantic Bottle Nose Dolphins that are trained to detect and 
mark locations of mines that are sitting on an ocean floor and buried under sea sediment (Marine 
Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  This system is primary used to clear channels for the 
safe shipment of personnel and materials through a given area (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet 
Systems, 2011).  The MK 7 system was used during the 2003 Iraq war operation where the 
system played an integral role in the clearance of mines from Umm Qasr‟s harbor to support 
allied force movement (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).  The exact system 
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capability and limitations in terms of accuracy, endurance, and speed are unknown for the 




Figure 84. MK 7 
The MK 7 system utilizes dolphins for the detection and locating of bottom mines.  The system is considered easy to 
deploy because it does not require large ships or helicopters (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
e. MK 8 Marine Mammals System (Dolphins) 
The MK 8 MMS seen in Figure 85 is primarily used for the initial landing of forces.  The 
system allows the forces to very quickly recognize and identify areas and channels that are safe 
for the landing of troops and machines (Marine Mammal Program: Fleet Systems, 2011).   
 
Figure 85. MK 8 System 
The MK 8 system is primarily used for MCM operations in the initial landing of amphibious forces.  The quick 
identification of threats is advantageous to allowing the rapid and safe landing of troops/machines (Marine Mammal 
Program: Fleet Systems, 2011). 
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The MK 8 has the advantage that it can be operated with a very low profile (MK 8, US 
Navy).  This is especially advantageous in the area of amphibious operations in the VSW areas, 
where it can be used for a surprise attack more easily.  For the purposes of this report, the exact 
capabilities of the system in terms of accuracy, speed, and endurance were either not found or 
classified.  
f. Marine Mammal Systems Limitations 
MMS limitations are a mixture of ethical issues, endurance limitations, and 
minesweeping speed.  It is hard to imagine a way that endurance and speed can be increased 
aside from better training of the mammals.  However, increased training or sensor suites would 
come at an increased cost for small performance increases that would still be physically limited 
and would still keep the mammal operating in the minefield.   
A. FUTURE SYSTEMS 
4. AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) 
The AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) in Figure 86 consists of semi-
submersible UUV called the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) that tows an advanced 
variable-depth AQS-20A sensor (Fifi, 2007).  Its mission is to survey shallow coastal zones and 
to improve the picture of the current tactical situation with its detection, localization, 
identification and classification capabilities (Fifi, 2007).  This system has 24-hour endurance and 
is capable of over-the-horizon, high-coverage search rates in deep and shallow water with a high 
probability of identifying mines (Lockheed Martin, 2010).  The project offices for the AN/WLD-
1 RMS are PMS 420 and PMS 403. 
 
Figure 86. AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) 
Developed by Lockheed Martin, the AN/WLD-1 is a UUV that utilizes an AQS-20A sensor (Lockheed Martin, 
2010).  It is designed with the capability to carry out detection, localization, identification, and classification in 
shallow waters (Fifi, 2007).   
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In the VSW zone, the AN/WLD-1 RMS system provides identification capability using 
an electro-optic sensor (Carson-Jelley, 2011).  The system has the advantage that it performs 
real-time data synchronization with off-board systems, in addition having data storage 
capabilities (Fifi, 2007).  However, the major disadvantage of the system is its size.  At 23 feet 
and 7 tons (Fifi, 2007), the system is not easily launched or transportable. 
5. AN/ALQ-220 Organic Airborne & Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) 
The AN/ALQ-220 OASIS, depicted in Figure 87, is towed from MH-605 helicopters or 
surface craft to provide organic, high speed magnetic and acoustic minesweeping capability (ITT 
Corporation Electronics Systems, 2008).  OASIS is capable of satisfying the need for a rapid-
coverage mine clearance capability required to sweep influence mines.  The specific 
technologies used on the system are induced cavitations acoustics and programmable depth and 
altitude control that allow the system to operate at controllable depths (Almquist, Status & Issues 
for Assault Breaching System Technologies, 2005).  The project office for the AN-ALQ-220 
OASIS is PMS 495. 
 
Figure 87. OASIS (Organic Airborne & Surface Influence Sweep-AN/ALQ-220) 
OASIS (being towed by a helicopter) has the ability detect, localize, and identify mines in MCM operations (ITT 
Corporation Electronics Systems, 2008).  The system can be used in both day and nighttime operations; however it 
lacks the complete capability to neutralize mines (North Atlantic Council, 2002). 
 
OASIS carries the advantage that it can be used in straits and amphibious objective areas 
where mine hunting is not practical due to ocean bottom mud and high clutter (ITT Corporation 
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Electronics Systems, 2008).  Due to weighing 930 pounds and being around 16-inches in 
diameter, the system is easily transportable and deployable, and recoverable (ITT Corporation 
Electronics Systems, 2008).   
There are several weaknesses associated with the AN/ALQ-220 OASIS.  Being a towed 
system, operations utilizing OASIS are not very covert.  The MH-60 towing of the device would 
most likely give away the location on the beach that an amphibious operation would occur on.  
Secondly, due to the towed nature of the device, the use of the system is limited by the device 
towing the system (MH-60).  In this case, there would most likely be weather and other 
environmental conditions that would limit the usefulness of the OASIS. 
6. Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasure Module (OAMCM) 
The OAMCM is an organic airborne platform that can perform end-to-end MCM 
capability using a helicopter as the Host Platform.  OAMCM is a system-of-systems composed 
of modular components including the Towed Mine-hunting Sonar System (AN/AQS-20), the 
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AN/ASQ-235), the Airborne Laser Mine Detection 
System (ALMDS), the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS),  and the Organic 
Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS)(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
Expeditionary Warfare Divsion (N85) & Mine Warfare Branch, 2012; Naval Mine Warfare, 
2001).  The capabilities of the Towed Mine-hunting Sonar System (AN/AQS-20) and the 
AN/ALQ-220 Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) were described earlier.  
The additional capabilities of the OAMCM SoS are described briefly as follows: 
The ALMDS shown in Figure 88 can detect, localize, and classify drifting and moored 
mines near the sea surface.  ALMDS uses a high-powered blue-green laser technology Streak 
Tube Imaging Laser (STIL) Laser Imaging Detecting and Ranging (LIDAR), state of the art 
complementary metal oxide semiconductor cameras, and image processing to fill the gap of the 
AN/AQS-20 by being able to hunt mines into the VSW zone.  However, the ALMDS and 
RAMICS cannot hunt bottom mines, and the RAMICS program was cancelled in 2011; limiting 
the applicability to this report. 
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Figure 88. ALMDS On Helicopter 
ALMDS in use on a helicopter platform (Northrop Grumman, 2006).  The system can detect, localize, and classify 
drifting and moored mines near the sea surface.  The system takes advantage of high powered laser technology to 
complete this sequence (Naval Mine Warfare, 2001). 
 
The AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) shown in Figure 89 is 
designed to reacquire and neutralize (with a shaped charge warhead placed very near a 
previously identified mine to cause high-order detonation) both unburied bottom and moored 
mines in shallow and deep water.  It consists of a control console and a launching mechanism for 
four Archerfish unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are lowered from the helicopter.  
These UUVs are tethered with a fiber-optic cable and equipped with video and sonar sensors to 
detect and find anti-shipping mines.  AN/ASQ-235's UUVs also carry an explosive charge to 
allow the operator in the helicopter to remotely dispose the anti-shipping mine (Naval Mine 
Warfare, 2001; BAE Systems, 2010; Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, 2008).  The 
AN/ASQ-235 has not yet been demonstrated for its capability to neutralize bottom mines in 






Figure 89. AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) 
The AN/ASQ-235 AMNS consists of a control console and launching mechanism (Raytheon Integrated Defense 
Systems, 2008).  The system‟s overall design allows it to reacquire and neutralize bottom and moored mines (Naval 
Mine Warfare, 2001). 
 
The combination of these components gives the OAMCM the capability to detect, 
localize, and identify drifting, moored, and bottom mines during day and night operations.  The 
system however lacks the capability to neutralize bottom mines in the VSW zone.  Even if the 
technology maturity can provide these modules their performance as desired, the OAMCM has 
significant vulnerabilities to attack in operations supporting amphibious landings due to its 
airborne operation.  Additionally, its towing system has to be constrained to a fixed altitude that 
makes the helicopter vulnerable to surface-to-air weapons.  Another discrepancy of this system is 
that its current technology is not designed to deal with modern types of influence mines that can 
detect sweeping signatures (North Atlantic Council, 2002). 
7. Joint Assault Breacher System (JABS) 
The Assault Breacher Systems (ABS) are naval mine neutralization systems and normally 
utilize explosive munitions as a means for mine countermeasures.  Historically, explosive 
munitions have been used to excavate mine fields, destroy and damage, or deactivate mines 
either on land or underwater.  Recently, with the advance in technology, a precision guided bomb 
can be used to dispense thousands of small neutralizers (darts) that can clear a mine field or clear 
lanes through which the landing forces can move safely and rapidly.  The systems that utilize this 
method are referred to as Countermine Systems (CMS).  The advantages of these methods are 
that their mine neutralization operations are faster than those of other MCM methods; they 
require less prior preparation for the littoral zones, and are not limited to the types of mines and 
the mine field environments.  
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One of the disadvantages of ABS is it requires proofing afterwards to eliminate 
remaining mines unaffected by the operation (Maropoti, James A. Col USMC (Ret), 2011).  The 
other disadvantage is the ABS depends on other systems for mine detection and localization.  
The final performance of the ABS will depend on the effectiveness of sub-component 
technologies.  These sub-component technologies have yet to reach maturity and may not 
perform as well as desired.  Furthermore, the ABS does not address modern types of mines that 
have improved insensitivity to sympathetic detonation (North Atlantic Council, 2002).  
One system that has already been demonstrated is the Joint Assault Breaching System 
(JABS).  Other similar ABS systems to be developed are the HYDRA-7, Mine Obstacle Defeat 
System (MODS), and the Naval Gun Fired System (NGFS). 
The Joint Assault Breaching System (JABS) utilizes existing Navy and Air Force 
Systems for the deployment and employment of a dispense mechanism to deliver Countermine 
Counter-Obstacle (CMCO) warheads.  The JABS can adapt the Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM) guidance kit to convert existing warheads (MK-83/BLU-110, MK-84, BLU-109 and 
MK-82) to accurate guided “smart” bombs.  These bombs can be delivered by strategic bombers 
B-52, B-2 or supersonic planes such as the F/A-18 or B-1B.  The JABS has been demonstrated in 
neutralizing mines in Beach Zone (BZ) and Shallow Zone (SZ) zones.  Further tests have been 
done to demonstrate its capability against bottom mines and obstacles in the VSW zone. The 
Navy is considering a plan to deliver an expanded capability for neutralization in the VSW by 
FY 13 (Cobham Life Support, 2009). The Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis 
(COBRA) with Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) can be used in 
conjunction with the JABS to detect the existence of mines in these zones (Almquist, Standoff 
Systems & Technologies for Near Shore Mine Countermeasures (MC), 2002). JABS is depicted 
in Figure 90. 
 
Figure 90. JDAM Assault Breaching System (JABS) 
The JDAM assault breaching system is a precision guided neutralization system in MCM operations (Almquist, 
Status & Issues for Assault Breaching System Technologies, 2007).  These munitions can be delivered by strategic 
bombers (B-52, or B-2) or supersonic planes (F/A-18 or B-1B) (Almquist, Standoff Systems & Technologies for 
Near Shore Mine Countermeasures (MC), 2002). 
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Similar to the JABS, the MODS (Figure 91) utilizes the JDAM guidance kit to deliver 
warheads equipped with either chemical darts for mine clearance or continuous rod warhead to 
obstacle clearance.  The JDAM kit also provides Global Positioning System and Inertial 
Navigation System capabilities for accurate guidance.  The MODS can be launched from F/A-18 
aircraft and guided to the target area where it performs a terminal maneuver that results in it 
being oriented in a vertical position.  The chemical darts or the continuous rod warheads are then 
dispensed from the MODS (Almquist, Standoff Systems & Technologies for Near Shore Mine 
Countermeasures (MC), 2002). 
 
 
Figure 91. Mine Obstacle Defeat System (MODS) 
The Mine Obstacle Defeat System (MODS) is used in mine neutralization operations (Almquist, Status & Issues for 
Assault Breaching System Technologies, 2007).  The system uses global positioning systems for accurate guidance 
to possible threats (Almquist, Standoff Systems & Technologies for Near Shore Mine Countermeasures (MC), 
2002). 
 
The HYDRA-7 (Figure 92) is an advanced mine-counter warhead that utilizes a Tactical 
Munition Dispenser (TMD) to deliver thousands of sub-munitions.  These sub-munitions are 
reactive material filled darts that can cause the high explosive within the mines to burn or 
detonate.  Each of the sub-munitions has a guidance system and propulsion system to accurately 
guide it to the targeted area.  The reactive material generates intense heat and pressure when 
subjected to a mechanical or thermal stimulus.  The sub-munitions initiate a terminal maneuver 
upon reaching the targeted area that result in each being oriented nearly vertical with respect to 
the ground target.  The propulsion system then increases the velocity and the darts are dispensed 
from the sub-munitions.  The increase in velocity is required in order for the darts to be 
dispensed with sufficient kinetic energy to destroy the mines.  The HYDRA-7 is currently 
deployed on an F/A-18 aircraft (Almquist, Standoff Systems & Technologies for Near Shore 




Figure 92. HYDRA-7 Darts 
The HYDRA-7 dart works by employing a Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD) to distribute sub-munitions darts 
that cause a threat to detonate or burn (Almquist, Status & Issues for Assault Breaching System Technologies, 
2007). 
 
The Naval Gun Fire System (NGFS) system utilizes the same warheads as the MODS; 
however the warhead can be delivered from a precision guided 155-mm naval artillery shell.  
The shell is a scalable version of the Best Buy Projectile used for Advanced Gun System (AGS).  
When the projectile approaches the targeted area, it performs a terminal maneuver that gives the 
projectile a vertical orientation.  At this point the payload is dispensed from the projectile 
(Almquist, Standoff Systems & Technologies for Near Shore Mine Countermeasures (MC), 
2002). 
8. MK 18 Mod 2 
The MK 18 Mod 2 Kingfish, seen in Figure 93, is a program that has been initiated as an 
upgrade to the MK 18 Mod 1 UUV.  The primary platform is a modified REMUS- 600 that is 
intended to enable larger ACR for detection of moored and bottom mines at the reduced risk to 
the operators and MMS.  Initial testing has shown that improved sensor capabilities for 
conducting MCM low visibility searches in high clutter and high burial conditions within the 
VSW zone.  The MK 18 Mod 2 has a depth rating of 600m and current testing has proven 
endurance greater than 20 hours at normal operating speeds.  The MK 18 Mod 2 is considered a 
light-weight system and is approximately 600lbs.  Due to the size comparison to the MK 18 Mod 
1, the Mod 2 cannot be lifted by operators.  Initial concepts for the system deployment include 




Figure 93. MK 18 Mod 2 System 
MK 18 Mod 2 System being deployed from small craft in a littoral region (Simmons, 2011). 
 
B. NATO SYSTEMS 
1. MUSCLE AUV 
NATO AUVs aim to take advantage of the safety factor involved with these systems.  
The NATO system Muscle is one such of these systems.  The system carries the capability to 
effectively hunt and classify mines by taking advantage of Synthetic Aperture Sonar, (SAS), 
(NURC 2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010).  This new technology is a method of 
compiling data from multiple sonar pings and processing the data into an actual image (NURC 
2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010).  The technology has been under development 
since 1996, and is now considered a mature technology.  The advantage of this system is that it 
allows for larger areas of sea bottom to be scanned in a faster and more effective manner than 
current methods (NURC 2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010). 
 
The MUSCLE AUV (proven through a set of sea trials) has shown the capability to hunt 
mines, with high accuracy and speed compared to previous systems, in the challenging 
conditions experienced in very shallow waters containing sands, ocean bottom clutter, and rocky 
bottoms (NURC 2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010). 
The MUSCLE system comes with several advantages in the VSW zone against bottom 
and buried mines.  Its aptitude for performance in ground clutter and rocky bottoms allow the 
unit to be able to look for and discriminate bottom mines.  The system‟s use of Synthetic 
Aperture Sonar (SAS) allows it to better recognize bottom and buried mines than previously 
fielded systems.  Due to the system being somewhat autonomous, it can be used somewhat 
covertly.  
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There are, however, a few disadvantages associated with the MUSCLE system.  As can 
be seen in Figure 94, the system must be launched by a ship and crane/lever system.  This can be 
a limiting factor with the system, as a crew and ship would most likely lead to a large logistical 
and support footprint involved with the system. 
 
 
Figure 94. HUGIN (Top) & Muscle (Bottom) 
The HUGIN and MUSCLE AUVs are NATO systems that can be used to provide high-resolution, high-speed 
mapping and imaging of the sea bed (Hagen, 2010).  Although quite large, the system can be effective against 
bottom and buried mines in MCM operations (NURC 2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010). 
2. HUGIN AUV 
The HUGIN is another NATO AUV system that offers a suite of underwater remote 
sensing capabilities.  The system operates without cables, tethers, or wires (HUGIN AUV, 2011).  
The HUGIN offers the capability of high-resolution, high-speed seabed mapping, imaging, 
ocean-bottom searches, monitoring, and undersea inspections (HUGIN AUV, 2011).  These 
abilities are currently being applied in the area of sea mine countermeasures.  The HUGIN 
systems are self-handling.  This offers the capability to allow the systems to navigate, and steer 
themselves to achieve mission objectives independent of constant human interaction (HUGIN 
AUV, 2011).  Due to the HUGIN‟s capability to operate without cables and tethers, the system 
has the advantage in that it can be operated covertly.  This lends to the ability to use the system 
on a landing area in VSW without the enemy knowing.  The systems high speed/resolution 
mapping of the sea bed has the ability to be very advantageous against bottom and buried mines.  
As in the case of the MUSCLE, the HUGIN, also pictured in Figure 94, is quite large as 
well, and must be launched using a ship (NURC 2009 Research Technology Highlights, 2010).  
This could potentially hinder the ability to launch and transport the system to areas where an 
amphibious assault may be planned. 
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IX. APPENDIX B: STAKEHOLDER LIST AND INTERVIEWS 
 
Table 36 lists the questions that were developed from the initial stakeholder research and stakeholder input as a result of the 
Threat and Capabilities analyses.  Stakeholder questions were directed at the relevant stakeholder as indicated in the table along with 
the resultant response.  A non-response by a stakeholder is shown in the table by a question being directed to a stakeholder and no 
response indicated in the response column for that stakeholder. 
 
Table 36. Stakeholder Questions and Responses 
Table captures the question and answers session conducted with each of the major stakeholders.  Information provided was used in the threat and current 
capabilities analyses and influenced the direction for the Capstone project. 
 
 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
1 Is there a system out right now that can 
detect and clear a path in a minefield that 






Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011 "No, there is not a complete solution to 
remove the man from the minefield.  Neutralization is still not 
automated and missions still require support divers to be close to 
the mine field.  The only technology that maybe close to 
answering this would be JABS.   
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011 No not 
right now.  MMS are the primary means of MCM operations.  The 
MMS have allowed the DIVER to stay out of the water, but the 
man must stay close to the minefield to support the mammal.  
MMS are really great at low false positives.  There is not a 
technology out there that can compare to MMS accuracy of low 
false positives.  
MMS also are great at buried mines (technology is only scratching 
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 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
the surface), and detection in a cluttered environment.  In 
comparison of MMS and UUVs in flat sandy bottom 
environments, UUV performance is approaching comparable 
levels to MMS.   
MMS also have an advantage over UUV‟s in that has a shorter 
DTE time.  Dolphins can detect and mark or detect, mark and 
neutralize in one pass.  (Mission dependent)   
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug The underwater 
systems that exist today and in future development only eliminate 
the man to a point.  They are still required to be within a certain 
distance from the minefield to retrieve the UUV.  The current 
MK18 Mod1/2 is limited also by endurance.  OTH launch and 
recovery platforms are also in very preliminary stages.  There is 
also no “one” system that can complete a full DTE sequence.  
Right now the MK18 Mod1/2 complete SCM-IR (search, classify, 
map, identify, reacquire) and there is limited development for the 
neutralization phase.  There is only one neutralization notional 
concept of SCM-IR at this point and the mission includes using 3 
different vehicles, one to do SCM and another to do IR.  A third 
neutralizer vehicle would come in to do the last step.  The only 
neutralization UUVs that is being worked on now for PMS 408 is 
the EUNS (Extended Underwater Neutralization system) and is in 
the primary development stage, not very mature. 
LCDR John Schiller, EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-2011- No, 
this capability is still not proven and not with current technology.  
There is hope with future concepts that we can meet removing the 
man/mammal from the minefield.  UUVs are great at locating 
objects but produce too many false positives.  MMS are great for 
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 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
detecting buried objects and nothing on the technology side has 
been able to reproduce their capability.  Also, significant work 
needs to be done in technology with neutralization. 





Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
interview 8-29-2011 “There are many factors that are involved in 
how long a DTE should take.  It really depends on several factors: 
 ACR-(Area coverage rate) 
 Size of the area 
 The need to be clandestine or not 
 Is the environment permissive or not 
 Water depth 
 Salinity 
 Environment (temp, currents, water clarity) 
 Percent clearance required 
 
The search should consist of 3 phases with UUVs: Intelligence 
Preparation of the Operational Environment  (IPOE), Refined 
search and IR and then neutralization if time permits/mission 
allows” 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011 - With 
MMS, it depends.  MMS cannot cover such large areas as UUVs.  
The dolphins will be worn out if required to cover large areas.  
MMS will still take almost 3 days or more and unlike UUVs, 
dolphins cannot do search area patterns.  The MMS swim in 
sections called “swim lanes”.  Dolphins take markers to the 
detected target and mark it with either location markers (MK8) or 
marker/neutralization (MK7) components (mission dependent).  
MMS cannot do mosaicing like UUVs (combine strips of sonar 
 a. How long does it take to complete an 
MCM mission? 
 b. How does that match up to current 
mission requirements? 
 c. Will future requirements change in 
the DTE process change the 
CONOPS to match system capability 
or invest in SE type processes to help 
get closer to solve the problem? 
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 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
images to make a map of the area), but mine feedback is closer to 
“real time” since MMS systems do not have any time consuming 
data download requirements.   
If MMS were used in combination with UUVs, there is a potential 
to reduce the DTE to 2 days.  UUVs could potentially run the 
SCM mission and dolphins can run the second pass and 
neutralization phase. 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - With current 
systems, it would take a minimum of 3 days with personnel 
working 24hrs a day.  This would also involve using all the 
human/technology assets employed and with no equipment 
failures. 
To get the technology to match the CONOPs, a notional mission 
execution may be like this: 
Day 1/Phase one: IPOE-Intelligence Preparation of the 
Operational Environment. 
Day 2/Phase two: SCM mission 
Day 3/Phase three: IR and neutralize if possible 
 
In regards to giving an answer to “2c.”; Mr. Qaiyumi thought that 
in the future that both the CONOPS and the SE process would 
need to change.  He expressed that at this present time there is a 
gap between the maturity of the technology and the expectations 
of meeting the requirements of the CONOPS. 
3 What is the requirement for amount of time 
it should take to clear a path in a minefield 






USMC Capt Peter Moon -29 Aug E-Mail “Clearance objective 
for MCM operation is 48 hours from the start of overt operations.  
72 is the threshold."  Overt operations can be characterized as 
anything that tips our hand permitting the enemy to reinforce and 
counterattack.  Amphibious landings are dangerous enough 
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 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
without completely giving away the very valuable element of 
surprise.  This is clarified as in a letter from CG MCCDC 
(Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command) to CNO in 1999." 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: MCM 
missions with MMS are not always executed as practiced in 
training.  In training MMS execute the full DTE sequence for the 
entire area.  MMS mission execution in practice:  Dolphins will 
swim 8 lanes in an area where a projected amphibious landing area 
is expected and complete detection.  Out of the 8 lanes, 4 lanes 
with the least amount of targets are cleared with mines being 
neutralized. 
LCDR John Schiller EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-2011- 
Although the USMC may quote 48hrs threshold and 72hrs 
objective as a requirement for MCM to conduct clearance 
operations, our capability is not there yet.  It‟s very dependent on 
size of the area, environmental, and bottom type.  Also consider 
the effort in preparation for an area search.  There are logistical 
support considerations for early set up, identifying a ship of 
opportunity and time for MMS to get adjusted to the area. 
4 In some our reading, it has indicated that 
MCM systems require post mission analysis 
(PMA) of the data that is collected to locate 
and classify mine like objects (SEA Cohort 
14, 2008). 
NSWC-Panama 
City,  NMAWC, 
PMS-495, PMS-
408, PMS 420 
Bob Stitt. ITT Techrep MMS Trainer/EODMU1, Mod 
1NSWC-PCD: MMS doesn‟t need PMA. 
a. Is there system or systems that don‟t 
require (PMA) in order to locate and 
classify mine like objects? 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:”MMS does not require PMA, to a point.  
They still have to search and mark positions and be verified by 
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b. If not, what is the minimum desired 
time to conduct PMA? 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:” It should be a 1:1 ratio or mission run time 
compared to analysis time.  1 hour of UUV search time to 1 hour 
of a human looking at the data (or less).”  
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD (Less than a 1:1 ratio).  The 
community has a desire to stay at this rate or lower.  From a 
technology development standpoint, it is recommended that PMA 
uses automated ways to interpret and assist the analysis process to 
recognize targets in sonar data.  There is, however, an issue with 
this because technology like this is still being developed and PMA 
operators do  not yet trust Auto Detection enough to really trust 
and rely on it.   
c. What is the maximum desired time 
to conduct PMA? 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011: ” No greater than 1:1”   
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD (WLD-1 – 1:3 ratio - Human 
Related problem -- Keeping this as a problem) 
 
d. Where and who will conduct the 
PMA?  Will it be done on one ship 
or all ships containing organic MCM 
systems required to perform the 
PMA? 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011: “PMA is conducted after the initial 
IPOE/SCM mission and it is currently not in real time.  PMA is 
mostly done at shore sites due to MK18 Mod2 are not approved 
for shipboard use or a fielded item.  MK18 mod1 is also limited 
due to its limited use in the field.”  
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD “There is no Answer to this yet.  
There are several problems related with getting UUVs on 
Amphibious platforms.  Mainly due to the big problem for fire 
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 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
suppression system with the MK18 Mod2‟s large - Lithium 
Battery.  The MK18 Mod2 also weighs 600lb.  Although the 
footprint is not officially defined, it is estimated to be fairly large. 
“ 
LCDR John Schiller EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-2011- PMA 
at this point is a real concern.  PMA performance is more a matter 
of training the operator and the performance of the operator to find 
targets.  I have no doubt the system will find and see the target, but 
will the operator? 
e. How is the data transmitted to ship 
responsible to perform a PMA? 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Currently, the EOD team launches 
UUV and retrieves it to down load the data.  The data is 
transferred over to the PMA operators.  The desire for future 
capability is to have Wi-Fi radio communications and upgraded 
acoustic communications to download data in real-time.   
f. Is there a desired way the data 
should be transmitted to the ship? 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011: ”Overall concerns with PMA: it takes a lot 
of training to prepare someone to assess sonar data.  Due to high 
turnover rates, it‟s difficult to keep trained personnel in the unit.  
There is not a “UUV rating” or NEC.  Analysis of the data is done 
by humans staring at sonar images on computer screens.  Humans 
get easily fatigued and could miss targets or miss classify.  The 
more search data collected, the longer a human has to stare at the 
screen. 
The more complex the ocean bottom is (cluttered), the more time 
it will take the human to go through the data.  Implementation of 
Auto Target Recognition (ATR) would help the human sort 
through all the data, but it needs to be mature technology.  We 
have to trust that it is working and are able to rely on it.  It needs 
to be accurate and reduce false alarm targets and false positives.” 
5 What is the endurance required for MCM  Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
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1. Threshold ()? 
2. Objective ()? 
Interview 8-29-2011: See current MK 18 Mod1/2  which state 
(Mod1 Threshold 9 hours at 4 KTs – Mod 2 is 20 hours) 
(Simmons 2011) 
6 From our reading the AN/WLD-1 has been 
deployed on USS Bainbridge and will be 
deployed on LCS(SEA Cohort 14, 2008): 
1. What is the maximum time allowed 
to deploy an AUV from a ship? 
2. What is the maximum time allowed 
to recover an AUV from a ship? 
 
 Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
 
7 Is the Navy planning to develop a MCM 
AUV that can be deployed from a 




 Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
8 Doctrine says that MCM operation will 
emphasizes the clearance of mines in the 
transport area, fire support area, and sea 
approaches to the landing beaches(JP 3-02, 
2009): 
1. Is the priority for clearance given in 
this statement? (In other words will 
the transport area need to be cleared 
first before the approaches or will 
this be done simultaneously?) 
2. If they are done in sequence; how 
much time is given to clear the 
control ship station, approach lane, 
AAV launch area, and boat lane?  
PMS-340 
NMAWC 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:”UUVs have been used for amphibious 
landings in the past, but in reality amphibious landings are not 
widely practiced today as often as they should be.  Some 
operations in the past using UUVs with NSCT-1 (old name for 
EODMU-1): Port UMM QASR, 1
st
 gulf war.  Although in training 
we always go through a full DTE, in practice it is not done that 
way.  We plan for what is necessary and leave secondary issues 
for later if we can get to them.” 
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Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011: Bottom/buried mines are the biggest threat 
right now.  We need to keep and maintain low visibility.  Efforts 
need to keep making progress for getting people out of the field 
and make our technology robust to handle a multi-threat 
environment” 
 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: Buried 
mines, and complex area searches:  MMS are the best detection 
asset for this currently. 
LCDR John Schiller EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-11- Mine 
warfare targets in VSW are small contact mines, large magnetic 
signature, influence mines.  The mine threats are changing to 
plastic and composite type materials.  These materials are 
developed so that sea growth is encouraged to grow on the target, 
making it harder to detect.  
10 Where do you consider the biggest 
capability gap to exist right now? 
ALL Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:” –Needing to have a human post process 
the data causes errors, false positives, and extended length of 
processing.  There is a great need for Automatic Target 
Recognition (ATR) capability.  It needs to progress faster.  -
Communication.  Communication meaning there is a lack or real 
time capability.  The UUVs are sent out on a 4-5 (or more) hour 
mission and must be collected by support boats, driven back to 
shore to download data.  Data down load is variable, but as 
discussed above, it can take 1 hour or more to review 1hr of sonar 
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Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: 
Technology is not advancing fast enough.  Technology needs to 
continue to work on reducing false positives to the performance of 
MMS. 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - A big gap 
right now is the capability in identification.  There is a big 
perception gap of trusting the sensor‟s ability.  There is no silver 
bullet system in MCM, no one system can perform in every 
environment (temp, depth, current).  Current and future 
development of Auto Target Recognition (ATR- autonomy 
behavior) will be a great thing if operators/users trust in the 
performance of the technology.  ID is something that in the MCM 
world has be primarily “visual” detection/identification of the 
threat.  Transition is not 100% for trusting ATR. 
LCDR John Schiller EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-11- Sensor 
maturity.  The UUV platform is stable, but the sensor payloads are 
not. 
11 What is the footprint requirements for 
MCM mission module equipment aboard 
ship (i.e. How much room do you have on 
the platform to support the MCM 




Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead - I do not have 
that info at my fingertips, but I do know it is significantly smaller 
than the HM DET footprint 
12 Current Doctrine states that logistical 
support for an Airborne Mine Counter 
Measures (AMCM) deployment requires a 





Saroch, George B CIV PEO LCS, PMS 420 E-Mail to Paul 
Welsh 8-22-2011: Just so you know, MCM-1 and MH-53E do 
little to no VSW work.  That work is primarily accomplished by 
the EODMU units with mammals/divers deployed from Combat 
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occupies 7000 square feet.  Additionally it 
requires berthing and messing for 450 
personnel (Marine Corps System Command 
Infantry Weapon Systems, 2011; MCWP3-
13, 2011; MCWP3-13, 2005).  Additionally 
the Navy got rid of its only MCM command 
ship, the USS Inchon.  The Navy plans to 
start retiring MCM ships in 2008 with the 
mission being taken over by the LCS in 
2017(Munoz, 2011).  If the Navy is no 
longer is going to deploy Mine type ships; 
further equipment and men must be 
deployed on other amphibious ships or 
LCS.  The LCS will have only 35 additional 
berthing accommodations (O'Rourke, 
2011).  This means to deploy 450 AMCM 
personal to support an Amphibious 
Operation; the operation will require 13 
LCS to perform the AMCM mission alone.  




Raiding Craft that are embarked from Amphibious ships.  There is 
plan to incorporate VSW capability in the out years from the LCS 
primarily from VTUAV with COBRA/ALMDS and neutralization 
utilizing JABS. 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - Even if LCS 
takes a modular approach, it still limits the operational capability 
of the LCS platform.  They would have to pull into ports to 
exchange the load out package, possibly exchange personnel.  It‟s 
a huge logistics nightmare.  One possibility would be to have 
UUV systems deployable OTH and controlled by shore based 
operators (like how AUVs are controlled from the US – like a 
video game!).  The LCS would only have to carry the vehicle.  No 
extra manning, limited training on launch and recovery. 
a. Does this mean AMCM operations 
may not be part of an Amphibious 
Operation – or is the contingent 
significantly reduced? 
Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead - The contingent 
aboard LCS is significantly reduced.  
b. If the number personal supporting 
MCM operation must be reduced – 
what is max number of personal that 
will be allowed to support any or all 
of the MCM operations? 
Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead - The LCS 
aviation DET will consist of approximately 23 people. 
c. With the current plans for future 
MCM assets what is the maximum 
Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
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number personal being planned to 
operate and maintain those systems? 
d. Will this make size constraints on 
the packing and manning of the 
MCM assets? 
Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead - Yes, LCS size 
being the driver. 
e. Is there size constraint requirements 
being place on future MCM assets? 
Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead -  Same as d 
13 Is a destruction method approach versus a 
removal from area approach preferred? 
NMAWC 
PMS-340 
Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
14 In the MCM DTE process, what phase is 
most critical?  Is there a phase in your 
opinion that lacks current 
progress/research? 
ALL Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:”Ensuring success of clearance of the mine 
field is critical.  This starts at the planning level.  An unknown 
area really makes a difference, especially when programming the 
UUV.  It has to know specific details in order to do its mission.  In 
the short term its identification and classification: ATR should 
help improve this.  In the long term its real-time capability and 
getting improvements to neutralization” 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: Detection 
and neutralization.   Lacking technology that is comparable to 
false positive capability of MMS (classify phase) 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - Detection is 
the most critical.  You need the system to detect stuff to be able to 
have the operators look at the sonar images.  The MCM 
community lacks a system that is adaptable to all environments. 
 
15 In today's MCM, what types of constraints 
exist that make the task of DTE difficult? 
NMAWC 
PMS-340 
Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:” (a.) –Environmental, (b.) -some 
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technology constraints (systems not robust enough), (c.) -UAVs 
are so advanced in comparison to UUVs.  The concept is the same, 
but the communication underwater and dealing with the 
environment makes the problem so much harder, (d) -current UUV 
neutralization techniques are not complete or mature yet.  Because 
of doctrine requiring visual confirmation and that technology is 
not trusted or mature enough to provide a solution; it makes the 
task very difficult”. 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011:  MMS 
have such a large footprint.  They take up a whole well deck on an 
amphibious ship. 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - Doctrine for 
identification phase.  Current doctrine requires a visual (camera or 
video) to identify the mine type.  Sonar images can practically be 
as clear as a picture, but cannot be used to ID.  If sonar images 
were allowed to be used in ID, it would change a lot of things.  
Scientists are also causing slow progress in the ID phase.  Most of 
them are concerned with detecting images, not necessarily 
classifying them.  Scientists should be working in all the DTE 
phases.  Environments also cause a constraint, current, salinity, 
temperature, turbidity.  Within each program office of 
development systems, there is lack of consistency with 
human/system interfaces.  (PMS 408 uses COIN to MEDAL, 
NMAWC is taking an EPMA approach and these systems don‟t 
talk to each other and can‟t share information.) 
Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead –Yes, the 
environment impacts performance. 
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16 What is the most likely operational 
environment we will encounter?  (i.e. what 
are the temperature, sea state, pressure, 
salinity, currents, etc?) 
 
ALL From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.1 UUV shall be 
capable of being transported, deployed/launched, operated, and 
recovered in sea states (SS) up to SS 3.  SS shall be measured at 
the 40-foot curve.  SS 3 is defined as wind velocity of 11-16 knots 
(KTs) with small waves 0.5m to 1.25m high, becoming longer; 
numerous whitecaps.(PMS 408, 2007) 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 8.2.1 The UUV 









 C).  Operational Water temperature is 
defined as the water temperature while the UUV and the auxiliary 
equipment intended for use in/underwater are deployed for the 
UUVs required endurance. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 8.2.2 The UUV 
System shall be capable of operating in air temperature (protected 








 C).  
Operational Air Temperature is defined as the air temperature 
while the UUV system is deployed during the 4-hour search-
classify-map portion of the mission. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 8.3 The UUV 
System shall be operable after encountering thermal shock 

















 C) (in-water). 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.2.1 The UUV 
shall be able to operate (i.e., transit and maneuver, not search-
classify-map) at water depths of up to 300 FSW. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.2.2 The UUV 
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shall be able to operate (i.e., transit and maneuver, not search-
classify-map) at the surface of the water. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.3 The UUV 
System shall be able to operate in a current less than or equal to 2 
KTs flowing in any direction. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.4 The UUV and 
all other components intended for in-water operations shall be able 
to operate in water having a salinity level of 0 to 45 ppt. 
From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.5 The UUV 
shall have the capability to operate to the specifications of this 
document in turbidity conditions of up to and including 66 mg/l (~ 
8 nephlometric turbidity units (NTU)) of suspended particulate 
matter as measured by a formazin calibrated optical backscatter 
meter. 
17 Amphibious Operations using AAVs can be 
conducted in sea states 1 through 4.  
However, it is not recommended to be 
conducted in Sea state 4 and above 
(MCWP3-13, 2005). 
What sea-state should a MCM system 
operate (Threshold & Objective) in the 
VSW? 
 From Performance Specification: Paragraph 7.1 UUV shall be 
capable of being transported, deployed/launched, operated, and 
recovered in sea states up to SS 3.  SS shall be measured at the 40-
foot curve.  SS 3 is defined as wind velocity of 11-16 knots (KTs) 
with small waves 0.5m to 1.25m high, becoming longer; numerous 
whitecaps.(PMS 408, 2007) 
 
18 What new technologies or 
techniques appear to be promising in 
reduction of the DTE sequence in the 10-40 
foot depth range and why? 
ALL Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:”Unmanned Cooperative Cueing and 
Intervention (UC2I: ONR project – Over-the Horizon project), 
Wi-Fi and autonomous launch and recovery platforms.” 
 258 
 Question Directed at What 
Stakeholders 
Answer 
Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011:  MK 18 
Mod 2 is showing promise for large area searches.  It is showing 
that sensor integration is versatile; attempting to ensure it is open 
architecture.  Mod 2 has greater duration than Mod 1.  The key to 
success will be to ensure that the UUVs can reduce their false 
positive contacts to be equal or lower than the MMS. 
Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - Data fusion 
technology; if there are multiple capabilities available out there, 
focus should be made towards combining capabilities for 
enhanced performance.  Limited attempts have been made to 
combine Forward Looking Sonar/Down Looking Sonar 
(FLS/DLS) with side scan sonar.  Magnetic sensors should also be 
considered to be combined (help with buried mines). 
19 Are there any environmental impacts 
concerns which need to be considered when 
developing a MCM system? 
ALL Aamir Qaiyumi NSWC-PCD Interview 19 Aug - High temp 
(heat concerns) Low frequency emissions are hurting marine life. 
20 What are the required MTBF for a MCM 
system (Threshold & Objective)? 
ALL Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
21 Is there any other similar effort trying to 




Admiral Williams (NPS) PMS-420 group is researching the 
ability to use JABS in the VSW region. 
22 In conducting MCM operation for an 
Amphibious Landing which would be 
considered more important speed or 
covertness?  
1. If covertness is more important than 
speed; is it right to assume this 
mission will not be performed with 




USMC Capt Peter Moon -29 Aug E-Mail:"Amphibious landings 
are dangerous enough without completely giving away the very 
valuable element of surprise.  (This is verified as in a letter from 
CG MCCDC to CNO in 1999.) 
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not be performed using an MH-60S) 
2. If speed is more important, then are 
mammals or submarine launch UAV 
considered for use in performing 
MCM operations? 
23 In performing Amphibious Breach of 
Coastal Defense; what type of mine clearing 
operation is typically planned for: Mine 





Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011:  In 
training, the full DTE is exercised (mine-hunting). 
24 According to Joint Publication 3-02, we 
understand that there are five phases to 
conducting an amphibious operation which 
are “Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, 
Movement, and Action” It is understood 
that MCM operation would commence with 
the planning operation. 
1. However, at what phase would 
MCM Pre-assault operations start? 
(Embarkation, Rehearsal, Rehearsal, 
Movement?) 
2. How much time would be typically 
allotted the MCM advance force to 
perform their mission? 
PMS-340 
NMAWC 
Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
25 In an Amphibious Operation a Boat Lane 
is described as having a length of 2000 to 




Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead – “The current 
AMNS design would need to be modified to clear mines in the 10 
to 40 ft VSW region.” 
a. In a typical Amphibious Operation  USMC Capt Peter Moon -29 Aug E-Mail:"12 lanes for 2 MEB 
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involving 1 battalion; typically how 
many Boat Lanes will be planned? 
sized element." 
b. Currently: how long does it take 
MCM operations to clear one boat 
lane? 
 USMC Capt Peter Moon -29 Aug E-Mail “Clearance objective 
for MCM operation is 48 hours from the start of overt operations 
with 72 hours being the threshold." 
c. Currently what types of assists are 
used to conduct MCM to clear a boat 
lane? 
 
 Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
d. Typically how much of the boat lane 
is considered in the VSW region? 
 Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
26 In performing an Amphibious Operation 
that requires the penetration of a hostile 
environment that has anti-landing defense; 
will the priority of MCM be to: 
1. Detect, Mark, and Avoid Mines? 
2. Detect, Classify, Mark and Avoid 
Mines? 







Matt Clements – (ITT Technical Representative EODMU1) 
Interview 8-29-2011:”In real exercises #1 is the practiced answer.  
In training, we exercise 2 and 3, mission dependent” 
27 How is a cleared lane marked for an 
amphibious force?  Is there a preferred 
method to marking a lane that is cleared? 
 
 
 Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
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28 If the requirement is to perform 
Neutralization of Mines; at what time 
should the mines be neutralized? (It is 
assumed that to neutralize a mine it must be 
blown in place.) 
1. Before Amphibious force crosses 
LD? If so – how much time before? 
2. After 1st wave crosses the LD to 
secure surprise? 
3. After all waves have reached the 
beach but support ships have not 




Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: In 
practice, neutralization is not always done.  Marking and 
avoidance is preferred.  Neutralization is only done if necessary 
and if available. 
29 In some of our reading, we have come 
across an AUV having chemical 
neutralization capability that provides a 
non-explosive neutralization ability (SEA 
Cohort 14, 2008).  This would seem to 
promote an ability to covertly neutralize 
mines allowing the amphibious force 
intentions to go undetected.   
1. Has there been some success in 
developing any of these systems? 
2. Is there a desire by the US Navy to 
have this ability? 
3. Are there limitations with this kind 
of a system? 
 
 
 Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead - ALMDS sweep 
cannot be done covertly. 
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30 In NAVSEA 2009 to 2013 Strategic 
Business Plan, it shows the number ship 
types classified as Mine going from 14 in 
the year FY-08 to Zero in FY-20(NAVSEA 
Strategic Business Plan, 2009). 
1. If this is this is still the current plan? 
2. If this is still the current plan, what 
type of ships will be required to 
carry the MCM assets? In other 
words, is it envisioned the mission 
will be taken over by another ship or 
aircraft? 
3. What C4I requirements are placed 
on the MCM assets to facilitate the 







LCDR John Schiller EODMU1 XO Interview 9-2-2011- The 
LCS is still a good concept.  Although the MCM mission module 
is still not defined, there are a lot of unknowns out there that still 
are being worked out.  Mission modules need to be reliable and 
capable of handling multiple threats.  UMCM capability has been 
proven successful compared to some SMCM platforms. 
31 Current Doctrine sites several limitations 
with deploy deploying Marine Mammal 
Systems (MMS) such as storage, 
transportation, water contamination 
(MCWP3-13, 2005).  Would a MMS be 
used for an Amphibious Operation in a 
hostile environment?  Is so when and how? 
1. Prior to the beach landing? 




Bob Stitt - (ITT Technical Representative MMS Trainer / 
EODMU1), Mod 1NSWC-PCD interview 8-23-2011: Yes, 
MMS are still considered primary means of clearance.  Although 
we train to complete the full DTE scenario, in practice this is not 
always done.  In real world events, we detect, mark and avoid.  
UUVs are still in development and are not widely employed in 
practice.  MK18 Mod 1 is the only UUV that has been used in 
operations.  If time is a limiting factor then a method of AMCM 
will be the primary means to neutralization. 
 
32 The LCS will be taking over the MCM  Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
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mission in 2017 and the LCS concept is to 
have mission packages to configure the LCS 
to perform that mission.  This poses a 
question for command and control. 
Who, for example, should have weapons 
release authority to destroy a mine, deploy 
MCM assets, or recover MCM assets – the 
ship‟s commanding officer or the officer in 





33 No other surface ships have been designed 
to operate as many off-board vehicles as the 
LCS.  How will each ship coordinate its 
own off-board systems, including 
unmanned air, surface and underwater 







Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
34 Should different ships take responsibility 
for particular dimensions –i.e. should one 
ship control all the underwater vehicles, or 






Stakeholders did not provide an answer to this question. 
35 Is there any discussion for covertly 
deploying MCM Autonomous Underwater 




Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead – I don't know. 
36 Is there any discussion for commanding and 




Danny Sinisi, PMA-299 OAMCM SEIT Lead – I have heard of 












































APPENDIX C: COMPARISON TO GUADALCANAL 
B. COMPARISON OF WWII AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH TODAY’S FORCE 
On 7 August 1942, the first United States amphibious invasion of WWII took place on 
the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomon Islands as depicted in 
Figure 95.   
 
Figure 95. WWII Guadalcanal Invasion  
Depiction of the 7 Aug 1942 invasion routes taken by TF-62 during WWII (Friedman K. I., 2011; Miller Jr., 1948). 
 
 
The US forces, Task force (TF) 44 and 62, consisted of cruisers, 15 destroyers, 3 fast 
transports, 5 Cargo Ships, 10 Troop Transports, 5 High Speed Minesweepers, 1 landing ship tank 
(LST), and 5 cargo transports.  In addition to Task force 44, three aircraft carriers provided CAS 
for the invasion.    
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Table 37 lists the ships that were involved in the invasion.  The main goal of the invasion 
was the capture of Henderson Field, an airstrip that had been built by the Japanese.  The 
bombardment that was provided by the task force was so fierce that it deterred the defenders, and 
left the Marines to land unopposed.   
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Table 37. WWII Task Force 62 and Aircraft Carriers 




Transports CRUISERS DESTROYER Mine 
Sweeper 
USS Saratoga USS Little – Fast 
transport (APD) 
Transdiv 12 – Note (1) 
- Note (2) 
USS Chicago Heavy 
Cruiser TF-
62.2Sqdrn Yoke  – 
Note (1), Note (2) , 
Note (3), Note (4) 
USS Buchanan TF 
62.4, Fire Group 
Mike – Note (1) Note 






USS Mckean – Fast 
transport (APD) 
Transdiv 12 – Note (1) 
- Note (2) 
HMAS Australia 
Heavy Cruiser TF-
62.2, Note (2), Note 
(3), Note (4) 
USS Blue Destroyer 
Squadron 7 
(DESRON 7),   – 





USS Wasp USS Gregory  – Fast 
transport (APD) 
Transdiv 12 – Note (1) 
Note (2) 
HMAS Hobart Light 
Cruiser TF-62.2, 
Note (2) , Note (3) , 
Note (4) 
USS Henley 
DESRON 7,  – Note 
(1), Note (2), Note 




 USS Calhoun  – 
Landing Ship Tank 
(LST) Transdiv 12 – 
Note (1) - Note (2) 
USS Vincennes 
Heavy Cruiser TF-
62.3, Note (2) , Note 
(4) 
USS Helm   
DESRON 7,  – Note 
(1) Note (2) , Note 





 USS Athena - AKA-
22 - Cargo Note (2) 
USS San Juan Light 
Cruiser TF 62.4, 
Fire Group Mike – 
Note (1) Note (2) , 
Note (4) 
USS Selfridge  
Destroyer Squadron 
4, (DESRON-4),  




 USS Betelgeuse -
AKA-260 - Cargo - 
Note (2) 
USS Astoria Heavy 
Cruiser TF-62.3, 
Note (2) , Note (4) 
USS Patterson  –
DESRON-4, Note (1) 
Note (2) , Note (3), 
Note (4) 
 
 USS Bellatrix -AKA-3 
- Cargo - Note (2) 
USS Canberra 
Heavy Cruiser TF-
62.2,Sqdrn Yoke – 
Note (1) Note (2) , 
Note (4) 
USS Bagley, 
DESRON 7,  – Note 
(1) Note (2), Note(4) 
 
 USS Formahaut - 
Cargo - Note (2) 
USS Quincy Heavy 
Cruiser TF-
62.3,Note (2) , Note 
(4) 
USS Ralph Talbot 
DESRON-4, Note 
(2), Note (4) 
 
 USS Libra -AKA-12 - 
Cargo - Note (2) 
 USS Mugford, 
DESRON-4, Note (2) 
, Note (4) 
 
 USS President 
Jackson APA-18 
Transdiv Easy – Note 
(1) - Note (2) 
 USS Jarvis, 
DESRON-4, Note 
(2), Note (4) 
 
 USS Neville -APA-9 
Transdiv Easy – Note 
(1) - Note (2) 
 USS Hull TF 62.3 
Fire Support Group 
(FSG)  L, Note (2), 
Note (4)   
 
 USS Zeilin APA-3 
Transdiv Easy – Note 
 USS Dewey TF 62.3 





Transports CRUISERS DESTROYER Mine 
Sweeper 
(1) - Note (2) Note (4) 
 USS Heywood APA-6 
Transdiv Easy – Note 
(1) 
 USS Ellet TF 62.3 
FSG  L,  Note (2), 
Note (4) 
 
 USS Crescent City 
APA-21 - Note (2) 
 USS Wilson TF 62.3, 
Note (2) , Note (4) 
 
 USS President Hayes 
–APA-20 - Note (2) 
 USS Monssen TF 
62.4, Fire Group 
Mike, – Note (1) 
Note (2) 
 
 USS President Adams 
-APA-19 - Note (2) 
   
 USS Hunter Liggett-
AP-27 - Note (2) 
   
 USS American Legion 
-AP-35  - Note (2) 
   
 USS Barnett-APA-5 - 
Note (2) 
   
Note: (1) Information found in Task Force 62 Order to Action Tulagi-Guadalcanal -13 August 
1942. FE24/A16-3 (CO1) - (Wilde Jr., 2001) 
 (2) (Friedman K. I., 2011) 
 (3) (Gill, 1968) 
 (4) (Budge, 2010) 
 
If a similar invasion was to be attempted with present day forces, the invasion force 
would be made up of Task Force 76 (TF-76), Destroyer Squadron 31 (DESRON 31), and Carrier 
Strike Group 11 (CARSTRKGRU 11) as shown in Table 38.  In this scenario, TF-76 was chosen 
because it is the US Seventh Fleet Expeditionary Strike group that is responsible for conducting 
expeditionary warfare operation in the Pacific (TF 76, 2011).  Since TF-76 does not have any 
organic anti-surface or anti-subsurface assets and very limited anti-air capabilities, assumptions 
were made to designate DESRON 31 as an escort since it is a Pacific Fleet asset (COMDESRON 
31, 2011).  Therefore DESRON 31 priorities would be to protect TF-76 from air and surface 
delivered ASCM‟s and subsurface torpedoes.  DESRON 31‟s secondary priority would be to 
provide suppression of coastal defenses.  Carrier Strike Group Eleven (CARSTRKGRU 11) was 
also chosen for the scenario because it is also included in the 7
th
 Fleet, which is assigned to the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet.  CARSTRKGRU 11 is composed of USS Nimitz CVN-68, Carrier Air Wing 
Eleven (CVW-11) and Destroyer Squadron 23 (DESRON 23) (COMCARSTRKGRU ELEVEN, 
2011).  The total force would be composed of 1 aircraft carrier, 7 destroyers (DDG), 1 guided 
missile cruiser (CG), 4 Fast Frigates (FFG) 1 landing helicopter deck (LHD), 2 amphibious 
transport dock (LPD), 1 landing ship dock (LSD), 1 amphibious command ship (LCC) and 4 
mine counter measure MCM ships. 
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Table 38. Today‟s Task Force 76, DESRON 31, and CARSTRKGRU 11 
Table depicts composition of present day force needed for a Guadalcanal-type invasion mission 
(COMCARSTRKGRU ELEVEN, 2011; COMDESRON 31, 2011; TF 76, 2011). 
 
CARSTRKGRU 11 AMPHIBIOUS 




USS Nimitz (CVN 68) USS Essex LHD-2 USS Avenger USS Chafee 
DDG-90 
USS Spruance (DDG 
111) 
USS Denver LPD  USS Defender USS Chung-Hoon 
DDG-93 
USS John Paul Jones 
(DDG 53) 
USS Tortuga LPD  USS Guardian USS Hopper 
DDG-70 
USS William P 
Lawrence (DDG 110) 
USS GermanTown 
LSD-42 





USS Blue Ridge LCC-
19 




  USS Crommelin 
FFG-37 
USS Curts (FFG-38)   USS Reuben 
James FFG-57 
USS Princeton CG 59    
 
This sets the stage to perform a comparison between a WWII task force and a today‟s 
force in providing suppression for MCM operation.  To make a comparison we made the 
following assumptions: 
1. Naval Fire Power to Support Amphibious Operation Assumptions 
In calculating the fire power that was available for the WWII task force, the ships 
accompanying the aircraft carriers were not included.  This is because the destroyers, cruisers, 
and battleship that protected the aircraft carriers were out of range to provide suppression fire for 
the landing force.  However, the destroyers and cruiser accompanying the USS Nimitz could 
launch tomahawk missiles in support of the MCM operation and still protect the Nimitz with 
anti-air and anti-ship protection.  Therefore these ships are used in the calculations of providing 
long range suppressive fire for an MCM operation.  There are two variants of Tomahawk 
missiles: the RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM Block IV) and the 
RGM/UGM-109B Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM), a radar guided anti-shipping variant 
(Sweetman, 2009).  
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 Table 39 lists the firepower available to support the amphibious force.   
Table 39. Fictional Modern Day Invasion Force Fire Power Mix 
 











DESRON 31        
USS Chafee 
DDG-90 96 48 5 
 
24 19 1 
 
USS Chung-
Hoon DDG-93 96 48 5 
 
24 19 1 
 
USS Crommelin 
FFG-37 40 30  
10 
   
1 
USS Hopper 
DDG-70 90 45 5 
 
23 17 1 
 
USS O'Kane 
DDG-77 90 45 5 
 




60 90 45 5 
 
23 17 1 
 
USS Reuben 
James FFG-57 40 30  
10 
   
1 
USS Russell 
DDG-59 90 45 5 
 
23 17 1 
 
CARSTRKGRU 11        
USS Spruance 




USS John Paul 




USS William P 
Lawrence DDG 























In calculating the fire power available the following assumption were made: 
1. The 1st priority of the combat surface ships would be to counter the ASCM missile 
threat.  Therefore half the available launch tubes would have Standard Missiles (SM). 
2. The 2nd priority of the combat surface ships would be to counter any surface threats.  
Therefore half of the vertical launch tubes that are left from the total vertical launch 
tubes not containing SM would contain TASM. 
3. Each combat surface ship would contain 5 to 10 ASROC torpedoes. 
This would give the combined force the ability to launch 200 TLAMs in support of the 
Marine Amphibious force.  
2. WWII and Modern Day Aircraft Assumptions and Comparisons 
The second assumption was the number of planes used in support of Marine force during 
WWII was 91.  The USS Saratoga could carry 91 aircraft (Friedman N. , 1983), the USS Wasp 
and USS Enterprise could carry 90 aircraft each (Friedman N. , 1983).  However, not all these 
aircraft would be combat aircraft and not all of them would participate in providing air support.  
Therefore a conservative estimate of 90 aircraft was made to provide the Marines with CAS 
during the invasion.  The aircraft that would have to provide CAS from the carriers would be the 
Navy Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter and the Navy Douglas SBD Dauntless (Scout/Dive 
Bomber).  The F4F could provide close air-support with six 50 caliber machine guns (Writer, 
2010).  The SBD Dauntless could deliver one 1000 pound bomb and two 100 pound bombs in 
CAS (Dwyer, 2011).   
 
It is unknown how many airplanes were deployed to support the Guadalcanal invasion; 
however, there were 103 SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers and 173 F4F-4 Wildcats fighters that 
were available from the carrier force to support the invasion of Guadalcanal.  Not all aircraft 
were dedicated to support the invasion; instead, there was a percentage to provide combat air 
patrol (CAP) for carriers a quick response for Anti-Ship operations.  If 75% of the SBD-3 dive 
bombers and 50% F4F fighters were dedicated to support the invasion, this would give the 
amphibious force 77 dive bombers and 87 Fighters for CAS.  
 
Therefore, a ground support attack could include a mix of 77 Dauntless and 87 Wildcats.  
This would give the support attack the ability to deliver 92,400 lbs of ordnance with aircraft 




Table 40 shows the number and type of aircraft that was available aboard the carriers to 
support the invasion. 
Table 40. WWII Carrier Task Force TF-61 
Table shows the available aircraft on the WWII carriers to support the invasion of Guadalcanal (Budge, 2010). 
 
Carrier and Squadron 
Number of 




VF-5 34 F4F-4 Wildcat 
 
VB-3 19 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 
VS-3 18 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 




VF-6 36 F4F-4 Wildcat 
 
VB-6 18 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 
VS-5 18 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 
VT-3 15 TBF-1 Avenger 
CV 
Wasp 
   
 
VF-71 29 F4F-4 Wildcat 
 
VS-71 15 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 
VS-72 15 SBD-3 Dauntless 
 
VT-7 10 TBF-1 Avenger 
 
In comparison, the modern day Nimitz aircraft carrier typical aircraft load-out includes 
12 FA-18E/Fs, 36 FA-18s, 4 EA-6B, 4 E-2C, 4 SH-60F, and 2 HH-60H aircraft (Nimitz Class, 
2011).  If 12 FA-18s were dedicated to providing CAP for the Nimitz; this would leave 40 
aircraft (12 FA-18E/F, 24 FA-18C/Ds and 4 EA-6Bs) for providing CAS to the Marines.  Note 
that the EA-6Bs would provide the electronic attack part of the obscuration mission.   
Each FA-18C/D can deliver up to 13,700 lbs of stores to include, free falling or guided 
bombs, cluster bombs, or napalm tanks (Boeing, 2011).  In addition to the aircraft from the 
Nimitz, the LHD can provide 6 Harriers AV-8B and 4 Super Cobras to provide suppression for 
the MCM operation (Nimitz Class, 2011).  The AV-8B can provide 13,200 lbs of stores to also 
include cluster bombs, guided and unguided bombs and napalm canisters (Donald & March, 
2004).  The Super Cobra can carry up to seventy 2.75-inch rockets or eight 5-inch rockets or 8 
Hellfire missiles (AH-1W / AH-1Z Super Cobra, 2011).  For this example, it estimated that the 
present day forces can deliver 627,200 lbs and 280 2.75” rockets in support of the MCM 
mission. 
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3. Firepower Comparison 
Table 41 tabulates the fire power that could be used for suppression, obscuration and 
Isolation during an MCM operation between both today‟s and the WWII force.  The modern day 
naval air force can deliver 7 times more ordnance faster and more precisely than the WWII force 
with fewer planes.  The US Navy and Marine Corps depend on the naval CAS to provide the 
bulk of the suppression and obscuration for the MCM operation.  However, if air power parity 
exists as it did in WWII, or the enemy gains air superiority, it is envisioned that fewer planes 
would be released to support the MCM operation.  Additionally planes may not be able to loiter 
without air superiority to seek targets of opportunity.  In this situation, they will not be able to 
sustain consistent suppression of targets.   
Table 41. Fire Power for Suppression Comparison between WWII with Today 
Comparison of suppression fire available to WWII and present day forces supporting an amphibious landing. 
 
WWII TF 44 SUPPRESION FIRE 
POWER 
 TODAY SUPPRESSION FIRE POWER 
Number Guns Gun Type  Number 
Guns/Rockets 
Guns/Rockets Type 
42 8 inch Guns   200 UGM-109ETLAM 
20 6 inch Guns    
123 5 Inch Guns  12 5 Inch Guns 
39 4 Inch Guns  3 76 mm 
17 3 Inch Guns    
16 1 Inch Guns    
52 40 mm    
2 37 mm  10 25 mm 
42 20 mm  5 20 mm 
Naval Combat Aircraft  Naval Combat Aircraft 
164  50 
92,400 lbs Ordnance in Mission  627,200 lbs Ordnance in Mission 
   280 2.75 Rockets in 
Mission 
 
The WWII Naval force produced more sustained fire power from their ships upon an 
objective than a modern day force would.  This is because the WWII era ships could sustain a 
land barrage.  Clearly it can be seen that a WWII task force can provide more effective 
suppression and obscuration fire than a modern day task force by the sheer number of artillery 
pieces at its disposal.  An argument can be made that Tomahawk missiles and laser guided 
munitions‟ from modern day aircraft can be more precise in their attack to eliminate coastal 
defenses.  However, the assumption is that the amphibious force can accurately identify the over 
watched positions or the land based defense artillery and mortars.  This might not be the case 
with an island that has a jungle environment with well-prepared defensive positions.  However, 
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suppression fire does not need to be accurate.  It needs to be close enough to create confusion, 
fear, and obscuration of the target to be effective.  Consider if just 10 rounds from each 8, 6, 5, 
and 4 inch WWII gun were used in suppression; it would total 2040 rounds for suppression as 
compared to 200 TLAM.   
4. WWII and Current Operations Breaching Comparison 
Figure 96 graphically summarizes the MCM Breaching capabilities between the WWII 
force and the US Naval force of today.  In short, the present day US Naval force has fewer 
capabilities to provide suppression and obscuration for mine obstacle breaching operation when 
the US does not have air-superiority.  The WWII force could move further close to the beach and 
provide suppressive and protective fire power for the MCM force and thus provide Isolation and 
Security.  Today‟s forces can quickly land Marine forces by air to provide forces that can isolate 
and harass the coastal defense and thus provide “Isolation“ and Security for the MCM force.  
Therefore, due to these unique aspects both the WWII and present day forces have equal 
capabilities to isolate the mine obstacle.  However, the mine obstacle sweeping capability of the 
modern day MCM ships are superior to the WWII force, but not by much.  Today‟s force has 
greater capability to detect and find the mines, but the MCM reduction capabilities of today still 
depend on men (divers) to neutralize the mines like the WWII force.   
 
Figure 96. Amphibious Mine Breaching Comparison between WWII and Today 








C. COMPARISON OF WWII AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH FUTURE 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 
To make a comparison of mine breaching capabilities with future assets, assumptions for 
the composition of a future force shown in Table 42 were developed using assets that will be 
available 15 years from now.  It was assumed that the future force would be composed of1 
aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers (DDG), 2 guided missile cruiser (CG), 1 Amphibious Assault ship 
(LHA), 2 amphibious transport dock (LPD), 1 mobile landing platform (MLP), 1 Joint High 
Speed Vessel (JHSV) and 4 Littoral Combat  ships (LCS). 
Table 42. Future Task Force and CSG Supporting Amphibious Operation 











USS Nimitz CVN  USS America 
LHA-6  
 














USS Fort Worth LCS USS Chung-Hoon 
DDG-93 












 USS Zumwalt 
(DDG 1000) 
USS Gravely (DDG 
107) 
  Michael Monsoor 
(DDG 1001) 
USS Princeton CG 
59 















Table 43 and Table 44 show the calculations for the suppressive fire power of a future 
force as compared to the WWII force.   
Table 43. Future Invasion Force Fire Power Mix Available For Suppression 





SM ASROC TASM TLAM 155 
mm 
Gun 
5“ Gun 57 
mm 
CGDESON XX        
USS Port Royal (CG 
73) 
122 61 10 31 20  2  
USS Chafee DDG-90 96 48 5 24 19  1  
USS Chung-Hoon 
DDG-93 
96 48 5 24 19  1  
Wayne E. Meyer 
(DDG 108) 
96 48 5 24 19  1  
USS Zumwalt (DDG 
1000) 
80 45 5 23 17 2   
Michael Monsoor 
(DDG 1001) 
80 45 5 23 17 2   
CARSTRKGRU 11        
USS Spruance DDG 
111 
96 48 5 24 19  NOTE 1  
USS John Paul Jones 
(DDG 53) 
90 45 5 23 17  NOTE 1  
USS William P 
Lawrence (DDG 110) 
96 48 5 24 19  NOTE 1  
USS Sampson (DDG-
102) 
96 48 5 24 19  NOTE 1  
USS Princeton CG-59 122 61 10 31 20  NOTE 1  
TF-XX        
USS Freedom LCS        1 
USS Independence 
LCS 
       1 
USS Fort Worth LCS        1 
USS Coronado LCS        1 
FIRE POWER AVAILABLE FOR SUPPRESSION 201 4 5 4 
 
Note 1: These destroyers and cruisers have 5 inch guns but would be too far away to use them in the suppression 








Table 44. Fire Power for Suppression Comparison between WWII with Future 
Comparison of suppression fire available to WWII and future forces supporting an amphibious landing. 
 
WW II TF 44 SUPPRESION 
FIRE POWER 
 FUTURE SUPPRESSION FIRE 
POWER 
Number Guns Gun Type  Number 
Guns/Rockets 
Guns/Rockets Type 
42 8 inch Guns   201 UGM-109ETLAM 
20 6 inch Guns  4 155 mm 
123 5 Inch Guns  5 5 Inch Guns 
19 4 Inch Guns  4 57 mm 
12 3 Inch Guns    
16 1 Inch Guns    
52 40 mm    
2 37 mm  10 25 mm 
42 20 mm  5 20 mm 
Naval Combat Aircraft  Naval Combat Aircraft 
164  50 
92,400 lbs Ordnance in 
Mission 
 627200 lbs Ordnance in 
Mission 
   280 2.75 Rockets in 
Mission 
 
The future force has a significant increased suppressive fire power over the present day to 
force.  The LCS carries 880 rounds of 57 mm and the Zumwalt class destroyers can carry up to 
950 rounds of 155mm.  It is projected that the 155 mm guns will have a maximum range of 62 
miles.  If these ships can be used in a suppressive fire mode, they could possible sustain fire up 
to 5420 rounds.  This is close to parity with the WWII task force.   
D. NEED FOR OTH CAPABILITY 
What offsets the task force from providing close in suppression for the MCM force is the 
protection of the amphibious ships from ASCM.  The presence of ASCM‟s drives the 
requirement for the ATF to operate from OTH.  OTH is difficult term to define and as the 
definition of distance varies to what an appropriate OTH standoff distance is from the objective.  
Joint Publication 3-02 Amphibious Operations states that “over-the-horizon amphibious 
operation is an amphibious operation initiated from beyond visual and radar range of the enemy 
shore.” (JP 3-02, 2009).  This is normally at the horizon which is approximately 22 to 25 miles at 
sea.  However, based on the analysis of being able to react to ASCMs it is suggested that the 
AFT contain MCM assets that initially operate no closer than 50nm from the objective.  
Additionally, other analysts have said that amphibious assaults will be launched from OTH at 25 
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to 50 miles at sea (Committee on Naval Expeditionary Logistics, 1999).  This further justifies 
that current and future MCM system should have the ability to be deployed and launched from 
distances greater than 50 nm.   
In a report to congress, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) was criticized for 
being designed to be launched from 25 miles from the shore (Feicket, 2010).  The report pointed 
out that this was not far enough by citing an example of a 2006 incident in which a Hezbollah C-
802 cruise missile successfully attacked an Egyptian ship 36 miles from shore (Eshel, 2006).  
The Chinese and Russians have developed sea skimming ASCM that travel at speeds over Mach 
2.  The Russian P-800 NATO designation SS-N-22 can travel at Mach 2.3 for over 186 miles 
(Russian/Soviet Soviet Sea-Baseed Anti-Ship Missiles, 2005).  These missiles can be launched 
from ships, submarines, aircraft, and truck mounted launchers.  If launched at the amphibious 
force, it is estimated that the ships will have approximately 35 seconds to react to it when 
detected at the maximum detection range of the ships.  Reaction time can easily be equated to 
probability of survival.  If the amphibious force is any closer to the launch point of origin, it 
decreases the anti-ASCM reaction time for the amphibious force.  The most likely point of origin 
for the ASCMs will be from concealed camouflaged areas around the objective or from 
submerged submarines.  In the projection of force for Guadalcanal example, covered and 
concealed ASCMs will be either on Guadalcanal or one of the nearby islands.  If the ATF cannot 
provide sufficient suppression fire to Guadalcanal or the nearby islands to protect the MCM 
operation or the ATF from ASCMs, it drives the requirement to operate at a safe distance from 
OTH to Guadalcanal and its surrounding islands.     
If the ATF operates more than 50 nm from the objective this reduces the suppressive fire 
support coming from the LCS.  Once again the WWII force appears to be superior in providing 
suppression and obscuration for the MCM operation.  If the MCM operation cannot depend on 
being provided with sufficient suppression of coastal defenses and obscuration from hostile 
forces, this becomes a gap in the performance of conducting MCM Operations.  This establishes 
the need for MCM operations to be done covertly.  
There are more reasons the MCM system need to have the capabilities to operate covertly 
other than the inability to have suppressive fire.  According to the Navy concept of “Ship-to-
Objective-Movement (STOM)”, it calls for an emphasis in the need for clandestine efforts to 
determine enemy strengths and weakness by locating and identifying mines and obstacles 
(Marine Corps Development Command, 2011).  STOM relies on surprise to achieve amphibious 
assaults from OTH.  As stated in the Marine Corps STOM concept document: 
“The enemy will contest the control of air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace 
domains.  Amphibious forces will offset these challenges by remaining, at least initially, over the 
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horizon, using the expanded maneuver space offered by the sea to complicate enemy targeting 
and provide more reaction time to defeat counterstrikes.  From this tactically advantageous 
position, the landing force will be able to initially avoid enemy strength, maneuver to create 
multiple entry points and disrupt enemy anti-access strategy and then overwhelm adversary 
defenses to attack or influence its‟ landward objectives” (Marine Corps Development Command, 
2011). 
The STOM concept does change the tactics for breach obstacles.  In other words, mine 
obstacles and gaps in the defense must be identified covertly without the use of suppressive fire.  
This must be done to maximize the effect of a surprise attack.  Additionally, the Navy identifies 
in the STOM concept paper, “…breaching, preparatory fires, and obstacle clearing which were 
traditionally pre-assault tasks, will become an integral part of the assault phase” (Marine Corps 
Development Command, 2011).  This drives the need for a MCM capability to locate, assess, 
classify, identify gaps, and map the mine field and obstacles before the assault.  This in turn 
drives a need for the MCM system to communicate this information back to the TF before the 
assault so that commander can make assessments and plan for entry points.  In order to plan for 
entry points, this drives a need for the TF to have a capability to communicate with MCM system 
the desired entry points and boat lanes to the MCM systems after the assessment of the 
reconnaissance.  Lastly creates a need for the MCM systems to reacquire the desired mines for 
neutralization and to synchronize the neutralization with the assault or to neutralize the mines 





















APPENDIX D: LEVELS OF AUTONOMY DISCUSSION 
This appendix supplements the discussion of levels of autonomy in the main report, 
providing further detail on each level of autonomy and the solution architectures to support the 
level. 
A. FULLY AND SEMI AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS 
 
NIST defines fully autonomous as: 
 
A mode of operation of an UMS wherein the UMS is expected to accomplish its 
mission, within a defined scope, without human intervention. Note that a team of 
UMSs may be fully autonomous while the individual team members may not be 
due to the needs to coordinate during the execution of team missions (NIST, 
2004). 
  
 A system which deploys fully autonomous vehicles has a human operating in a 
supervisory control mode, and vehicles operating as intelligent agents who also can operate in a 
supervisory capacity.  Supervisory Control is a mode where one or more human operators are 
intermittently sending and receiving information to the unmanned system (Hew, 2010).  It is 
where a machine closes a control loop, and a supervisor intermittently programs the machine 
with changes in mission.  An intelligent agent is an autonomous entity that observes and acts 
upon an environment directing its activity towards achieving goals (Hew, 2010).   
 
A supervisor is an agent that has supervisory control over subordinate agent(s) and can be 
human or artificial without restriction (Hew, 2010).  A supervisor intermittently reprograms its 
subordinates, using information that it has gathered from the environment or taken from the 
subordinate agents (Hew, 2010).  The supervisor monitors mission progress, provides mission 
level directions, and coordinates missions (NIST, 2004). 
   
In a fully autonomous condition, a single human operating in supervisory control can 
direct the operation of one or several vehicles in an MCM operation.  This means that the human 
would have a tactical display maintaining situational awareness of the overall status of vehicles, 
the mode they are operating in, their status, the reported locations of mines and obstacles, and the 
overall status of routes reconnoitered and cleared.  The human controller would be able to 
reprogram one vehicle or a group of MCM vehicles for mission changes, select routes for 
clearance, and grant permission for neutralization. 
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It is envisioned that the vehicles operating as intelligent agents have on-board processing 
for self-navigating, target detection, target classification, obstacle avoidance, mapping the AO, 
and communicating.  
 
It is also envisioned that one of the vehicles can operate as supervisor of one or more of 
the other MCM vehicles in the AO to change search patterns or redirect searches.  This means 
that the supervisor not only has situational awareness of its environment, but also the 
environment and status of its intelligent agents. 
 
The main characteristic of fully autonomous operation is that the human needs only very 
limited intermittent communication with one or more of the vehicles.  Because of this, the 
bandwidth of the communications between the human and vehicles and between vehicles in the 
field can be very limited. 
 
Another characteristic of fully autonomous operation is that the vehicles must maintain 
redundancy in critical sensors for navigation and processing.  The navigation solution is critical 
for determining vehicle location, mine location, performing obstacle avoidance, maintaining 
search patterns, and performing collaborated missions with other vehicles.  The navigation 
solution must be highly reliable and accurate to perform these functions over long periods of 
time.  The vehicle must have redundancy in the navigation sensors in order compensate for errors 
caused by degradation or failures in sensor inputs.  It must be able to compare navigation 
solutions to correct errors in drift and to maintain a reliable accurate navigation solution for long 
periods of time. 
 
The vehicles must be able fuse information that comes from different sensors for the 
purpose of target classification.  Fusion is the process of combining or blending of relevant data 
and information from single or multiple sources into representation formats to support the 
interpretation of the data and information and to support system goals like recognition, tracking, 
situation assessment, sensor management, or system control.  It involves the process of 
acquisition, filtering, correlation, integration, comparison, evaluation and related activities to 
ensure proper correlations of data or information exist and draws out the significance of those 
correlations (NIST, 2004).  It is envisioned that the MCM system has level 4 or level 5 data 
fusion.  These levels of fusion are described in the NIST Special Publication 1011. Level 4 data 
fusion consists of assessing the entire process and related activities to improve the timeliness, 
relevance and accuracy of information and/or intelligence.  It reviews the performance of sensors 
and collectors, as well as analysts, information management systems, and staffs involved in the 
fusion process (NIST, 2004).  Level 5 fusion connects the user to the rest of the fusion process so 
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that the user can visualize the fusion products and generate feedback/control to enhance/improve 
these products (NIST, 2004). 
 
A fully autonomous vehicle can have several advantages for covert operations in that it 
can be planted in the AO long before it is needed.  A fully autonomous vehicle could lie dormant 
for several months until it is activated to perform its mission by a predefined signal or time 
period.  This could give advantages to seeding the vehicles in the AO by various clandestine 
methods.  Additionally it is anticipated that autonomous vehicles have higher development cost, 
but much lower life cycle cost due to the fact the fully autonomous vehicles need fewer people to 
operate and control them. 
 
There are a minimum of 3 redundant critical sensors that are measured independently to 
enable fully autonomous operation.  This is done so that critical information can be compared for 
sensor errors due to degradation and failures.  These critical sensors are pressure transducers 
used to measure depth and speed.  It is also recommended to that the system contain 3 redundant 
inertial reference systems and 3 independent processors to insure precise navigation.   
B. TELE-OPERATED SYSTEM 
Tele-operation is where a human operator, using video feedback and/or other sensory 
feedback, either directly controls the actuators or assigns incremental goals, waypoints in 
mobility situations, on a continuous basis, from off the vehicle via a tethered or radio linked 
control device.  In this operation mode, the UMS may take limited initiative in reaching the 
assigned incremental goals (NIST, 2004).   
 
Tele-operated MCM vehicles have very limited SA because of limited onboard 
processing and lack in redundancies for critical sensors.  The MCM vehicles have level 1 or level 
0 fusion abilities.  Level 1 fusion is where a vehicle takes a new input and normalizes the input 
data, correlates the data into an existing entity database, and updates that database. 
 
Tele-operated vehicles need to be recovered to perform post mission analysis or need to 
continuously stream data back to the MCM control ship for mission processing.  The human 
operator needs continuous communication with the vehicle to assess and direct its operation.  
The operators per shift could range from 1 to 2 personnel to operate one vehicle. 
 
The vehicle cannot be planted covertly and expected to lie dormant without the risk of 
losing the vehicle due to very limited SA. 
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It is envisioned that the MCM vehicles would be able to operate in this mode when all or 
most of it critical sensors used for navigation have failed or been severely degraded or its ability 
to process navigation inputs or sensor inputs has been severely degraded. 
C. REMOTELY PILOTED SYSTEM 
Remotely piloted systems are where a human operator, without benefit of video or other 
sensory feedback, directly controls the actuators of the UMS on a continuous basis, from off the 
vehicle and via a tethered or radio linked control device using visual line-of sight cues.  In this 
mode, the UMS takes no initiative and relies on continuous or nearly continuous input from the 
user (NIST, 2004). 
 
This mode of operation requires an operator to have direct sight of the MCM vehicle.  
This can be accomplished from video provided by another platform, or by an operator 
controlling the vehicle while maintaining eyes on the vehicle.   
 
In the case for MCM operations, the assumption would be that humans would be 
conducting PMA at the control ship. 
 
Remotely piloted systems have no situational awareness of their environment, and require 
constant operator input to guide it to accomplish its mission. 
 
It is envisioned that the MCM vehicles should be able to operate in this mode when all or 
most of its critical sensors used for navigation have failed, or its ability to process navigation 
inputs are failed and its sensor inputs has been severely degraded. 
D. ADDITIONAL AUTONOMY ARCHITECTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
Additional features such as processing capability, neutralization responsibility, sensor 
confirmation, DTE time delay activation, requirements for doctrinal change, manning 
recommendations, real-time communication requirements, and Post Mission Analysis 
requirements need further consideration compared to the system level of autonomy:   
 
1. Processing Capability: As autonomy increases, the processing capability 
increases.  As the decision control shifts from the human to the system with 
increasing autonomy, the system needs to have the processing capability to 
handle complex behavior and decision algorithms. 
2. Neutralization Responsibility: Increasing autonomy allows the system to take 
responsibility for DTE completion.  A concept would be that as autonomy 
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increases, the system would be authorized to engage the mine if it identifies a 
target within specific parameters without waiting for the human to make 
decisions. 
3. Sensor Confirmation: With the human in the loop at the lower levels of 
system autonomy, the system would be required to show the human target 
confirmation using only one of four sensors.  This would allow the human to 
make decisions on the target even if there is only one sensor to confirm data.  
At higher levels of autonomy, the system would need additional target 
confirmation data since the human is absent from the loop as a monitor. 
4. DTE time delay activation: A concept benefit with highly automated systems 
is that it would have the capability to activate a search on either a time delay 
or upon human confirmation.  This allows the vehicle to be seeded in the AO 
and lie dormant until it is needed.  This allows the vehicle to be planted 
covertly and reactivated at a later time. 
5. Requirements for Doctrinal Change: As defined in the NWP MCM 3-15 
doctrine, target neutralization can only be executed after visual identification 
is made by a diver.  Not only does this keep the human diver in harm‟s way, 
it is not matching the scope of current roadmap doctrinal concepts.  The 
doctrine should be in line with allowing the system to provide identification 
details as autonomy is increased. 
6. Manning for the system: As the level of autonomy increases to a fully 
autonomous system, the number of operators that are needed to control and 
oversee the system will decrease substantially. 
7. Post Mission Analysis: Increasing autonomy in conjunction with establishing 
a real communication network allows the system to take on the 
responsibilities of the DTE sequence with human monitoring.  This in turn 
allows real-time processing and decision making at the higher levels of 




E. COMMUNICATION LEVELS 
An important consideration is the methods of communications that are used for system 
operation.  The system‟s level of autonomy plays a significant factor in how much data is needed 
to be transmitted and received.  Systems with the higher levels of autonomy only need general 
instructions from the operator, such as the dimensions of the search area, where systems with 
more human interaction need to transmit information much more often. Table 45 highlights the 
frequency of communications for each level of autonomy. 
 
Fully autonomous systems should have the ability to transmit its location and status 
periodically to the systems oversight personnel.  These updates are transmitted on an intermittent 
or periodic basis.  Location and function updates would be transmitted at a regular time interval 
with possible mine locations and neutralizations sent back to the oversight as needed. 
 
With the remotely piloted option, communications would occur in a continuous manner.  
This would mean command and control data and sensor feeds would be transmitted from the 
SPUDS to a local operator.  This would require a much higher bandwidth than only sending 
periodic updates. 
Table 45. Communication Exchange Frequency by Autonomy Level 
 
This table shows the frequency of communications by each autonomy level. The fully autonomous system will 





Fully Autonomous intermittent 
Tele-operated semi continuous 
Remote Piloted continuous 
MK 18 UUV  
semi continuous 
(C2 data only) 
 
 
One of the most difficult tasks that must be performed in MCM operations for the 
amphibious force is establishing OTH communications between the MCM vehicles the MCM 
control ship.  Additionally, establishing underwater communications in the noisy VSW 
environment is also difficult.  There are three basic architectures that are considered for this 
project.  The first architecture consists of a series of buoys that use Wi-Fi communication to 
transmit information.  This is used with fully autonomous vehicles.  The second architecture uses 
 286 
directional line of sight communication to transmit data back to the command center via an 
airborne data link.  This architecture would force an antenna to be tethered to a surface above the 
water to transmit and receive data.  The last architecture uses a local operator to command and 
control the vehicle.  This also requires an antenna to be tethered to a surface above the water to 
transmit and receive data.  Table 46 provides details of viable communication systems for each 
level of autonomy. 
Table 46. Communication Comparison for Autonomy Levels. 
 
This table provides the details around the two potential communications architectures for the SPUDS. The chart 















time of  
antenna 
 





M N RF (UHF/SHF) 







H Y SHF/EHF Constant 
Remote 
Control 
Light of Sight with 
Local Operator 
M Y VHF/UHF Constant 
 
F. CURRENT AUTONOMY LEVELS  
An initial analysis has been conducted on the MK 18 Mod 1 UUV system, divers and 
MMS, to identify current system level of autonomy.  Taking the understanding of the current 
operating and fielded systems, the intent of defining autonomy architectures was to take each 
definition of autonomy and identify which system features would be necessary to meet the 
definition.   
1. Diver Operations 
Current MCM operations using divers put a large burden on humans performing 
clearance operations, putting humans at risk in hostile and dangerous environments, obligating 
the human to perform all functions of the DTE.  Although this has been the approved method for 
MCM clearance operations since the 1950‟s, technology developments and OPNAV future 
concepts have been encouraging the removal of the human and increasing the reliance on 
unmanned systems to complete the tasking.  Understanding the level of tasking that is placed on 
humans is important to understand in order to start identifying methods of reducing their 
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burdens.  An important area to note where OPNAV future concepts need to shift doctrinal 
procedures is within the NWP MCM 3-15.  Current doctrine states that a target can only be 
neutralized once a human has visually identified (Vid) and classified the target.  Table 47 shows 
the functions that are currently performed by a human diver compared to a system in MCM 
operations.   
Table 47. Current MCM Diver System Functions 
 
This table shows the functions that are performed by the human diver in MCM operations. In this case, the human 
carries out the entire detect to engage sequence. 
 
DIVERS 
Functions Human Task System Task 
Search x N/A 
Detect x N/A 
Identify x N/A 
Classify x N/A 
Engage x N/A 
Communication x Team Leader with Host 
Platform 
2. MMS Operations 
MMS operations are similar to divers in that a large burden is put on mammals.  
Although mammals have an increased search area capability over divers, humans still must 
remain close to operational areas in order to support the mammal.  During MMS operations, 
divers are still required to visual identify a target before neutralization is authorized.  Table 48 
provides an overview of functions that are carried out by mammals and humans in an MCM 
operation.  
Table 48. Overview of MMS Operations 
 
This table depicts functions that are carried out by the mammal vs. a human being. As shown, the human tasks are 
mostly verification to marine mammal‟s findings. 
 
MMS 
Functions Mammal Task Human Task 
Search x N/A 
Detect x N/A 
Identify x Verify 
Classify x Verify 
Engage x Verify 
Communication x X 
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3. MK 18 Mod 1 UUV 
The MK 18 Mod 1 UUV is a sensor platform where raw data is collected.  There 
currently is no real time data transmit capability with some limited C² information that can be 
communicated via acoustic communication nodes to the UUV during operations.  Human 
operators must retrieve the vehicle, download raw data, and convert into imagery data that can be 
viewed by Post Mission Analysis (PMA) Operators.  It is also important to note that Probability 
of Detection/Probability of Classification (PdPc) is not based on MK 18 UUV‟s capability, but is 
based the human‟s ability to interpret imagery data from raw sensor data.  This has proven 
challenging to accurately measure PdPc since the values can vary and are directly related to the 
capability of the trained operator. 
 
Current operations have shown that one hour of UUV mission data yields approximately 
one hour of PMA Operators reviewing imagery.  Using humans to identify targets has proven 
somewhat successful, but involves intense training and man-hours to prepare humans to 
complete this task well.  There are currently no fielded elements that assist the operator in 
identifying targets.  Table 49 provides an overview of the functions performed by humans and 
the MK 18 UUV in an MCM mission.   
Table 49. Summary of Human and System Tasks for the MK 18 Mod 1 
 
This table provides an overview of the functions that are currently completed by a human vs. system for the MK 8 
Mod 1 UUV.  
 
MK 18 Mod 1 UUV 
Functions Human Task System Task 
Search  x 
Detect x  
Identify x  
Classify x  
Engage x N/A 
Communication x x 
4. Other Considerations 
As mentioned, current doctrine requires visual identification by a human before 
neutralization.  If the intent is for autonomous technology in the future development to remove 
the burden, technology must first be proven mature and accurate.  Additionally, the MCM 
community would need to modify doctrine concepts to allow systems to be considered a valid 
identification and classification platform.    
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As noted, Probability of Detection/Probability of Classification (PdPc) value is not based 
on MK 18 UUV‟s capability, but is based the human‟s ability to interpret imagery data from raw 
sensor data.  Not only would a doctrinal change be necessary to enable systems to identify and 
classify targets, but software and autonomy behavior would need to be developed to support this.  
Enabling the shift of limited human tasking and elevating technology and completing the DTE 
functions using autonomous systems would allow the PdPc values to be based on measurable, 


























APPENDIX E: DETAILED ARCHITECTURE MAPPING 
A. ALTERNATIVE ONE MAPPING 
1. Alternative One Components Mapped to Functions 
Table 50 summarizes how each component addresses the functions explored in this report 
(search, detect, identify, engage, and communicate).  Table 50 also shows the breakout of tasking 
that is performed by human operators, the MCM ship, and the SPUDS for Alternative One. 
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Table 50. Alternative One Functions Allocated to System Components 




1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 










Enter operational area 
FS.7.1  
Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query  vehicle status 









Acoustic/Wifi Recorder/Playback Depth/Pressure Sensor 
Wi-Fi radio Acoustic Comm 





(4) Optical Sensors 
 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Deploy Magnetic Gradiometer 



























Pressure Depth Sensor 
Acoustic Comm 






1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 




Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query vehicle status. 




Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Mission Processor(3) 
Tactical Oversight Computer 
and tactical map 
Display/Controls 
Pressure Depth Sensor 






Optical Sensor  
Magnetic Sensor System 












from sensors indicating 
contact in the area 
FD.1.1 
  
Optical Sensor  
Magnetic Sensor System 
Recording System 
Sonar Sensor System 
Mission Processor(3) 




















1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 










Create message about a 
detection in the area 
and its and location 
FD.1.4 
Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query vehicle status. 
- Tactical Oversight 
Updates Tactical 
Map and passes on 





Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Tactical Oversight Computer 
and tactical map 
Display/Controls 
Mission Processor(3) 










 Process sensor input 
FC.2.1   
Optical Sensor (4) 
GPS/Acoustic Navigation 
Beacon 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Recording System 


















1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Sub Component 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Sonar Sensor System 
Create message about 
contact classification 
FC.2.3 
Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query vehicle status 
- Tactical Oversight 
Updates Tactical 
Map and passes on 




Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Mission Processor(3) Tactical Oversight Computer 
and tactical map 
Display/Controls 









Determine if mine-like 






Optical Sensor (4) 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Sonar Sensor System 
Determine if mine-like 






Optical Sensor (4) 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Sonar Sensor System 
 







1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Sub Component 
Determine if mine-like 
contact is a drifting 
mine 
FI.3.3 
Optical Sensor (4) 
 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Sonar Sensor System 
Determine if mine-like 




query vehicle status 
- Tactical Oversight 
Updates Tactical 
Map and makes 
determination if 
contact should be 
avoided - passes 
information to Host 
C2 
Server/Switch Mission Processor(3) 
Acoustic/Wi-Fi 
Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Optical Sensor (4) 
Tactical Oversight Computer 
and tactical map 
Display/Controls 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Wi-Fi Radio 
Sonar Sensor System 
Acoustic Comm 
Create message about 
mine identification 
FI.3.5 
Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query vehicle status 
- Tactical Oversight 
Updates Tactical 
Map and passes on 








Server/Switch Mission Processor(3)  
Acoustic/Wi-Fi 
Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Recorder 
Tactical Oversight Computer 








1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 















Tactical Oversight.  
Creates 
Neutralization Plan 
and passes it onto 
Host C2 and 
Programs Vehicle 
Server/Switch 
Mission Processor(3) Acoustic/Wi-Fi Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Controls 
Tactical Oversight Computer 





Mission Operator or 
Tactical Oversight 
query vehicle status 
- Tactical Oversight 
Monitors 
Server/Switch 
Magnetic Sensor System 
GPS/Acoustic Navigation 
Beacon 
Sonar Sensor System 
Mission Processor 
Power System 
Mission Operator Computers 
Status Display/Control 
Optical Sensor 
Magnetic Sensor System 











  Tactical Oversight 
Monitors  







Pressure Depth Sensor 
Server Optical Sensors 





Tactical Oversight Computer 







1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle OTH Communication 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Sub Component 
 









Tactical Oversight Computer 























Wi-Fi Radio Acoustic Comm 
Acoustic/Wi-Fi 








Wi-Fi Radio Acoustic Comm 
Acoustic/Wi-Fi 






 Tactical Oversight 
and Pilots monitor 
Vehicle Status 








Tactical Oversight Computer 




Recorder/ Playback Recording System  
Server Mission Processor(3) 
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2. Alternative One Components mapped to Requirements 
Table 51 depicts the Alternative One components mapped to the high level system requirements. 
Table 51. Alternative One System Components Mapped to Requirements 
Table lists System Requirements allocated to system components.  
 MCM Advanced System 
 UUV System OTH 
Comm. 
System 












































































































































































































































X  UA X X X BW M X 
  
 
REQ 2.0: Precise 
Navigation 






Operational Modes  













REQ 5.0: MCM 
Communication 













X X X X X X  









REQ 9.0:  
Detect and Classify 
Mines 
3 3         
 
 
Note: The letter "X" indicates the component affects solving the requirement regardless of alternative.  "UA" 
indicates under water acoustic communication. "M" indicates Multiple Platforms can deploy system.  "BW" 
indicates Buoy Acoustic/Wi-Fi network.  "A" indicates acoustic aided.  "3" indicates there are three independent 
systems performing requirement.  "F" indicates that it is fully autonomous operation.  "T" indicates that it is Tele-
operated.  "W" indicates Wi-Fi Radio. 
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B. ALTERNATIVE TWO MAPPING 
1. Alternative Two Components Mapped to Functions 
Table 52 summarizes the how each component addresses the functions explored in this 
report (search, detect, identify, engage, and communicate).  Table 52 also shows the breakout of 
tasking that is performed by human operators, the MCM ship, and the SPUDS for Alternative 
Two.   
Table 52. Alternative Two Functions Allocated to System Components 
 




1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle 












Pilot, Co-Pilot and 
Tactical Oversight 
Monitors vehicle 
status.  Pilot 
directs/commands 
vehicle 
Computer System  Propulsion System 




Steering Control(s) INS/GPS 
Server DVL 





Pilot, Co-Pilot and 
Tactical Oversight 
Monitors vehicle 
status.  Co-Pilot 
directs vehicle to 
turn on sensors 
TCDL 
Optical Sensor 
(2) Optical Sensors 
Control Panel 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Deploy Magnetic 
Gradiometer 
Pilot, Co-Pilot, & Tactical 
Oversight Computers and 
vehicle Status Displays 






Pilot, Co-Pilot and 
Tactical Oversight 
Monitors vehicle 
status.  Pilot 
directs/commands 
vehicle to follow 
search patterns 
TCDL TCDL 
Control Panel INS/GPS 



















Pilot & Co-Pilot Vehicle 
Computers Status Display 
Mission Processor 
Tactical Oversight 
Computer and tactical map 
Display 
Pressure Depth Sensor 
Create mission 
complete message 
Pilot, Co-Pilot and 
Tactical Oversight 





1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle 
Human Sub Component Sub Component 
FS.7.5 Monitors vehicle 
Monitors Vehicle 
Status on mission 
Server 
Recorder 
Pilot & Co-Pilot Vehicle 
Computers Status Display 
Mission Processor Tactical Oversight 





Pilot, Co-Pilot and 
Tactical Oversight 
Monitors vehicle 
status.  Co-Pilot 
directs vehicle to 
turn OFF sensors 
Server  Optical Sensor 
Recorder Magnetic Sensor System 
Pilot & Co-Pilot Vehicle 
Computers Status Display 
Sonar Sensor System 
Tactical Oversight 

















contact in the area 
FD.1.1 
3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data and 
determine contact 
and passes info to - 
Tactical Oversight  
MA Computer System, 
and Sensor Displays,  
Optical Sensor 
Tactical Oversight 
Computer and tactical map 
Display,  
Magnetic Sensor System 
Recording System Recording System 
Server 
Sonar Sensor System 
Mission Processor 
TCDL TCDL 
Record location of 
contact 
FD.1.2 
Tactical Oversight - 
plots contact on 
tactical map and 
passes information 
onto Host C2 
Tactical Oversight 










3 Mission monitor 
Environmental data  
Co-Pilot monitors 
depth 
MA Computer System, 
and Sensor Displays,  
Pressure Sensor 
Temperature Sensor 
Co-Pilot Computer and 






about detection in 
the area and its 
location 
FD.1.4 
3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data and 
determine contact 
and passes info to - 
Tactical Oversight.  
Tactical oversight 
passes information 




MA Computer System, 
Sensor Displays, and 
controls 
Tactical Oversight 
Computer and tactical map 





1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle 

















MA Computer System, 
















MA Computer System, 










3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data and 
determine contact 
and passes info to - 
Tactical Oversight.  
Tactical oversight 
updates Tactical 
Map and passes 




MA Computer System, 
















is a bottom mine 
FI.3.1 
3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data to to 
determine Mine 
Contact is bottom 




MA Computer System, 








is a moored mine 
FI.3.2 
3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data to 
determine Mine 
Contact is moored 




MA Computer System, 








3 Mission Analysis 







1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle 
Human Sub Component Sub Component 
is a drifting mine 
FI.3.3 
determine Mine 
Contact is a drifting 
mine.  Tactical 
Oversight Monitors 
MA Computer System, 








should be avoided 
FI.3.4 
3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data to 
determine Mine like 
Contact should be 




MA Computer System, 










3 Mission Analysis 
analyze data 
identify Mine like 
Contact and pass it 
to Tactical 
Oversight.  Tactical 
Oversight Updates 
Tactical Map and 
passes information 
to Host C2 
Server 
  
MA Computer System, 



















Tactical Oversight.  
Creates 
Neutralization Plan 
and passes it onto 
Host C2 and Pilots 
Tactical Oversight 






Pilot & Co-Pilot 
Computers Vehicle 
Status/Navigation Display 









Computer and tactical map 
Display,  
INS/GPS 
Pilot & Copilot 
Navigate Vehicle to 
Mines Last Known 
Location 






MA monitor Sensor 
Displays for 
Contact 
MA Computer System, 









1st Level Sub 
function 
Performing System 
Human/Host Platform MCM Vehicle 
Human Sub Component Sub Component 
Server 
Magnetic Sensor System 
Deploy Magnetic 
Gradiometer 





guide vehicle to 
mine monitor 
status.  Tactical 
Oversight Monitors  






Pressure Depth Sensor 






Computer and tactical map 




























TCDL TCDL  







TCDL TCDL  





 Tactical Oversight 
and Pilots monitor 
Vehicle Status 
TCDL TCDL  
Server Mission Processor 













TCDL Recording System 






2. Alternative Two Components Mapped to Requirements 
Table 53 depicts the Alternative Two components mapped to the high level system requirements. 
Table 53. Alternative Two System Components Mapped to Requirements 
 
Table lists System Requirements allocated to system components.  
 MCM Advanced System 
 UUV System OTH 
Comm. 
System 













































































































































































































































X  RDT X X X RDA M RD 1 
 
 
REQ 2.0: Precise 
Navigation 





















REQ 5.0: MCM 
Communication 













X X X X X X  









REQ 9.0:  
Detect and 
Classify Mines 
 1 RDT    RDA  RD 4 
 
 
Note: "X" indicates the component affects solving the requirement regardless of alternative.  "RDT" indicates 
"Radio Data link, Tether Antenna" communication.  "RDA" indicates "Radio Data link - Airborne Platform".  "M" 
indicates "Multiple Platforms" can deploy system.  "T" indicates "Tele-operation" mode of operation.  "1" indicates 
there is one independent system performing requirement.  "4" indicates there are four independent systems 
performing requirement.  "6" indicates there are six independent systems performing requirement. 
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C. ALTERNATIVE THREE MAPPING 
1. Alternative Three Components Mapped to Functions 
Table 54 summarizes the how each component addresses the functions explored in this 
report (search, detect, identify, engage, and communicate).  Table 54 also shows the breakout of 





Table 54. Alternative Three Functions Allocated to System Components 
 



















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 









Enter operational area 
FS.7.1  
Communication Operator 
Monitors and acknowledges 













Position into MCM 
Vehicle 









status back to Host 
Platform that there 















Sonar Sensor Sys 





















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 





Monitors and acknowledges 












Compass VHF/UHF Radio 
Propulsion 
System  






























Monitors and acknowledges 














Optical Sensor Local MCM 
Vehicle Operator 
Commands Vehicle 
to turn off sensors 
 VHF/UHF Radio 
Magnetic Sensor 
Sys Control Panel/Display 




















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 







status back to Host 
Platform that there 













indicating contact in 
the area 
FD.1.1 
4 MA Analyze Data 
Tactical Oversight Monitors 





recorded data from 
vehicle and 
transport it back to 
the MCM host Plat 
form 
 
HP Video Encoder 
Magnetic Sensor 
Sys 
HP MCM Server Recording 
System HP MCM Switch 
MA 
Computer/Display 
Sonar Sensor Sys 
Tactical Oversight 
Computer/Display 
Record location of 
contact 
FD.1.2 
4 MA Analyze Data and 
determine contacts with 
locations 
Tactical Oversight Monitors 
HP MCM Recorder 
Play Back 
      
HP Video Encoder 
HP MCM Server 







4 MA Analyze Data and 
monitor and corrects 
HP MCM Recorder 
Play Back 




















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Human Component 
sensors 
FD.1.3 
Tactical Oversight Monitors HP MCM Server DVL 












Create message about 
a detection in the area 
and its location 
FD.1.4 
4 Mission Analysis analyze 
data and determine contact 
and passes info to - Tactical 
Oversight.  Tactical 
oversight passes information 
on Host Platform C2 and 
updates tactical map 




HP MCM Server 














 Process sensor input 
FC.2.1 
4 Mission Analysis analyze 
data and determine contact 
Tactical Oversight.  
Monitors 




  HP MCM Server 




















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 









4 Mission Analysis analyze 
data and determine if 
contact is Mine-Like of Non 
Mine- like, Tactical 
Oversight.  Monitors 




HP MCM Server 





HP MCM Play Back 
Recorder  
Create message about 
contact classification 
FC.2.3 
4 Mission Analysis 
Operators  analyze data and 
determine contact 
classification and passes 
info to - Tactical Oversight.  
Tactical oversight passes 
information on Host 
Platform C2 and updates 
tactical map 




HP MCM Server 













Determine if mine-like 
contact is a bottom 
mine 
FI.3.1 
4 Mission Analysis 
Operators  analyze data and 
determined if mine-like 
contact is a bottom mine- 
Tactical Oversight.  
monitors 
HP MCM Play Back 
Recorder  
   
HP MCM Server 






















 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Human Component 
Tactical Oversight 
Computer/Display 
Determine if mine-like 
contact is a moored 
mine 
FI.3.2 
4 Mission Analysis 
Operators  analyze data and 
determined if mine-like 
contact is a moored mine- 
Tactical Oversight.  monitor 
HP MCM Play Back 
Recorder  
   
HP MCM Server 





Determine if mine-like 
contact is a drifting 
mine 
FI.3.3 
4 Mission Analysis 
Operators  analyze data and 
determined if mine-like 
contact is a Drifting mine- 
Tactical Oversight.  monitor 
HP MCM Play Back 
Recorder  
   
HP MCM Server 





Determine if mine-like 




determines routes and if 
mines should be avoided 
HP MCM Server 
   
Tactical Oversight 
Computer/Display 
Create message about 
mine identification 
FI.3.5 
4 Mission Analysis analyze 
data identify Mine like 
Contact and pass it to 
Tactical Oversight.  Tactical 
Oversight Updates Tactical 
Map and passes information 
to Host C2 




HP MCM Server 
























 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 
















Tactical Oversight.  Creates 
Neutralization Plan and 








mission from Host 




instructs Local operator 
team on mission 
 
Reacquire 
FE.4.2   
Propulsion 
System MCM Team 
Leader Instructs 
MCM Vehicle 
Operator  to load 
coordinates of 














Position and Mine 
Position into MCM 
Vehicle 
Sonar Sensor Sys 










vehicle to mine and 


































 MCM Vehicle Local Operator 
Human Sub Component Sub Component Human Component 










receives Local operator 
message and passes it to 
Tactical Oversight 









HP MCM Switch 
Tactical Oversight updates 
Tactical Map and passes 
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2. Alternative Three Components Mapped Requirements 
































Table 55. Alternative Three System Components Mapped to Requirements 
 
Table lists System Requirements allocated to system components.  
 
 MCM Advanced System 
 UUV System OTH 
Comm. 
System 










































































































































































































































































REQ 5.0: MCM 
Communication 















X X X X X X  





1 1 RDT X X X  M  
 
X 1 
REQ 9.0:  
Detect and 
Classify Mines 






Note: "X" indicates the component affects solving the requirement regardless of alternative.  "RDT" indicates 
"Radio Data link, Tether Antenna" communication.  "RDA" indicates "Radio Data link - Airborne Platform".  "M" 
indicates "Multiple Platforms" can deploy system.  "R/T" indicates system is a hybrid of Remote Control/Tele-
operated.  "1" indicates there is one independent system performing requirement.  "4 PMA" indicates there are four 
independent systems and personal performing post mission analysis.  "5 PMA" indicates there are five independent 
systems and personal performing post mission analysis. 
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APPENDIX F: MODELING EFFORTS 
A. INITIAL MODELING EFFORTS 
A BOE model was created in Excel as an experiment to determine the starting point for 
the ExtendSIM model that would be used for simulation.  The intention of the initial modeling 
was to test the methods used on the alternative architectures and to use information based on an 
existing system to develop a baseline for comparison.  The MK18 UUV was used as the baseline 
system since performance information was available from the CRD and from results of testing 
performed by JHU (PMS 408, 2011; Pollitt, 2011).  The initial parameters used for the MK18 
UUV BOE model are found in Table 56. 
Table 56. BOE Initial Parameters and Results 
This is a list of the parameters used in the BOE model when using the MK-18 system. 
Parameter Value 
Forward speed 1.5 meters/second or 1.64 yards/second 
Probability of detection and classification 
(PdPc) 
0.75 
Probability of identification (Pi) 0.8 
False Alarm Rate (FAR)  0.15 
Distance between objects in BOE 280 meters 
BOE minefield area 500 meters by 500 meters 
Track width 4 meters 
Number of tracks 125 
Total distance traveled during BOE 63000 meters 
Number of bottom mines 105 
Number of moored mines 45 
Number of non-mines 75 
Time to complete one pass 42000 s or 11.66666667 hours 
Percentage of mines not detected 38% 




The main purpose of the BOE was to verify the initial ExtendSIM simulation results, and 
verify the methods were consistent.  The creation of the BOE and ExtendSIM models were 
performed, before the architectures were defined, to ensure a quick transition into modeling the 
final alternatives.  One assumption made for the MK-18 model includes that the vehicle does not 
stop or loiter over mines during the search.  The model also assumed that the system will follow 
a grid pattern, but the turn radius for the vehicle is not being included. 
 
Each track of the search pattern was decided to be four meters in the BOE.  This pattern 
was influenced by a presentation by George Pollitt (Pollitt, 2011).  The back of the envelope 
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model had the mines evenly distributed along the path, and the order of the mines and objects 
were randomly selected.  The BOE also used an area of 500 by 500 meters as opposed to the 500 
by 500 yards to simplify the initial math.  The distribution of the mines and the size of the field 
were modified for the ExtendSIM model to be consistent with the DRM. 
 
Minefield 1 was created using a uniform random distribution to determine the location of 
both the bottom and moored mines and non-mine objects, and can be seen in Figure 97.  A 
uniform distribution was chosen with the assumptions that over time some mines may move 
based on currents and other factors.  Also, the threat analysis showed that if the mines were 
delivered by aircraft, the minefield pattern would be random with a uniform distribution.  In 
order to have the “most random” minefield, a uniform distribution was chosen.  Since the DRM 
describes a sea floor with a slope of 1˚, the Excel file included a measurement in yards of the 
distance from the surface of the water to the sea floor.  This distance was used to determine the 
distance from the mine hunting system to the bottom mines or non-mine objects.  To further 
develop the model, moored mines should eventually include a measurement for length of tether 
to determine their exact three-dimensional position in the minefield.    
 
 
Figure 97. Minefield 1 
The figure is a two-dimensional graphical representation of Minefield 1 used for the simulations.  The locations of 
objects on the map are to scale; however, the sizes are not.  The stars represent 105 bottom mines, the circles 
represent 45 moored mines and the triangles represent 75 non-mine objects. 
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Minefield 2 was produced as perimeter blocking minefield and with mines placed in lines to 
simulate an individual vehicle dropping mines during a short period of time. The arrangement of 
mines in Minefield 2 is shown in Figure 98.  This minefield has 100 fewer mines than Minefield 
1.  The non-mine objects are the same as those used in Minefield 1 to simulate the same VSW 
area being cleared. 
 
Figure 98. Minefield 2 
The figure is a two-dimensional graphical representation of Minefield 2 used for the simulations.  The locations of 
objects on the map are to scale; however, the sizes are not.  The stars represent 40 bottom mines, the circles 
represent 10 moored mines and the triangles represent 75 non-mine objects. 
 
The input databases for the first ExtendSIM model held the creation time, the minimum 
distance the system was from the mine, and the probability of detection for each of the mines and 






Figure 99. MK-18 ExtendSIM Model 
The figure is a screen shot of the MK18 UUV version of the ExtendSIM model used for simulation.
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A screen shot for the original MK-18 model can be seen in Figure 99.  The model 
handled all the targets in a similar method.  The target, whether a bottom mine, moored mine, or 
non-mine object, was created and assigned a delay.  This delay represents the time the system 
would take to intercept the target.  For the MK18 model it was assumed the system would 
perform the same “mow the grass” pattern as was modeled in the back of the envelope model.  
Based on a 1.5 meters/second rate, the times and distances were calculated in Excel and entered 
into the model‟s database.  The target was then sent into an equation object which reads the 
probability of detection and classification (PdPc) from the database, and uses a uniform 
distributed random value to determine if the object was detected or not.  The equation was used 
to control the value of the probability of detection for each target.  
 
The model was intended to be able to handle various factors such as bottom mine burial, 
or target composition, factors which would directly affect the probability of detection of the 
sensors.  For much of the original model testing a probability of 0.75 was used for PdPc.  That 
model assumes that if a moored mine is detected, identification as a moored mine is certain.  
However, the non-mines and the bottom mines would have ground clutter to interfere with 
detection.  A probability of 0.8 was included as the probability of correct identification (Pid) to 
allow the possibility that the sea-floor-located target may not be identified correctly.  The values 
for PdPc and Pid were taken from the MK-18 CRD as threshold requirement values for future 
system performance (PMS 408, 2011).   
 
If the target was identified as a mine, it was passed to a neutralization subroutine.  The 
neutralization was produced assuming there were three chances to neutralize the mines.  This 
would have allowed the model to handle the possibility of multiple attempts to neutralize the 
mine.  The probability of neutralization (Pn) at each attempt was 0.5.  This was selected since the 
MK18 UUV did not have any neutralization capability and was mainly done as a proof of 
concept for the model, and the values of Pn and the numbers of chances were selected by the 
group.  In the neutralization object a delay was added assuming the MK18 UUV would finish the 
entire minefield before neutralization would occur.  The delay was equal to the time the MK18 
UUV was calculated to transit the entire minefield.  This assumes the theoretical neutralization 
system moves at the same speed as the MK18 UUV, and follows the same path.  After further 
research this portion of the model was removed when the neutralization function was removed 
from the bounded system. 
 
The intention of modeling the MK18 UUV was not to create a highly accurate model of 
the MK18 UUV system, but as a test for the concepts of programming the model and to use as a 
baseline for comparison.  Using the MK18 UUV model, 1000 iterations were performed.   
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For Minefield 1 the results showed on average, 43.73% of the mines remained in the area 
after one pass.  The standard deviation of this percentage is 0.040.  The average time to complete 
one pass of search and neutralization was 79833 seconds with a standard deviation of 364 
seconds, or approximately 22 hours.  The ACR was calculated at 0.002748 n.m.
2
/hr.   
 
For Minefield 2 the average results showed 45.11% of mines remaining in the area after 
one pass, with a standard deviation of 0.070.  The average time to complete one pass of search 
and neutralization was 79260 seconds, with a standard deviation of 270 seconds.  The ACR was 
calculated at 0.002768 n.m.
2
/hr.  Since the pattern of the search did not change between both 
minefields the completion times are similar.  
 
The performance of the model was compared to the values determined for the MK18 
UUV during testing performed by Johns Hopkins University (JHU) as 0.25 km
2
/hr (Pollitt, 
2011).  Converting the JHU value into English units, the value is approximately 0.0726 n.m.
2
/hr.  
Even though there were activities included in our definition of the ACR that were not considered 
in the JHU definition, the difference showed that the track width used in the model was too small 
and caused the ACR to be excessively low. When the track width was increased to 40 yards the 
ACR was calculated as 0.0506 n.m.
2
/hr.  This track width was used for the remainder of the 
modeling.   
 
This initial work provided the framework for the follow-on modeling.  The models were 
modified and showed where some of our assumptions needed to be updated.  However the 














B. MODELING RESULTS 
For each minefield, 1000 runs of the ExtendSIM model were performed on each 
architecture.  Figure 100 displays that for Alternative One there is not a large difference in the 
ACR or the undetected mines metrics between Minefield 1 and Minefield 2.  Since Alternative 
One has such a short time to detect and classify, this permits the ACRs to be similar.  The 
histograms indicate that the data follows a normal distribution.  Table 57 shows the values 
calculated based on the results of the simulations for Architecture One.  This table shows the 
mean ACR for Minefield 1 was 0.0144 n.m.
2
/hr with a standard deviation of 7.43E-05.  For 
Minefield 2 the mean ACR was 0.014333 n.m.
2
/hr with a standard deviation of 7.39E-05.  The 
mean value for undetected mines in Minefield 1 was 0.1 with a standard deviation of 0.024.  For 
Minefield 2 the mean value for undetected mines was 0.1 with a standard deviation of 0.043.    
Table 57. Results from Architecture One 
This table provides the values for the box plots for Architecture One and the standard deviation calculated based on 
1000 runs of the model. 
 




Minefield 2 ACR 
Undetected 
Mines 
Min 0.014173 0.04 Min 0.01404 0 
25th percentile 0.014369 0.086667 25th percentile 0.014283 0.06 
Median 0.014419 0.1 Median 0.014334 0.1 
75th percentile 0.014473 0.12 75th percentile 0.014386 0.12 
Max 0.014639 0.186667 Max 0.014554 0.28 
Mean 0.0144 0.1 Mean 0.014333 0.1 





Figure 100. Modeling Results for Alternative One 
This figure is a quad chart showing the results of the modeling for Architecture One.  Displayed are the distributions of the metrics of ACR and for Undetected 
Mines, in both box chart form and histogram form.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves 
cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median value of the data.
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Figure 101 shows that for Alternative Two the ACR for Minefield 2 is significantly 
higher than in Minefield 1.  This is due to the wide differences in the time to detect and classify.  
Minefield 2 has far fewer mines to observe which would allow the vehicle a faster search time, 
resulting in a higher ACR.  There is no significant difference in the number of mines left 
undetected between the minefields.  Table 58 shows the values calculated based on the results of 
the simulations for Architecture Two.  
Table 58. Results from Architecture Two 
This table provides the values for the box plots for Architecture Two and the standard deviation calculated based on 
1000 runs of the model. 
 




Minefield 2 ACR 
Undetected 
Mines 
Min 0.00289 0.113 Min 0.00502 0.04 
25th percentile 0.00318 0.18 25th percentile 0.00564 0.16 
Median 0.00326 0.2 Median 0.00580 0.2 
75th percentile 0.00333 0.227 75th percentile 0.00599 0.24 
Max 0.00358 0.313 Max 0.00677 0.38 
Mean 0.00325 0.2 Mean 0.00581 0.2 






Figure 101. Modeling Results for Alternative Two 
This figure is a quad chart showing the results of the modeling for Alternative Two.  Displayed are the distributions of the metrics of ACR and for Undetected 
Mines, in both box chart form and histogram form. The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves 
cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th




Figure 102 shows similar results to Figure 101 for Alternative Three in that the ACR is 
controlled by the amount of time it takes to detect and classify the mines.  Table 59 shows the 
values calculated based on the results of the simulations for Architecture Three.  
Table 59. Results from Architecture Three 
This table provides the values for the box plots for Architecture Three and the standard deviation calculated based 
on 1000 runs of the model. 
 




Minefield 2 ACR 
Undetected 
Mines 
Min 0.00246 0.133 Min 0.00372 0.06 
25th percentile 0.00262 0.193 25th percentile 0.00413 0.195 
Median 0.00267 0.213 Median 0.00422 0.24 
75th percentile 0.00273 0.24 75th percentile 0.00431 0.26 
Max 0.00291 0.327 max 0.00466 0.44 
Mean 0.00267 0.215 Mean 0.00422 0.231 






Figure 102. Modeling Results for Alternative Three 
This figure is a quad chart showing the results of the modeling for Alternative Three.  Displayed are the distributions of the metrics of ACR and for Undetected 
Mines, in both box chart form and histogram form.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves 
cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median value of the data.
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After the initial results were reviewed, the effect that ordered speed of the vehicle had on 
the ACR was explored and evaluated to determine if it was possible to significantly raise the 
ACR by increasing vehicle speed.  The effect of vehicle speed verses sensor performance was 
unknown, and it was assumed that there would be no degradation in sensor performance at the 
increased travel speed.  Because the main portion of the modeling concerned a vehicle traveling 
at 1.64 y/s, with a 2.5 knot current, a baseline simulation was performed to judge how the vehicle 
traveling at 1.64 y/s with no current would perform.  Once complete, the current was returned to 
the same value and direction the base model used.  This value was 2.5 knot current at 10˚.  The 
ordered speed was increased from 1.64 y/s,which is 2.9122 knots, to 3 knots.  The simulation 
was also performed at speeds of 4 knots, 5 knots and 6 knots.   
 
Figure 103, Figure 104, and Figure 105 show the results of increasing the search speed on 
the alternative architectures.  Figure 103 shows for Alternative One, the number of undetected 
mines are not affected by the search speed; however, the ACR at 3 knots is lower than the higher 
speed values.  The results show if the ordered speed is too close to the speed of the current, the 
ACR suffers.  They also show that once the problem of the current is overcome by increasing 
speed, the amount of time to perform the detect and classify functions starts to override any 
improvement caused by an increase in speed. 
 
Figure 104 shows the ordered speed does not have any significant affect on the ACR for 
Alternative Two.  This is probably due to the large detect and classify time.  It was concluded it 
did not matter how fast or slow the vehicle moved through the minefield, and speed does not 
change the ACR.  In general, to improve the ACR a reduction in the time to detect and classify is 
required. 
 
Figure 105 shows there is a slight improvement as speed goes up for Alternative Three.  
Since Alternative  Three‟s search is recorded and the data must be downloaded before PMA is 





Figure 103. Speed Sensitivity for Alternative One 
This figure shows the results from the sensitivity modeling for Architecture One.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values 
calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median value of the data. 
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Figure 104. Speed Sensitivity for Alternative Two 
This figure shows the results from the sensitivity modeling for Alternative Two.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values 
calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th





Figure 105. Speed Sensitivity for Alternative Three 
This figure shows the results from the sensitivity modeling for Alternative Three.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values 
calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th





The sensitivity analysis was continued by reviewing the affect the time to detect and 
classify had on the ACR.  As can be seen with the analysis performed on the ordered speed of the 
vehicle the time to detect and classify had the most significant effect on the ACR.  This analysis 
was performed by selecting 3 mean times and 3 standard deviations to use in combination.  The 
first mean time that was selected was time used for Alternative One, which was 60 s.  This time 
was then doubled resulting in the second time of 120 s, which was doubled to give the final time 
of 240 s.  This process was repeated for the standard deviations.  The standard deviations were 
selected as 20 s, 40 s, and 80 s.  This resulted in 9 combinations for each alternative which 
produced a total of 27 combinations.  1000 simulation runs were performed for each 
combination.  The results for Alternative One can be seen in Figure an increase in the standard 
deviation causes the box plot of the ACR to become wider.  This means that if two alternatives 
are close in the mean time to detect and classify, there will be less chance the two alternatives 
would be statistically different.  The results also show that as the mean time is doubled, the ACR 
is reduced by less than half the value.  As the mean time to detect and classify gets larger the 
affect approaches half.  This is due to the models keeping the time to navigate the minefield 
constant in this analysis.  As the time to detect and classify increases the affect of the time to 
navigate becomes less significant.  
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Figure 106. Alternative One:  Time to Detect and Classify Sensitivity 
This figure shows the results from performing a sensitivity analysis of the time to detect and classify. The error bars 
on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 
percentile to the 75
th
 percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median value of the data. 
   
The results for Alternative Two and Three showed the models behaved in a similar 
fashion.  The results for Alternative Two can be seen in Figure 107, and the results for 
Alternative Three can be seen in Figure 108. 
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Figure 107. Alternative Two:  Time to Detect and Classify Sensitivity 
This figure shows the results from performing a sensitivity analysis of the time to detect and classify.  The error bars 
on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 
percentile to the 75
th
 percentile.  Where the boxes change color shows the median value of the data. 
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Figure 108. Alternative Three:  Time to Detect and Classify Sensitivity 
This figure shows the results from performing a sensitivity analysis of the time to detect and classify.  The error bars 
on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves cover the 25
th
 
percentile to the 75
th


















In order to see how each of the alternatives compared to each other, the results were also 
graphed at each mean time to detect and classify.  It was discovered that with a mean of 60 s 
with a standard deviation of 20 s, the ACR for all alternatives was statistically different.  As 
either the standard deviation or the mean time was increased, the ACR for Alternative One and 
Alternative Two became statistically similar using the same mean and standard deviation.  For 
all combinations of means and standard deviations, Alternative Three had a lower ACR.  Figure 
109 shows the results for the mean time set at 60 s.  This shows that only at the 20 s standard 
deviation Alternative One and Two are significantly different.  As the standard deviation 
increases this significance is reduced. 
 
Figure 109. 60 s Mean Time to Detect and Classify sensitivity 
This figure shows the performance of the alternatives when the mean time to detect and classify is set to 60 seconds.  
The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes themselves cover 
the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th






Figure 110 continues to show that as the mean time is increased to 120 s, Alternative One 
and Two are almost identical.  This trend can also be seen in Figure 111 for the 240 s mean time.  
This trend can be explained because the functions of detect and classify are performed during the 
mission rather than after the system is recovered.  If the mean times were identical then the ACR 
would become identical; however, the effects of communicating with the SPUDS over the 
horizon would increase.  The reason Alternative Three has a lower ACR is due to the need for 




Figure 110. 120 s Mean Time to Detect and Classify sensitivity 
This figure shows the performance of the alternatives when the mean time to detect and classify is set to 120 
seconds.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes 
themselves cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th




Figure 111. 240 s Mean Time to Detect and Classify sensitivity 
This figure shows the performance of the alternatives when the mean time to detect and classify is set to 240 
seconds.  The error bars on the box plots show the minimum and the maximum values calculated; the boxes 
themselves cover the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
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APPENDIX G: ALTERNATIVE COST BREAKDOWNS 
A. ALTERNATIVE ONE COST BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
Figure 112 illustrates the cost breakdown structure for the R&D phase shown at the 3
rd 
level for Alternative One. 
 
Figure 112. Alternative One R&D Phase Cost Breakdown Structure 
CBS for MCM Alternative One.  Costs (shown in $K) for R&D phase are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal years and overall phase 
of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 113. Alternative One Acquisition/Production/Construction Cost Breakdown 
CBS for MCM Alternative One.  Costs (shown in $K) for Acquisition/Production/Construction are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal 
years and overall phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 114. Alternative One O&S and Disposal Phases Cost Breakdown Structure 
CBS for MCM Alternative One.  Costs (shown in $K) for O&S and Disposal phases are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal years and 
overall phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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B. ALTERNATIVE TWO COST BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
Figure 115 illustrates the cost breakdown structure for the R&D phase shown at the 3
rd 
level for Alternative Two. 
 
Figure 115. Alternative Two R&D Phase Cost Breakdown Structure 
CBS for MCM Alternative Two.  Costs (shown in $K) for R&D phase are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal years and overall phase 
of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 116. Alternative Two Acquisition/Production/Construction Cost Breakdown 
CBS for MCM Alternative Two.  Costs (shown in $K) for Acquisition/Production/Construction are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective 
fiscal years and overall phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 117. Alternative Two O&S and Disposal Phases Cost Breakdown Structure 
CBS for MCM Alternative Two.  Costs (shown in $K) for Acquisition/Production/Construction are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective 
fiscal years and overall phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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C. ALTERNATIVE THREE COST BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
Figure 118 illustrates the cost breakdown structure for the R&D phase shown at the 3
rd 
level for Alternative Three. 
 
Figure 118. Alternative Three R&D Phase Cost Breakdown Structure 
CBS for MCM Alternative Three.  Costs (shown in $K) for R&D phase are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal years and overall 
phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 119. Alternative Three Acquisition/Production/Construction Breakdown 
CBS for MCM Alternative Three.  Costs (shown in $K) for Acquisition/Production/Construction are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective 
fiscal years and overall phase of the program.  Likewise, total cost for each phase is provided. 
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Figure 120. Alternative Three O&S and Disposal Phases Cost Breakdown 
CBS for MCM Alternative Three.  Costs (shown in $K) for O&S and Disposal phases are broken down to the third level and totaled for respective fiscal years 














































APPENDIX H: DEFINITIONS 
Table 60 provides further explanation for terms used throughout the report. 
Table 60. Definitions List 
Table lists key terms that require definition to assist in the understanding. 
 
Advance Task Force 
A temporary organization which precedes the main body to 
the objective area, for preparing the objective for the main 
assault by conducting such operations as reconnaissance, 
seizure of supporting positions, mine countermeasures, 
preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air 
support. 
Amphibious Assault 
Amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious 
operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or 
potentially hostile shore.  Only amphibious assault involves 
the permanence of establishing a LF ashore.  The special 
measures required for a rapid build-up of combat power 
ashore, from an initial zero capability, creates organizational 
and technical differences between amphibious operations 
and land warfare. 
Amphibious Force 
An amphibious force is a naval force and Landing Force, 
together with supporting forces that are trained, organized 
and equipped for amphibious operations.  In naval usage, it 
is the administrative type command of a fleet (i.e., national 
amphibious capability. 
Amphibious Task Force 
(ATF) 
An ATF is the task organization formed for the purpose of 
conducting an amphibious operation.  An ATF always 
includes navy forces and a Landing Force (LF), with their 
organic aviation and supporting forces. 
Area Coverage Rate 
Area of concern searched by a single vehicle divided by the 
time to achieve 100% coverage of the objective area by the 
search sensor suite.  This parameter applies to open water 
areas in non-complex environments where the system can 
operate in parallel tracks at optimum speed for sensors 
employed, unencumbered by obstacles (e.g. piers, pilings, 
other man-made structures, complex bottom types, etc.).  In 
the diverse configurations and environments characteristic 
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of coastal areas (e.g. pier/berthing areas, etc.), irregular 
search patterns and tactics may be required to achieve Pd/Pc 
and Pi performance against characteristic threat objects.  
Characterization of ACR for different environments is 
desirable; however these are performance measures for 
tactical employment of the system.  ACR may require 
tradeoff in the more complex environments and confined 
areas; hence, a system level threshold value for ACR for all 
possible environments is not appropriate. 
Area Of Operation 
An operational area defined by the joint force commander 
for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to 
accomplish their missions and protect their forces. 
Biomimetic Sonar 
It is adaptive mobile sonar normally located on a robot arm 
that moves in response to the echo time of flights to position 
an object along the transmitter axis at a known range and 
elevation to maximize the incident acoustic energy.  The 
system employs a learning stage followed by a recognition 
stage.   
Boat lane 
A lane for amphibious assault landing craft, which extends 
seaward from the landing beaches to the line of departure.  
The width of a boat lane is determined by the length of the 
corresponding beach.  The current typical length is from 
2000 to 2700 yards.  The width is 500 yards. 
Clandestine Operations 
It is an intelligence or military operation carried out in such 
a way that the operation goes unnoticed. 
Classify 
A term used to indicate the MCM vehicle has classified the 
mine contact as a bottom mine, moored mine, or drifting 
mine.  The detected contact is further investigated, usually 
with a higher resolution sonar, and classified as a (Mine 
Like Contact) MILC or (None Mine Object) NOMBO. 
Detect 
A term used to indicate the Mine Counter Measure Vehicle 
detects a mine-like object.  The object may or may not be a 
mine. 
False Alarm Rate 
The False alarm rate is the number of times the MCM 
vehicle incorrectly detects and classifies a "Non-Mine-Like 
Object".  It is defined by: (Number of Non-Mine-like 
objects detected /Number on non-mine-like opportunities) X 
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(Number of non-mine-like objects incorrectly 
classified/number of non-mine-like objects detected). 
Fully Autonomous 
This is a mode of operation of an unmanned system (UMS) 
wherein the UMS is expected to accomplish its mission, 
within a defined scope, without human intervention.  Note 
that a team of UMSs may be fully autonomous while the 
individual team members may not be due to the needs to 
coordinate during the execution of team missions. 
HRI 
Human-robot interactions are the human robot interfaces 
and interactions. 
Identify 
Identify is a term used to indicate the MCM vehicle 
identifies the mine-like contact as a mine or not a mine.  
Identification should be made using an optical system so 
that a positive ID of the mine can be made.  This prevents 
expenditure of neutralization efforts and charges on 
nonthreatening objects.  It also keeps the MCM forces from 
assuming. 
Landing Force (LF) 
A LF is the task organization of ground units assigned to an 
amphibious operation, which may include aviation and/or 
surface units when assigned to Commander Landing Force 
(CLF). 
Line of Sight (LOS) 
Refers to electro-magnetic radiation or acoustic wave 
propagation.  Electromagnetic transmission includes light 
emissions traveling in a straight line.  The rays or waves 
may be diffracted, refracted, reflected, or absorbed by 
atmosphere and obstructions with material and generally 
cannot travel OTH or behind obstacles. 
Littoral Penetration 
Points 
An LPP is a point within an LPS where the actual transition 
from waterborne/over-water movement (“feet wet”) to 
overland (“feet dry”) movement occurs. 
Littoral Penetration Site 
An LPS is a continuous segment of coastline through which 
landing forces cross by surface or vertical means. 
Locate 
Locate is a term to indicate the MCM vehicle has 
determine/processed and stored the location of the mine or 
mine-like contact to be used for future processing.  The 
contact position is refined and plotted as precisely as 
possible (specifying navigation sensor, datum, and position 
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in latitude/longitude to a thousandth of a minute) so that 
further prosecution can be carried out either immediately or 
at a later time.  MCM forces use the WGS-84 datum as 
measured by GPS P-code as the standard reference system. 
Neutralization 
The mine is either rendered inoperative or removed from the 
area. 
NOMBO 
Non-Mine Bottom Object is an object on the bottom of the 
water that appears to be a mine.  However, it is a Non-Mine. 
Over-The-Horizon 
(OTH) 
At is an amphibious operation initiated from beyond visual 
and radar range of the enemy shore. 
Reacquire 
Reacquire is the act of a MCM vehicle finding a mine again 
after it has gone off to perform another mission such as 
search. 
Remote Control 
A mode of operation of a Unmanned system (UMS) wherein 
the human operator, without benefit of video or other 
sensory feedback, directly controls the actuators of the UMS 
on a continuous basis, from off the vehicle and via a 
tethered or radio linked control device using visual line-of 
sight cues.  In this mode, the UMS takes no initiative and 
relies on continuous or nearly continuous input from the 
user. 
Sea State 
It is the general condition of the free surface on a large body 
of water with respect to wind waves and swells.  A sea state 
is characterized by statistics, including the wave height, 
period, and power spectrum. 
Semi-Autonomous 
A mode of operation of an Unmanned system (UMS) 
wherein the human operator and/or the UMS plan(s) and 
conduct(s) a mission that requires various levels of human-
robot interaction (HRI). 
Supervisor 
A supervisor is an agent that has supervisory control over a 
subordinate agent(s); it will intermittently reprogram its 
subordinates, using information that it has gathered from the 
environment or taken from the subordinate agents.  As for 
all agents, a supervisor can be human or artificial, without 
restriction. 
Supervisory Control 
The notion of supervisory control is as follows: supervisory 
control is where one or more operators are intermittently 
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programming and receiving information from an artificial 
intelligent agent. 
Tele-operation 
A mode of operation of a Unmanned system (UMS) wherein 
the human operator, using video feedback and/or other 
sensory feedback, either directly controls the actuators or 
assigns incremental goals, waypoints in mobility situations, 
on a continuous basis, from off the vehicle and via a 
tethered or radio linked control device. In this mode, the 
UMS may take limited initiative in reaching the assigned 
incremental goals. 
UXO 
Unexploded explosive ordnance – is an explosive ordnance 
that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared 
for action, that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, 
or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to 
operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains 
unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other 
cause.  Sensor systems related to these munitions have the 
capability to detect, identify, and select specific targets 
using infrared, proximity, magnetic influence, acoustic, and 
seismic technologies which can be encountered on land or 
sea.  Attempts to approach and perform a render-safe 














































LIST OF SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAV   Amphibious Assault Vehicles  
ACR   Area Coverage Rate 
AGS   Advanced Gun System 
ALMDS  Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
AMCM  Airborne Mine Counter Measures 
AMNS   Airborne Mine Neutralization System 
AO   Area of Operation 
ASCM   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASROC  Anti-Submarine Rocket 
ATF   Advance Task Force 
ATR   Automatic Target Recognition 
AUV   Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
BIT   Built in Test 
BOE   Back-of-the-Envelope 
BULS   Bottom Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Localization System 
BZ   Beach Zone 
C2   Command and Control 
C4I   Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
CAS   Close Air Support 
CARSTRKGRU Carrier Strike Group 
CG   Commanding General 
CV   Carrier 
COBRA  Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
CMCO  Countermine Counter-Obstacle 
CMS   Countermine Systems 
CRD   Consolidated Requirements Document 
DESRON  Destroyer Squadron 
DET   Detachment 
DDG   Destroyer 
DRM   Design Reference Mission 
DVIS   Diver Visual Information System 
DTE    Detect to Engage  
EA   Electronic Attack 
EFFBD  Enhanced Functional Flow Body Diagram 
EFV   Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
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EM   Electromagnetic 
EMI   Electromagnetic Impulse 
EODMU  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobil Unit 
EOD   Explosive Ordinance Disposal 
EUNS   Expeditions Underwater Neutralization System 
FFG   Fast Frigate 
FLS/DLS  Forward Looking Sonar / Down Looking Sonar 
FSW   Feet of Sea Water 
I-IPT   Interoperability Integrated Product Team 
JABS   Joint Assault Breaching System  
JDAM   Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JHSV   Joint High Speed Vessel 
KTs   Knots 
LCAC   Landing Craft Air Cushion  
LCC   Amphibious Command Ship 
LCM/LCU  Landing Craft Mechanized and Utility 
LCS   Littoral Combat Ship 
LHA   Amphibious Assault Ship 
LIDAR  Light Detection and Ranging System 
LPP   Littoral Penetration Point 
LPD   Amphibious Transport Dock 
LSD   Landing Ship Dock 
LST   Landing Ship Tank 
MCM   Mine Countermeasures 
MCCDC  Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
MEB   Marine Expeditionary Brigade  
MK   Mark 
MLP   Mobile Landing Platform 
MMS   Marine Mammals System 
MODS   Mine Obstacle Defeat System (MODS) 
MOE   Measure of Effectiveness 
MTBF   Mean Time Between Failure 
MTTR   Mean Time To Repair 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGFS   Naval Gun Fire System 
NGS   Naval Gun Support 
NMMP  Navy Marine Mammal Program 
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NOMBO  Non-Mine Bottom Objects 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
OAMCM   Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasure  
OASIS   Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep 
ONR   Office of Naval Research 
OTH   Over The Horizon 
PMA   Post Mission Analysis 
PMS   Project Management Ship 
RAMICS  Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System 
RPA   Remote Pilot Aircraft 
RPV   Remote Pilot Vehicle 
SMCM  Surface Mine Counter Measures 
SoS   System of Systems 
SS   Sea State 
SSC   Ship to Shore Connector 
STIL   Streak Tube Imaging Laser 
STOM   Ship to Objective Movement 
SZ   Shallow Zone  
TA   Target Acquisition 
TASM   Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile 
TBD   To Be Determined 
TLAM   Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
TMD   Tactical Munition Dispenser 
TOC   Total Ownership Costs 
TPED   Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, And Distribution 
UBA   Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
UIS   Underwater Imaging System 
UMCM  Underwater Mine Countermeasures  
UMS   Unmanned system 
UUV   Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
UV   Underwater Vehicle 
UXO   Unexploded Ordnance 
VSW   Very Shallow Water 
VTUAV  Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle  
WSESRB  Weapon System Explosive Safety Review Board  
WWII   World War II 
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